SCOTTISH JOURNAL
of
THEOLOGY

Vol. 14, *No.* 1 *March* 1961

EDITORS:
REV. PROFESSOR T. F. TORRANCE
REV. PROFESSOR J. K. S. REID

OLIVER & BOYD LTD.
EDINBURGH: TWEEDDALE COURT
LONDON: 39A WELBECK STREET, W.1.

SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Published Quarterly

Editors:

Rev. Prof. T. F. Torrance, M.B.E., D.D., D.Theol.,
21 South Oswald Road, Edinburgh, 9 (Telephone 46114)

Rev. Prof. J. K. S. Reid, D.D.,
44 Headingley Mount, Leeds, 6 (Telephone 56853)

Consulting Editors:

Rev. Principal J. H. S. Burleigh, D.D., B.Litt.
Chairman of Directors

Rev. Prof. David Cairns, D.D.

Rev. Prof. N. W. Porteous, D.D.

Rev. Prof. A. M. Hunter, Ph.D., D.Phil., D.D.

Directors:

The above-named together with

Rev. Prof. E. P. Dickie, M.C., D.D.
Rev. J. Heron, B.D., S.T.M.
Rev. Stewart Mechie, D.D.
Rev. T. M. Murchison, M.A.
Rev. J. A. McFadden, B.D.
Rev. J. W. Stevenson, M.A.
Rev. J. B. Torrance, B.D.
Rev. R. S. Wallace, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.
Rev. D. B. Thomson, M.A., M.Th., *Secretary*

CONTRIBUTIONS are invited from members of all branches of the Christian Church.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE—MSS and Books for review should be sent to one of the Editors.

BUSINESS CORRESPONDENCE should be sent to the Registered Office.

PRICE: Six Shillings and Sixpence (U.S.A. and CANADA $1.00) per copy, post free.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: Twenty-four Shillings, post free. (U.S.A. and and CANADA $4.00.)

PUBLISHED BY OLIVER AND BOYD FOR SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY LTD.

Registered Office: TWEEDDALE COURT, EDINBURGH, 1

CONTENTS

PAGE

JONATHAN EDWARDS' CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL, by W. P. Jeanes, Waco, Texas 1

THE CHURCH AND THE HISTORICAL JESUS, by the Rev. Professor William Nicholls, Winnipeg 15

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE WORD OF GOD, by the Rev. William G. Young, Gujrat, Pakistan 34

DEATH AND LIFE IN CHRIST, by the Rev. Ronald Berry, B.D., Washington, N. Ireland 60

BOOK REVIEWS:

Austin Farrer: *The Freedom of the Will*, by the Rev. J. Heywood Thomas, Manchester 77

W. A. Whitehouse: *Order, Goodness, Glory*, by the Rev. Principal H. Cunliffe-Jones, Manchester 79

E. J. Tinsley: *The Imitation of God in Christ*, by the Rev. Principal H. Cunliffe-Jones, Manchester 80

John Knox: *Jesus Lord and Christ*, by the Rev. Professor Daniel Deegan, Portland, Oregon 81

Lindsay Dewar: *The Holy Spirit and Christian Thought*, by Dr J. A. B. Holland, Edinburgh 87

E. Jenni: *Die politischen Voraussagen der Propheten*, by the Rev. Professor James Barr, Edinburgh 89

Daniel Lys: *Nèphèsh, Histoire de l'Âme dans la Révélation d'Israël, au sein des Religions Proche-Orientales*, by the Rev. Professor G. A. F. Knight, Chicago 91

C. E. B. Cranfield: *The Gospel according to Saint Mark*, by the Rev. Professor James S. Stewart, Edinburgh 94

Kendrick Grobel: *The Gospel of Truth*, by the Rev. Dr R. McL. Wilson, St. Andrews 96

Alf Corell: *Consummatum Est: Eschatology and Church in the Gospel of St. John*, by the Rev. H. P. Owen, Bangor 99

R. W. Muncey (ed.): *The New Testament Text of St. Ambrose*, by the Rev. Dr Ian A. Moir, Balquhidder 100

Bonifatius Fischer: *Vetus Latina*; *Die Alkuin-Bibel*, by the Rev. Dr Peter Katz, Cambridge 102

Henry Chadwick: *The Circle and the Ellipse*, by the Rev. Canon E. Evans, Hellifield 103

John Crew Tyler: *The Blind Seer: George Matheson*, by the Rev. Dr Erik Routley, Edinburgh 104

Keetje Rosemond: *La Christologie de Saint Jean Damascène*, by the Rev. Canon E. Evans, Hellifield 105

Peter Hinchliff: *The South African Liturgy*, by the Rev. Professor William D. Maxwell, Grahamstoun 105

W. Jardine Grisbrooke: *Anglican Liturgies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, by the Rev. Dr John A. Lamb, Edinburgh 106

Noële M. Denis-Boulet: *The Christian Calendar*; Irénée-Henri Dalmais: *The Eastern Liturgies*, by the Rev. Dr John A. Lamb, Edinburgh 108

A. C. Bouquet: *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions*, by the Rev. Kenneth MacKenzie, Edinburgh 108

BOOKS RECEIVED 112

IN THIS ISSUE

Articles on Free Will
the Church and the Historical Jesus
the Holy Spirit and the Word of God

The Biblical Study is on 2 Cor. 5—Death and Life in Christ

Among the reviews are works on
Free Will
the Imitation of Christ
Jesus as Lord and Christ
the Holy Spirit
Prophecy
the Gnostic Gospel of Truth

JONATHAN EDWARDS' CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL

by W. P. JEANES

THE year 1958 marked the two-hundredth anniversary of the death of the celebrated Puritan divine, Jonathan Edwards. Edwards stands out as the one figure of real greatness in the intellectual life of colonial America. He was born, bred, and passed his whole life on the verge of civilisation; yet he has made his voice heard wherever men have concerned themselves with that great topic—God's sovereignty and the human will. We shall consider, in spite of twentieth-century philosophical prejudice, his most important piece of scholarship—*Freedom of the Will.*

'Tis not unlikely, that some who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the 'fate' of the heathen, 'Hobbes' neccessity', and 'making men mere machines'; accumulating the terrible epithets of 'fatal', 'unfrustrable', 'inevitable', 'irresistible', etc. and it may be, with addition of 'horrid' and 'blasphemous'; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those who have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination. Or difficulties may be stated and insisted on which don't belong to the controversy; because, let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to anything distinguishing of this scheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemptuous words; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and insult.[1]

In all discussions concerning sin and grace, the metaphysical and moral question of human responsibility must be

[1] Jonathan Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 430-1.

disposed of. The controversy between Edwards and the Arminians concerns this point: may the act of free agents be rendered inevitably certain without destroying their liberty?

Before proceeding to give an outline of Edwards' arguments in support of this doctrine, it is important to state the meaning of the words he employs.

The word *will* itself is one of those confused terms upon which Edward imposes a double meaning. He states that a 'perfect definition of the will, to say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses . . .'.[1] The 'will' includes 'approving, disapproving, liking, disliking . . . inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased'. Then Edwards advocates a theory, which is applicable only to the will in the restricted sense, as that faculty by which we decide on our acts (purposes and volitions).

Edwards' usual definition of *motive* is in the subjective sense, for those inward inclinations which are in the mind itself.

> By 'motive', I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.[2]

It is only in this sense of the term that the will is determined by the 'strongest motive'. But even here we must admit that we have no standard by which to determine the relative strength of motives other than their actual effect. To say that the will is determined by the 'strongest motive' only means that it is not self-determined.

Edwards says, 'I mean by cause, I assert, that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that *begin to be*, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves.'[3] His simple meaning is that motives are the reasons which determine the agent's assertion of his will in one way rather than in another.

Ambiguity arises when confronted by these expressions, 'the will is free', and 'the agent is free'. As Edwards speaks of freedom of the will, he means that man is as free as his will. Thus man is free and justly accountable for his conduct, while his will is dependent upon 'some external motive, or internal

[1] Edwards, op. cit., p. 137. [2] ibid., p. 141. [3] ibid., p. 181.

habitual bias'.[1] 'Or in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills,'[2] does not make him independent of himself or his faculties.

The most fruitful source of confusion on this subject is *liberty* and *ability*. The Arminians' undemonstrated hypothesis of the self-determined sinfulness of each man, and his ability at any moment to choose either good or evil is a radical departure from the Scriptural doctrine of original sin.

> . . . the will is the proper, adequate and immediate cause of sin, and has two motives and incentives to commit sin, the one internal, the other external. *The internal*, which lies in man himself, is the love of himself and a concupiscence or lusting after temporal things, or of the blessings which are visible. *The external* motive is an object moving the appetite or desire; such objects are honors, riches, pleasures, life, health and soundness, friends, country, and similar things, the contraries to which man hates and execrates, and is afraid of them, if he imagine them to be impending over him. But these motives do not move the will so efficaciously that the will is necessarily moved; for, in this case, the will would be excusable from sin; but they move the will through the mode of suasion and enticement.[3]

On the other hand, Edwards distinguishes between liberty before and after the fall of man. Before the fall, man had the ability either to sin or not to sin; after the fall, man has had liberty to sin, but not to do good.

> The case with man was plainly this: when God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the *nature of man*, in which his love to his liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exercised; these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call *flesh*. Besides these, there were *superior* principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the *divine nature*. . . . When man sinned, and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God, on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house.[4]

[1] ibid., p. 164. [2] ibid., p. 163.

[3] 'A Letter on the Sin Against the Holy Ghost', *The Writings of James Arminius*, trans. James Nichols (3 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 525-6.

[4] 'The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended', *The Works of President Edwards* (4 vols.; New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1881), Vol. II, pp. 476-7.

Jonathan Edwards is constantly represented as denying that volitions are self-determining, or that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts, or that man is an agent, because he wrote against the self-determining power of the will as taught by Clarke and Whitby. These two things are really distinct; for, when we say that an agent is self-determined, we mean that he is the author of his own acts and that the reasons of his determinations are within himself. Edwards fastens chance or design *in infinitum* upon a will that 'determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act . . . but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest be not free, none of them all can be free'.[1]

If misunderstanding is to be forestalled, one must consider the points upon which both sides of this controversy are in agreement:

1. They are agreed that man is a free moral agent.

2. They acknowledge that a free agent is the author of his own acts.

3. They admit that no rational volition is ever arrived at except under the influence of motives.

4. They assume that the word *will* is to be taken in its restricted sense (concerns volitions alone). This same problem has again and again baffled the theologians and philosophers—whether the will, or rather the agent, in order to be free, must be undetermined. Edwards postulates that 'you are free to do what you can do, but you are not free to do what you won't do'.[2]

Jonathan Edwards advocates that view of free agency which is able to find no difference in the liberty of spheres of free being, whether God, Christ, or man before the fall. To deny free agency to God would be to reject His personality and to reduce Him to a mere power or principle. But if it be argued as 'Dr Whitby, and some other Arminians, mak(ing) a distinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a state of trial',[3] then Edwards refers one to the case of our Lord.

[1] Edwards, op. cit., p. 172.

[2] Perry Miller, *Jonathan Edwards* ('The American Men of Letters Series'; New York: William Sloane Assoc., 1949), p. 258.

[3] Edwards, op. cit., p. 203n.

And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy; because his will was not free *ad utrumque*, to either holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this account, there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies . . . that 'virtue', when applied to these things 'is but an empty name'; that there was no merit in any of these things; that is, that Christ was 'worthy' of nothing at all on the account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honor or respect from God or man; because his will was not indifferent, and free either to these things, or the contrary; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it *impossible* that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account (to use Dr Whitby's language) 'it would be sensibly unreasonable' that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things![1]

A second argument is derived from the foreknowledge of God as taught in the Scriptures. Whatever metaphysical explanation may be given to this divine attribute; however one may ignore the distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge, or however one may contend that God inhabits eternity and is in no wise subject to the limitations of time and that, to Him, nothing is successive, still the fact remains that man exists in time and that, to him, there is a future as well as a present. To deny the divine knowledge of God—'on the supposition of God's ignorance of the future volitions of free agents, it will follow, that God must in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly to wish he had done otherwise; by reason that the event of things, in those affairs which are most important, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was aware beforehand'[2]—is to destroy the idea of an omniscient God (obviously this statement presupposes the distinction between God's revealed standard for mankind in the Scriptures which is often thwarted, while His divine plan is never frustrated). Yet if the advocates of a self-determining will do not oppose the doctrine of foreknowledge, then that is all Edwards needs:

God's certain foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future existing: but if future existence be

[1] Edwards, op. cit., pp. 290-1. [2] ibid., p. 253.

firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then he sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.[1]

Thus for Edwards the foreknowledge of God renders an event absolutely certain. The whole difficulty is in its being certain; and that must be admitted, or one supposes that free acts are uncertain and not known to an omniscient God. Edwards concludes his argument from the Scriptures by noting that foreknowledge supposes certainty, that foreordination determines it, and that providence effects it. Would anyone, because he is not able to comprehend how God can effectually govern free agents without destroying their freedom, give up the doctrine of providence? Who would wish to see the reins of the universe fall from the hands of Infinite Wisdom and Love to be seized by chance or fate?

Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is not inconsistent with a determining disposal of all events, of every kind, throughout the universe, in his providence; either by positive efficiency, or permission. Indeed such an *universal, determining providence*, infers some kind of necessity of all events; such a necessity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of the event. . . .[2]

A third argument is derived from the moral character of volition. A man is responsible for his external acts because they are decided by his will; he is responsible for his volitions because they are determined by his principles and feelings; he is also responsible for his principles and feelings because they constitute his character, even if inherently evil. If he detaches the outward act from the will, then he ceases to be a morally responsible character.

. . . a person's being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing these two things: (1) His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. (2) His pleasure's being wrong. Or in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion; a person's having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the sum of the matter.[3]

Edwards' doctrine that the will is determined and not self-

[1] Edwards, op. cit., p. 265. [2] ibid., p. 431. [3] ibid., p. 357.

determined is involved in the rational character of our acts. For him, a rational act is not merely an act of a rational being but is performed for a reason—and so long as man's acts are determined by his volitions and by his own reason and feelings, he has all the liberty of which he is capable.

> It can't be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, can't hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to shew his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, can't keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man can't be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. . . . Therefore, in these things to ascribe a nonperformance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being *able*, but a being *willing*.[1]

The doctrine of free agency, that underlies Edwards' thought, is removed from a mechanical necessity which precludes the possibility of responsibility; from a theory of contingency which assumes that an act, in order to be free must be uncertain; and from a self-determined will, which acts independently of reason, conscience, inclinations and feelings. He teaches that a man is a free and responsible being because he is the author of his own acts and because he is determined to act by nothing outside of himself, but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings and dispositions. His acts are the true products of the man and reveal what his true nature is. In diagram form may now be given a summary of Edwards' thought upon free will.



There are some objections to Edwards' doctrine of an evilly-determined human will:

1. That it makes man the author of sin and morally responsible for his acts.
2. That it emphasises that moral good consists in the doing

[1] Edwards, op. cit., p. 162.

of the will of God, and that the following of one's own will is the 'bondage of sin'.

3. That it asserts that the eternal knowledge of God cannot be frustrated by the actions of His creation.

4. That it robs man of being able to boast that he is the cause of his salvation.

5. That it favours strict morality on the part of the elect.

6. That it preserves the world-wideness of the Scripture message.

It makes man the author of sin. Protestants agree it is impossible that a sinful desire or volition should originate in the holy will of God. Then how could sin originate in the will of a creature created with a positively holy disposition? That Adam was *created* and did not exist from all eternity is attested in the Scriptures. Thus he was less than eternal deity, he possessed a holy yet fallible will, and he did fall—these are also established by divine testimony. Because all our reasoning must be based upon consciousness, and since no man has in his consciousness the same experience as that representative of the human race—we lack some necessary data. But the origin of our sinful volitions is plain enough.

Man is morally responsible for his Acts. According to the Scriptures, death was the universal punishment for the sin of Adam; it is also obviously true that depravity of man's nature was likewise imputed. This does not teach that, because I am the sane offspring of criminal parents, a just judge would excuse my crimes because of my vitiated moral nature inherited and encouraged by criminal parents. Here then is the ground of human accountability—the possession of rationality plus the gift of conscience. It is because the sinner is endowed with these natural faculties that he is a responsible creature.

Moral good consists in the doing of the will of God and the following of one's own will is the 'bondage of sin'. Moral good in its widest sense is a perfection of God which qualifies all the rest of His attributes. Augustine was the first theologian to declare that sin is not an entity but is, in its essence, simply a defect. This was his dictum that 'nothing is evil unless a privation of the good'. Edwards in *The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin* distinguishes 'superior principles' as the absence of that which does not belong to the subject, as sin to flesh. While 'inferior

principles' are the absence of that which belongs to the nature of the subject and are necessary for its perfection, as Spirit to flesh. Sin therefore is a privation because it originates in the absence of moral good which *ought*[1] to be present in the actions of human beings. It must be remembered that inherent depravity which 'comes from a defective or private cause' instantly becomes a positive vice as one acts under moral obligations. Not to be in all things conformed to God's will is to rebel against Him and sink into bondage.

Eternal knowledge of God cannot be frustrated by the actions of His creation. Much misunderstanding arises through confusing the Christian Doctrine of Eternal Knowledge with the heathen notion of Fatalism. There is only one point of agreement between them—both assume the absolute certainty of all future events. The essential difference is that Fatalism has no place for a personal God, it holds that all events come to pass through the working of a blind, impersonal, non-moral force which cannot be distinguished from physical necessity. On the other hand, Edwards holds that events come to pass because an infinitely wise, powerful, and morally good God has so appointed them. That sovereign God has eternal knowledge of the certainty of all past and future events or He, like man, knows only the finite present and its conscious past. The Christian doctrine represents God as the loving Father whose orderly plan unfolds the outside inducements that man, while acting by his own nature, chooses, decides, and wills exactly as God has eternally known. From God's foreknowledge the Arminians argue that Edwards advances a supralapsarian view of the universe. This theological fallacy lies on their unwarranted assumption that a holy God cannot permit the occurrence of sin.

> Man was created holy, for it became God to create holy all his reasonable creatures. It would have been a disparagement to the holiness of God's nature, if he had made an intelligent creature unholy.[2]

[1] Kant laboured in vain to establish that 'ought implies can', while Brunner maintains that 'ought' implies 'cannot'. 'If I feel I *ought* to do right, it is a sign that I cannot do it. If I could really do it, there would be no question of "ought" about it at all. The sense of "ought" shows me the Good at an infinite, impassable distance from my will.' Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative* (trans. Olive Wyon Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 74.

[2] Jonathan Edwards, 'God Glorified in Man's Dependence', *The Development of American Philosophy* (ed. Walter G. Muelder and Laurence Sears, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 18.

Is not a father benevolent in excluding a reprobate son from his family, yet knowing that the inevitable consequence of his exclusion will be greater wickedness? It may also be inferred that an infinitely wise and just God, in not creating Adam a mechanical being, is neither the author nor approver of man's disobedience. The New Testament teaches in the metaphor of the lump of clay, as applied by Isaiah and Jeremiah to the degeneracy of the Chosen People, that God judicially abandons and gives man up to his reprobate mind.

> Of course I can almost hear your retort: 'If this is so, and God's will is irresistible, why does God blame men for what they do?' But the question really is this: 'Who are you, a man, to make any such reply to God?' When a craftsman makes anything he doesn't expect it to turn round and say, 'Why did you make me like this?' The potter, for instance, is always assumed to have complete control over the clay, making with one part of the lump a lovely vase, and with another a pipe for sewage. Can we not assume that God has the same control over human clay? May it not be that God, though he must sooner or later expose his wrath against sin and show his controlling hand, has yet most patiently endured the presence in his world of things that cry out to be destroyed? Can we not see, in this, his purpose in demonstrating the boundless resources of his glory upon those whom he considers fit to receive his mercy, and whom he long ago planned to raise to glorious life? And by these chosen people I mean you and me, whom he has called out from both Jews and Gentiles.[1]

Man is robbed of being able to boast that he is the cause of his salvation. 'Every student of philosophy is familiar with what is called "the paradox of hedonism", the unquestionable fact that if one seeks pleasure as the *summum bonum*, one does not obtain it, that the quest of happiness defeats itself. But there is another paradox which is not so often noted: what we may call "the paradox of moralism"; the fact that the quest of *goodness* defeats itself. It is not precisely by trying to make ourselves into good men that we become good men. It is not by careful cultivation of our characters in the light of an ideal that the finest character is actually formed. That purely moralistic method is apt to lead either to manifest failure or, if it seems to be succeeding, to a self-righteous pride, which is

[1] Romans 9.19-24 (trans. J. B. Phillips). Observe the distinction between the passive participle *κατηρτισμένα* (negative reprobation) and the active *προητοίμασεν* (election)—the vessels of wrath are said to be fitted, as broken pieces, for that destruction which man deserved when he broke with God; whereas God Himself is expressly said to have prepared His chosen vessels of mercy for glory.

really the worst failure of all. It is "Pharisaism". That is how the quest of goodness defeats itself.'[1]

True Christians have followed a different way. Instead of concentrating on their own characters, they have relied upon a God-centred enlightening[2] of their minds, putting a new spirit in their hearts, determining their wills toward the Good and enabling them fully to receive His grace in Christ Jesus.

It favours morality on the part of the elect. 'God's decree establishes means; it doth not only ordain the end, but the means to that end; and the one is never separated from the other. God decrees that the earth shall be fruitful; this doth not exclude, but includes, that the sun must shine upon it, showers must water it, and the husbandman must till it, as his God instructs him (Isaiah 28.26). God decrees that fifteen years shall be added to Hezekiah's life; this made him neither careless of his health nor negligent of his food; he said not, "Though I run into the fire, or into the water, or drink poison, I shall nevertheless live so long"; but natural providence, in the due use of means, co-wrought so as to bring him on to that period of time preordained for him.'[3] The contrast between the Edwardian and the Arminian moral system is that of *conviction* against *sentiment.* The Arminians appeal to the sentiment of one's ability absolutely to determine his moral and eternal state. Thus his morality depends upon emotions that are liable to fluctuate with sensation. Edwards, on the other hand, appeals to conscience under a revealed system of divine laws, which operates in defiance of feeling, and which must be obeyed at the peril of the soul. It seeks rather to convict man of a deep sense of duty to the voice of God as He guides the soul in moral conduct. God is conceived as having marked out the moral laws in which man is to walk—laws which He will not change; and man is required to walk in them, joyously or

[1] Donald M. Baillie, 'Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, IV, No. 2 (June 1951), p. 121.

[2] The theory of John Locke, that knowledge was based on experience and sensation and not on innate ideas, held a strong fascination for Edwards from early years. His emphasis on experience is well marked in his demand for conversion. Sensation, however, to Edwards was not the same as Locke's idea. The latter taught about the impact of material things upon the senses. To Edwards, sensation was the impact of God upon the soul. (See Edwards' sermon 'A Divine and Supernatural Light'.)

[3] Christopher Ness, *An Antidote Against Arminianism* (Swengel ['Union Co.'], Pennsylvania: Bible Truth Depot, 1946), p. 49.

sorrowfully, with as much or as little sentiment as he pleases. Hence morality is characterised by stability and strength, which may sometimes lapse into stubbornness and harshness.

'It is further to be remembered as a diadem upon the brow of Calvinistic morality, that in all the history of the Puritans there is said to have been not one case of divorce. . . . Lawlessness in general was scarcely, if ever, more unknown than among the Puritans. If, then, Calvinism was actually unfavourable to morality, as charged, it would indeed be a strange coincidence that where there has been the most of Calvinism there has been the least of crime. "This is the problem", says Froude (*Calvinism*, p. 8), "Grapes do not grow on bramble-bushes. Illustrious natures do not form themselves upon narrow and cruel theories. Spiritual life is full of apparent paradoxes. . . . The practical effect of a belief is the real test of its soundness. Where we find heroic life appearing as the uniform fruit of a particular opinion, it is childish to argue in the face of fact that the results ought to have been different." '[1]

The world-wideness of the Gospel is presented. These are the four words used in the New Testament for *world*:

1. γῆ—*land* or *earth* in the purely physical sense as distinguished from the heavens (Revelation 13.3).

2. οἰκουμένη—*inhabitable earth* or *ground* signifying the world as the abode of man (Matthew 24.14 and Luke 2.1).

3. αἰών—*indefinite time* or *age*, there is also a secondary sense, that all exists in the world under the condition of time (1 Corinthians 2.7).

4. κόσμος—*arrangement*, *ornament*, *world* which shows a development from a physical meaning to an ethical sense. Since the Arminians insist upon κόσμος meaning only the sum total of humanity in the world, one is compelled to examine the nine different meanings of this word as given in Thayer's *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament:*

(*a*) *Adornment:* 'whose adorning let it not be the outward (one) of braiding of hair' (1 Peter 3.3).

(*b*) *The universe as a whole:* 'God who made the world and all things that (are) in it' (Acts 17.24).

[1] Loraine Boettner, *The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1954), p. 280.

(*c*) *Circle of the earth* (far and wide): 'your faith is announced in the whole world' (Romans 1.8).

(*d*) *The human race:* 'and all the world be under judgment to God' (Romans 3.19).

(*e*) *Whole mass of men alienated from God:* 'but I chose you out of the world, on account of this the world hates you' (John 15.19).

(*f*) *Worldly affairs:* 'In the world you have tribulation; but be of good courage, I have overcome the world' (John 16.33).

(*g*) *This evil world-system:* 'now the prince of this world shall be cast out' (John 12.31).

(*h*) *The Gentiles in contrast with the Jews:* 'But if their (the Jews) offence (be the) wealth of (the) world . . . of the Gentiles' (Romans 11.12).

(*i*) *The elect:* 'God was in Christ reconciling (the) world to himself, not reckoning to them their offences' (2 Corinthians 5.19).

But where is the oft-boasted proof of the uniform meaning of κόσμος as *all mankind*? Some press this meaning so far in verses like 2 Corinthians 5.19 and 1 Timothy 2.6 that God is represented as too loving to punish anybody, and so full of mercy that all mankind is reconciled to God by Christ. Yet if one will permit the Scriptures to expound themselves, he will find that 'all' in 1 Timothy 2.6 is interchangeable with 'many' in Matthew 20.28. This seems to agree with such biblical expressions as '*many* shall come from east and west, and shall sit . . . in the kingdom of heaven'; '*many* are called, but few chosen'; 'this is my blood that of the new covenant, which is shed for *many* for remission of sins'.

While it is true that some verses taken in themselves do seem to imply the Arminian position, yet there are other verses which teach Predestination, Inability, Election, and Perseverance and which cannot by any legitimate means be harmonised with Arminian teaching. Bernard Ramm says, it is a maxim of hermeneutics that '*obscure passages must give right of way to clear passages*. There is the danger and temptation to invest a passage of very dubious meaning with far greater content than it will bear.'[1] It has been shown that the evidence

[1] Bernard Ramm, *Protestant Biblical Interpretation* (Boston: W. A. Wilde Co., 1950), p. 95.

which is brought forward in defence of Arminianism and which, at first sight, appears to possess considerable plausibility can legitimately be given an interpretation which harmonises with Edwards' view. Unhesitatingly one can assert this view represents the true world-wideness of the Scriptures—the universal Christianisation of the world and the complete defeat of the forces of spiritual wickedness. This, of course, does not mean that every individual will be saved, for many are unquestionably lost. But the human race attains the goal for which it was created, and sin does not snatch it out of God's hands; the primal purpose of God is the salvation of the race and through Christ Jesus it fulfills its original destiny.

THE CHURCH AND THE HISTORICAL JESUS[1]

by The Rev. WILLIAM NICHOLLS

I

The Christological approach to the doctrine of the Church, which is now seen as the most hopeful way forward for the work of Faith and Order, could mislead us if it were to direct our attention away from the dependence of the Church on the historical Jesus, and to lead us to think instead only in the dogmatic terms of a Chalcedonian analogy. While there is much to be learned about the right way to formulate our doctrines from such theological machine-tools, our first business in thinking about the nature of the Church is to learn to bear witness to the acts of Christ Himself in founding the Church as the new People of God, and in keeping it throughout its history as the instrument of His present work. If the purpose of this paper is to think especially of the dependence of the Church, as a continuous society in history, on its origins in the historical actions of Jesus, in the Incarnation and Passion of Christ as concrete facts in space and time, there is no intention thereby to deny the equal importance of the corresponding dependence of the Church on the present action of its living and ascended Lord. The Catholic kind of concern for Church order, issuing in an insistence on the historical links between the contemporary Church and its foundation by Jesus, in order that the Church should always be the same body that Jesus founded, need not be thought to conflict with the equally important kind of concern for Church order characteristic of Protestants, issuing in an insistence on the proclamation of the pure Word of God and the right administration of the Sacraments, in order that the Church should here and now be a living Church, continually created anew by its Lord. On the contrary, it would be fatal to the Church if either of these concerns ever became really unimportant to it. More than that, this paper is written

[1] A paper presented to the European Section of the Faith and Order Theological Commission on Christ and the Church, in 1957, and revised in the light of discussion.

in the conviction that these two concerns are really necessary to one another.

The Church is the Church only in dependence on the acts of Jesus Christ its Lord, who both founded it in the days of His flesh, and abides now as its living Lord at the right hand of the Father. Its being and its continuity depend alike upon His grace and His faithfulness. Thus it would not be the Church if it were not in touch with its Lord today, or if it were no longer anchored to its origins in its foundation by the historical Jesus. It can only remain in touch with its living Lord if it does indeed remain anchored to its historical foundations, and it can only remain anchored to those foundations if it continues today to be His Church, by remaining dependent upon His faithfulness and grace, and in subordination to His present action. On the other hand, a wrong understanding of the Church, and therefore a source of division between Christians, can arise, when either of these aspects of the nature of the Church is so emphasised that the other falls into complete obscurity. Perhaps no church, and no theologian, worthy of the name, could be content with so one-sided a Christology of the Church. None the less, the demands of controversy sometimes lead us so to mis-state our own teaching that it lies open to the charge. Thus Catholics, in their concern that the Church be indeed the same Church that Jesus founded in the first century, lay great stress on Tradition, on the Creeds and the writings of the Fathers, on the Liturgy, and the Sacraments which it enshrines, on the succession of Bishops in the Church. But such a theology of continuity can be reduced almost to absurdity by the supposed demands of controversy and apologetic, as when some writers in my own Church toy with the idea that valid orders are the first mark of a true church, and so come near to legitimising the pseudo-churches led by the *episcopi vagantes*. In the same way, Protestants, in their concern that the Church be a living Church here and now, lay great stress on the Word, on the Real Presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, on the immediacy of personal faith in the living Christ. But perhaps a Catholic may be forgiven for suggesting that this theology also comes near its *reductio ad absurdum* in the sectarian idea that any group of Christians can start a Church, or even in the Barthian idea of the event-Church (if we understand it rightly) which seems

to mean that the Church flashes in and out of existence like a neon light.

The comparative ecclesiology of the pre-Lund era, which is perhaps not so unnecessary in the actual healing of schism as some of us would like to think, has made much of this familiar to us. We can see that in the Catholic view there is the presupposition that because the Church is an organic society, the Body of Christ in history, it must of necessity have a continuous history from the Incarnation to the present day and on to the return of Christ. The Catholic finds it almost impossible to conceive of a legitimate breach in the historical continuity of the Church, because he supposes that the link between Christ and the present-day Christian runs down the history of the Church. Christ has founded a society of persons to be His visible Body in the world, and has equipped it with a structure which He uses to keep it one with Him. Equally, we can see that in the Protestant view there is the presupposition that at least one breach in the institutional continuity of the Church was legitimate, and that at the Reformation the true line of continuity of the Church lay in the breach with the apparent continuity of the past, and not in its preservation. The Protestant postulates a hidden continuity, which cannot be simply identified with the visible structure of Church order.

II

Is there any way through such an impasse? Apparently not, if the question continues to be put in the same terms. But if we start not with the familiar question of continuity or reformation, but rather with a search for the work of Christ in keeping His Church both continuous and living, we may find in each tradition a recognition, upon which we can build, of the concern which the other has made principally its own. Thus, although Protestants, and especially Lutherans, are inclined to say that no one particular form of Church order is necessary to the Church, they certainly hold that order as such is necessary, and insist, as strongly as any Catholic, upon the necessity for the Church never to deviate from the faith of the Apostles, and upon the right administration of the Sacraments. They claim continuity for themselves, and are willing to see an expression of it in the use of traditional confessions of faith and in the

careful maintenance of an orderly succession in their own ordinations, even where these do not derive from the old episcopal succession. Similarly, while Catholics insist upon the necessity of all Christians abiding in the structure of the Church which Christ and His Apostles gave to it, and which the early Church developed, they are not interested in this for archaeological reasons, but in order that the Church today may be the living Body of Christ, equipped with all the riches of His grace which are needed for the discharge of its function in the divine economy.

The central purpose of this paper, therefore, is to ask how the present action of Christ in building up His Body in the world has been prepared for by His own actions in history in founding His Church with a structure of unity and continuity. When the continuity of the Church is seen Christologically, and no longer merely institutionally, the concern of the Catholic for its maintenance, and for its restoration in those areas of Christendom where it has been lost, becomes relevant to the Protestant as something that he can share, instead of seeing it as a threat to his own integrity.

III

Christ's work in the Church is twofold. Its foundation lies in the steps He took in the days of His flesh, or in the forty days before the Ascension; the second form of His work built on that foundation, is His present and continuing spiritual action. They are related, to change the analogy, as the body is related to the spirit: they are mutually necessary, and each is meaningless without the other. Before He ascended into heaven, Christ left on earth a Body, equipped with organs of direction, growth and increase. But the Body awaited the lifegiving Baptism of the Holy Spirit, before it could be fully the Church. The Johannine account makes this relationship particularly clear (John 20.21-23). The Apostolic Commission is given to the Eleven, and they receive the Holy Spirit, along with the empowering to remit and retain sins. The risen Christ breathes the breath of new life into the waiting body of the Church, as God breathed the breath of life into Adam, and he became a living man. The foundation of the Church is an act of new creation, but its raw material is found in the men who have

followed Christ in His earthly ministry. In the synoptic tradition, with its continuation in Acts, other aspects of the relationship, which are also relevant to us, are exhibited. The crucial role of the Twelve, within the wider group of the disciples of Jesus, is clearly brought out. They are to be the patriarchs of the New Israel, and in the End will sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes (Matt. 19.28; Luke 22.30). Christ at His Ascension leaves a Church which is already equipped with a Ministry, but which awaits the endowment of power from on high, the power of the Holy Spirit which the ascended Christ will send on the day of Pentecost. The two accounts mutually interpret each other. The Pentecostal descent of the Spirit is also the giving of life to the waiting body of the Church. Here is the foundation of our twofold Christology of the Church.

Thus the Body which receives the Spirit is not an undifferentiated mass, but an organism, containing within itself specialised functions to be performed by the different members, each of which is necessary to the other and to the whole. The germ of the full specialisation of the gifts of the Spirit may be discerned in the pre-Pentecostal differentiation in the community of the disciples between those whom Jesus chose to be with Him and to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom, and the rest. This basic differentiation corresponds to the difference later universally recognised, however much its exaggerations have been the occasion of protest and reform, as that between the ordained ministry and the 'laity'. Upon this foundation the ascended Christ builds when He gives gifts to men, including the orders of ministry in the Church, whether occasional and 'charismatic', or permanent and 'official' (Eph. 4.8ff). All subsequent gifts of ministry derive from the Apostolate, or at least come under its ordering and authority, in the sense that they are an expansion and development (though by the same token also a diminution) of the one ministry archetypally exercised by the Apostles. Thus, in the distinction which He Himself set up during the Ministry between the Twelve and the other disciples, Christ prepared the form of the Church, which He would more fully shape in His ascended Lordship, empowering and guiding all these ministries, including the Apostolate itself, through the Holy Spirit.

IV

If we continue to assume that Christ intended to found a Church, since that was in any case the principal historical outcome of His life, we may go on to recognise other provisions, mentioned in Scripture and the earliest tradition, which He made, and was believed by the early Church to have made, for the ordering and continuation of its life. Of these provisions, we have already briefly alluded to the Apostolate, and must now discuss it more fully. We may also recognise, and in their turn deal with, the Word and Sacraments, and a way of Christian life, which in the last resort may be the most important provision of all.

The crucial importance of the Apostolate is now widely recognised by scholars, and need not again be demonstrated. The Apostles have a unique place in the Church, as the foundation, after Christ Himself, upon which the whole structure is built. It may be more necessary to demonstrate that in a sense the Apostles were the first Christian ministers. They exercised a pastoral stewardship over the Lord's household (Luke 12.42), they were the original celebrants of the Eucharist, they held the power of binding and loosing, they led the mission of the Church. The conspicuous presence of the Apostles at the centre of the primitive community, exercising all the functions that have ever been claimed for the Christian ministry, renders baffling the contention of some theologians that the early Church was without a ministry at all.

It does not of course follow that the Apostles were ministers in the same sense as we are. There is plausibility in the claim that the role of the Apostles in the Church was so unique that it could not be transmitted at all. Certainly the Apostolate as such is unique, for it belongs to the substance of the revelation-event itself. The Apostles were the master-builders, who gave form and order to the Lord's household (1 Cor. 3.10). They laid the foundation, upon which all others must build; no new foundation can be laid after them. Above all, the Apostles are unique, because they are chosen to bear testimony to the Christ, and to His resurrection, of which they are witnesses. It is these aspects of the Apostolate which are present to the minds of theologians who say that the Apostles can have no successors.

It would, indeed, be true to say that the later development of the New Testament canon makes it possible for the Apostles to continue to bear that witness throughout all the ages of the Church. When the Church today, through its ministry, bears authoritative testimony to the coming of Christ, it does so always on the basis of the New Testament tradition, which is in principle that of the Apostles.

On the other hand, while it may be granted that the missionary, liturgical and pastoral functions of the Christian ministry are exercised uniquely when it is an Apostle who exercises them, they are not in themselves unique to the Apostles. They can be transmitted to others, and indeed must be, if the Church is to endure for more than one generation. Whatever the upshot of the historical controversy about the form of ministry in the early Church, and whatever the meaning of the apparent equivalence of bishops and presbyters in the New Testament, the fact remains that the subsequent regular and continuing ministries in the Church are derivative from the ministry of the Apostles, and inherit its responsibilities and prerogatives in varying degrees. The Apostolic derivation of the ministry was a fact and belief of cardinal importance to the early Church, once it became involved in controversy about the Faith. It may be added, that while there are no doubt to be discerned in the New Testament period, and perhaps later, charismatic ministries not obviously derived from the Apostolic Ministry itself, these too where they appeared were brought under the authority of the Apostles, sometimes by the laying on of hands, and continued to be exercised in fraternal fellowship with and in subordination to the ministry of the Apostles. By the second century, the pattern of ministry is settling down to an Episcopate, believed universally to have inherited the transmissible functions of the ministry of the Apostles, working with a presbyterate and diaconate of more local scope.

The non-transmissible forms of the Apostolic Ministry also lead to developments of great importance for the subsequent ordering of the life of the Church. The Apostolic *kerygma* and *didache* are the forerunners in one aspect of the Church's proclamation of the Word, shortly to be noticed, and in another of the Rule of Faith, itself the ancestor of the various baptismal creeds, such as the old Roman Creed which we know in a later

form as the Apostles' Creed, and thus in turn of the more developed confessions of faith which were used as the standard of orthodoxy, such as the Nicene Creed. The fuller tradition of the Apostles is crystallised by themselves and their associates in the books which make up the New Testament canon. The Creeds and the New Testament canon are developments out of the original Apostolic Tradition, but it would be difficult to maintain that they are not developments which safeguard its integrity.

Christ's institution of the Apostolate thus develops in due course on the one hand into the Episcopate, regarded as in succession to the Apostles at first by its teaching office and later also through the succession of consecrations (exceptions, if indeed authentic ones exist, do not invalidate the principle that the Episcopate is in succession to the Apostles), and on the other hand into the Creed and canon, the double safeguard of the Tradition of the Apostles. The Creed, the canon and the Episcopate, as the pillars of orthodoxy, developed during the same period, and in response to the same influences. Each was believed to be Apostolic, though in each case a modern historian might qualify the claim a little. The authority each has for us is similar: essentially it is the authority of the second-century Church, exercising its judgment as to what was Apostolic in the light of its own knowledge of the living Tradition. As John Knox remarks in his book, *The Early Church and the Coming Great Church* (Abingdon Cokesbury), it is not easy to say on what ground one can accept one of these and reject either of the others.

V

We come now to the second major element in the provision which the historical Jesus made for His Church, the Word and the Sacraments. Here too we may have to be content, when we look at the actions of our Lord before the crucifixion, with hints and foreshadowings of an intention which becomes fully intelligible only in the light of its fulfilment in the Church; only in the case of the Eucharist do the documents furnish us with a clear account of its institutions, and even there it is notorious that the scholars have found difficulty in assuring themselves that the command to repeat the rite is original. In the case of

Baptism, Matthew 28.19 bears witness at the very least to what the Church believed had been the intention of the Lord. Indeed, it seems clear that Baptism was thought to have an authority which nothing could override, for all who wished to join the Church were baptised, however complete and spectacular their previous conversion; even Cornelius and his household, who had already received the Holy Spirit, were held to have been thus qualified for, and not exempted from, Baptism. It is perhaps also significant, and not altogether what we might have expected, in view of the precedent of the Twelve, that St. Paul was also baptised, even after a conversion that he himself regarded as a resurrection-appearance.

We have already considered the proclamation of the Word from another point of view, in alluding to the Apostolic *kerygma* as the origin of the Creed. But of course it is even more obviously the origin of the Church's *kerygma*. In proclaiming the living Word of God, the Church continues the most characteristic of all the Apostolic works, a work that St. Paul sets even above baptising, at least as far as his own vocation is concerned. Can we, however, trace this too to the provision of Jesus for His Church? The Gospels record the command of the risen Lord to preach the Gospel to all nations, and clearly the Gospel to be preached is grounded upon that Gospel which Jesus Himself preached during his earthly ministry. H. Riesenfeld of Uppsala has lately made it seem possible (in *The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings*, London, 1957, and in an unpublished address to the Society for the Study of Theology) that Jesus gave His teaching to His disciples, as the Rabbis did, in a form that could be learned and repeated. His teaching was given and received as a holy and lifegiving Word, and it was as such that it was repeated by those who were authorised to pass it on. If there is truth in this contention, the origin of the preaching of the Word by the Church is clearly to be sought not merely in the Apostolic preaching but in the preaching of Jesus. And in that case too its origin will lie in the deliberate action of Jesus, in view of the continuation of His Church.

The Word and the two major Sacraments are forms of continuity, every bit as much as the continuing succession of the ministry, because they too, as well as being present actions of the living Lord, ground each believer, and each generation

in the Church, on the one redemptive act on which the Church is founded. For when the Church, in obedience to Christ's institution, and assuming after Him the form of the Servant, offers His grace to men, through the proclamation of the Word and the administration of Baptism and the Eucharist, it prepares the way for an act by which, in differing modes, Christ today unites the believer with the *Heilsgeschichte*, with the acts in Incarnation, Ministry, Cross and Resurrection, by which He united Himself to all mankind, and renewed humanity in Himself.

VI

If we accept what has been said, we find ourselves recognising the four traditional elements in the Church's structure of unity and continuity on which most present-day reunion schemes have been based: the Bible, the Creeds, the two major Sacraments, and the episcopal Ministry. While we do not find all these immediately instituted by Christ, we do find those that were not so developing speedily and inevitably out of something that was, namely the Apostolate. As Archbishop Ramsey has maintained in *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, if 'developments . . . took place, they were all tested. The tests of a true development are whether it bears witness to the Gospel, whether it expresses the general consciousness of the Christians, and whether it serves the organic unity of the Body in all its parts. . . . Judged by these tests and by Scripture which sums them up, the marks of the Church which we have just described have been abundantly vindicated, since they were the means by which the Gospel of God prevailed over the one-sided theories and perversions of Christian life' (op. cit., p. 64).

We may add to these structural elements of continuity, which have traditionally received the most attention, the tradition of living to God which Christ bequeathed to His Church, a way of life which was lived by Him throughout His life, and finally sealed in the Passion. In the last resort, all the elements of continuity exist to serve this last, for Apostolate, Bible and Creed, and the two great Sacraments, have no other purpose than to unite us with His dying and risen life. The ultimate continuity of the Church lies in it being the extension of the Incarnation, understood as being the extension throughout

scottish-journal-of-

history till the Parousia of that Body which was not only born at Bethlehem, but died and rose again. That is why the continuity of the Body is sacramental: we cannot join in it naturally, but only by sharing the Passion and Resurrection of our Head.

VII

Thus the forms of continuity, as Christ left them to the Church, appear in their true meaning. 'The Church is complete in Christ, who is "the fulness of him that filleth all in all"; its prolongation in space and time is simply the incorporation of men into the fulness which has been achieved in Christ' (Nicholls, *Jacob's Ladder*, p. 51). The continuity of the Church, seen from the point of view of Christ's achieved fulness, is the gathering up of men by Christ into His own crucified and risen Body; eschatologically, the whole history of the Church adds nothing to Christ. Historically, the continuity of the Church is secured by Christ's continual acts of incorporation of men into the unity of His Body through the Word, Baptism and the Eucharist, rendered possible by the obedience of the Church. The Church remains one through all its history because its life remains the one redeemed life which is the fruit of Christ's Passion and Resurrection.

It is in the light of this basic truth that the terms 'tradition' and 'apostolic succession' should be considered. Both can mean in the last resort nothing less than the continuation in men from age to age of the risen life of Christ, imparted to them by the Holy Spirit on the basis of the provisions made already by Christ before He ascended up into heaven. For in tradition we do not hand over to others a mere form of words, but the reality of the redeemed life, which we ourselves have been given to live. The faith of the Church is but the expression of a living Word, which makes men to participate in the redemption won by Christ. And in apostolic succession we have to do not simply with the succession of one minister by another, even though that succession derive from the Apostles themselves, but with the transmission from generation to generation of the whole life of the Church as a being-in-Christ. The orderly succession of the chief ministers of the Church has indeed a great importance within this deeper continuity, of which it is

the outward sign, just as the Apostles occupied a position of great importance in the original institution of the Church. But the unbroken chain of ministerial succession is there not for its own sake, but to attest that the Church is really organically one with the Church Christ founded; it attests Christ's faithfulness, in truly passing on, from one generation to the next, that fulness and richness of redeemed life, in all its many-sided expression.

Thus the continuity of the Church is not simply the continuity of a human institution, like the Roman Empire, with its survival into modern times in the Holy Roman Empire. It is the continuing of Christ to dwell in those whom He has made members of His Body, and to be in them, in each generation, the same yesterday, and today, and for ever. And on our side it is the abiding of that human society, whose history is evidently part of the world of which secular historians take account, in the Lord who alone gives that history its meaning. Certainly it must be said as emphatically as possible that the historical continuity of the Church is of no value unless it is indeed continuity in Christ. If the gracious presence of Christ were ever to be withdrawn from His Church, no form of ecclesiastical continuity, episcopal or otherwise, could save it from relapsing into one more sinful human grouping. The Church is nothing in itself; its meaning is derived wholly from its being the Body of the Redeemer.

Accordingly the continuity of the Church derives from the unalterable will of Christ to dwell in the world in every generation, by means of the Body which He created in His redemptive acts. In His Passion, and Resurrection, in His Ascension and Pentecostal sending of the Spirit, He gave to the world the fulness of grace. Nothing can possibly be added to that fulness of grace except the state of glory itself, which His Return will usher in. And even in this age the Church enjoys through the Holy Spirit an actual earnest and foretaste of the glory of the heavenly life, and in its liturgy partakes in advance of the marriage supper of the Lamb. The Church is in one sense precluded from development, for all change could only mean the forsaking of the fulness with which it is initially endowed. Its continuity is to abide in that which was given once for all in Christ.

The continuity of the Church thus appears as an organic continuity in Christ, transcending its own institutional forms. Its continuity is indeed precisely the continuity of its King and Head. None the less, we need to understand the relationship of Christ's continuity to that of His Church. That relationship is best described, as we have here described it, as a sacramental one. The continuity, which is Christ's gift perpetually offered to sinful and schismatic men, is given in historical forms which are its outward sign. Since these signs are His gift, and the means of its donation to us, they effect what they signify, so long as our disobedience does not prevent their operation. The Church is not simply an eschatological reality, a charismatic community of those who are one in the Spirit: it is also a historical institution with outward and visible forms. But these forms have no virtue of themselves. They are forms of unity and continuity only in so far as they are sacramental of Christ's own gracious action, in making men one with each other in His Body. Without the continual gracious work of the living Lord at the right hand of the Father, there is no Church. But we must dare to say also that without the forms of unity and continuity which Christ gave to the Church before He ascended, there is also no Church. There is not the Body which Christ founded, but a society of those who believe in the principles of Christianity. Many of us belong to or have belonged to such societies, whether within our own church, or uniting together members of different churches: we recognise in them an outflowing of the work of Christ, but we know they are not the Church. About the Church, as well as about its Lord, there is a 'scandal of particularity', and it is one which gives even more offence to the devout. Yet if we forsake the Church in its particularity, in its dependence upon the one historical action of its Founder, we stray off into a religiosity which is not of a piece with the Faith of the New Testament. The Church is *this* society, not any society, and it is the society which stems exclusively from what Jesus did at certain moments in the first century in Jerusalem, when He ate a meal with His disciples, when He ate and drank with them again after He rose from the dead, and when in His risen majesty He commissioned spiritually defeated men to be His Apostles.

VIII

In the concluding part of this paper, we must now turn to the functioning of these Christ-given forms of continuity in the Church of history, and to consider how their effectiveness is hindered by disunity in the Church, and so finally to think of their part in the restoration of unity. We have seen that Christ gave His Church the Apostolate, with its twofold function of witness and pastoral stewardship, the Word and Sacraments, and a pattern of spiritual life which was that of His own obedience to the Father and accepting love for men. In the subsequent Church, we can trace a threefold continuity on the basis of that gift. There is first of all continuity in the Word, supported by the continuity of doctrine through which the Church is kept in the Apostolic Tradition. Then there is a sacramental continuity, whereby men enter the one continuing Body through Baptism, and are continually renewed into it by the Eucharist. Finally, there is the continuity of ministerial succession, whereby the chief stewards of the Church, whose responsibility it is to proclaim that Word and to administer those sacraments, enter into the inheritance of the Apostles, the first stewards of the mysteries of God. In the working of all of these there is to be seen an Apostolic Succession, which is the means by which Christ's own continuing takes historical form in the Church. Apostolic Succession is not just ministerial succession; it is the fulness of all three in union and co-operation with each other. Where any is lost or impaired, Apostolic Succession is to that extent lost or impaired. Where any is retained, the continuity of the Church is also to that extent partially retained and to be gladly recognised.

If we take first continuity in the Word, with the continuity of doctrine which is its presupposition, a living unity down the ages in the one Apostolic Faith, it is perhaps from a sense that it is indeed fundamental. Without it, all is lost. With this, there will be a constant tendency to the recovery of the others, even if they have been lost or impaired through disunity. By continuity of faith, Christ keeps men in constant confession of His own unique Lordship over His Church and His World, to the glory of God the Father. He continues in every age to bring men under the judgment of the Father, as sinners in need of

redemption, and points them to His Passion and Resurrection as the one means of this redemption. So our Lord in His great prayer in John 17 speaks of keeping His followers by the Word of the Father, which He has given to them, for that Word is truth. By it He keeps them in the Father's name, and keeps them one, though they are exposed to the disruptive forces of the world. Scripture and Creeds, and all the ecumenical confessions of faith, are means offered by the Church to Christ according to His will and the guidance of His Spirit, whereby He may keep the Church in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

Sacramental continuity begins with Baptism, and is continually renewed by participation in the Eucharist. Here men are made members of Christ's Body, and continually gathered into it again as through sin they drift away from it. In the sacraments they share continually in His death and resurrection, and so enter into the true continuity of His ascended life. Since these sacraments are for the whole people of God, we may recognise here the continuity of the whole Body, in which ministerial continuity takes a special and in a sense subsequent place, in so far as a man is a member of the royal priesthood of the whole people before he is subsequently called to be a ministerial priest to his fellow-members of the Body. Christ is continually building up and maintaining His Body in the World through the two Gospel Sacraments.

Ministerial continuity demands to have a little more said about it, for it has been the most disputed in our Western controversies. It needs to be understood in the context of the other two forms of continuity, with which it is necessarily bound up, since the ministry is the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, but also and above all, as part of the work of Christ. When a member of Christ's body is ordained to the ministry, he does not leave the Body, or come to occupy some place above and apart from the Body, so as to be something in himself, apart from Christ, or apart from the Body and the rest of the members. But he is taken by Christ, and set in a new relationship to Him, beyond but not cancelling that which he already has in common with all the other members of the Body, in order that Christ may use him as an organic link between Himself and the members of the Body, and between the members and

one another. His function is not to come between the members and Christ, since indeed they are already linked to Him by their Baptism, but rather that he may be offered to Christ as a means whereby Christ may keep the members of the Body in closer and firmer relationship with Himself. His ministry to Christ has meaning only in and through the rest of the Body.

Thus on the basis of the ministry of the Apostles, instituted by Him on earth, Christ has in all subsequent ages in the Church called men and empowered them through the Holy Spirit in the Body to act for Him, to bear testimony to the one Faith on the basis of the Apostolic Tradition, to feed the flock with the means of grace, to care for their souls as under-shepherd to the Chief Shepherd, and to lead them into the world in mission. As such, the minister is the inheritor of the pastoral and missionary ministry of the Apostles, and is not only the servant of the first two forms of continuity, but also by his office a link between the Apostles and the contemporary Church. For when a man succeeds to the full ministry, he inherits a guardianship, summing up that which is vested in the whole people of God, of that precious tradition of redeemed life which originated in the Apostolic Church, and has been passed on down the ages to this day. Thus, when he solemnly receives that guardianship, or passes it on to others in the presence of the Church, the Church sets its seal to the fact that the Tradition is being duly handed on, in order that it may be lived out in the next generation also.

The continuity of ministerial succession is no substitute for the faithfulness of Christ, who alone can keep His Church one and continuous in Himself. Nor is it a substitute for the proclamation of God's Word, and the administration of the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist, for it is by these that Christ continually brings men into His own fulness of life. But as the ministry of God's Word and Sacraments, its own continuity at the historical level testifies to each generation of the faithfulness of Christ, who first commissioned the Apostles by His Word, and by the power of the Holy Spirit, and continues to give the same commission to those who in each generation succeed to their stewardship. We misunderstand ministerial succession if we regard it as a guarantee, whether of right doctrine, which empirically it evidently is not, or of efficacious

sacraments. It is Christ who guarantees these things, not the Church. But the continuity of the ministry may be a sign and an attestation of the fact that He does so guarantee them, as He has always done. There is thus an intelligible meaning in the traditional claim that a *valid* ministry is a prerequisite of *valid* (though not necessarily of *efficacious*) sacraments. Validity has to do with the presence of the historical sign, efficaciousness with the action of Christ.

It is thus that the minister comes to be a focus of the unity and continuity of the Church. As the guardian of the tradition, in common with his fellow-ministers in other churches, as the inheritor, in common with them, of the Apostolic Commission to bind and loose, as the under-shepherd of that part of Christ's flock which is entrusted to his charge, he is the instrument of Christ's gathering of his people into the unity of the one Body, and into the unity of all generations of its life. Since he did not take this ministry on himself, but had it entrusted to him by Christ in His Body, with prayer and the laying on of hands, he brings with him in his office the accumulated tradition of the centuries of the Church, in which the endless riches of Christ, given in their fulness to the first generation of the Church, have been again and again learned and understood in forms appropriate to every period. Since he exercises it in common with ministers in other churches, with whom he must consult, he unites his church to the others. And in his own person as the celebrant of the Eucharist he gathers up the unity of the church which is under his personal charge.

While this is in some degree true wherever there is Christian ministry, it is set forth most clearly where the episcopal order has been preserved. For here we have a development indeed out of the first-century ministry of universal Apostles and local presbyter-bishops, but a development that occurred very early and was as far as we know almost if not quite universally accepted, though it is likely that it varied locally in the form of its administration, and especially perhaps in its relationship to the presbyterate and to the diaconate. At any rate we do not find it being questioned even in the heretical and schismatic churches of patristic times. Here the break took place rather in the first form of continuity, the doctrinal one, which we have seen reason to believe is of primary importance. With

the schisms of the Reformation period we have a different and far more complex situation. For if the Reformation can be justified at all, it must be on the ground that the first form of continuity was menaced in the main body of the Church, and that therefore the other two forms of continuity also stood in peril. Yet the endeavour to restore the true continuity of the Church led, in most of the Reformation Churches, through the schisms that the sin of all those involved on both sides rendered inevitable, to an impairment of the third or ministerial form, since it now lacked the orderly handing on from the previous generation of the inherited ministry of the Catholic Body. Even where the episcopal form of ministry was preserved, the line of consecrations often ran through a very narrow channel, and partial schism could not be avoided. In other cases, the continuance of the old ministry was not even desired, and it was felt that the true pastoral ministry of the flock of Christ could only be restored by a new start. Even here, some degree of continuity was doubtless preserved, and the ministry was not a wholly new thing, but in some sense, as it was claimed to be, the old reformed.

IX

Whatever the continuity of the Church, it always stands in need of reformation. To have been reformed once, at a certain epoch called the Reformation, is no more a guarantee of possessing the true form and life of the Church than to have held fast to older ways. But true reformation in the Church cannot be separated from the concern for the maintenance of continuity, for it is precisely the threat which the Church's involvement in the world offers to the true continuity of the Church which renders vigilance, criticism and perhaps reformation necessary. Indeed, where the Christ-given forms of continuity have been preserved, they are themselves a continual means of renewal, speaking, as they do, to those who have ears to hear, of the one foundation of the Church, and of its nothingness apart from Christ. Thus we cannot regard the Reformation settlement as itself final, but must see, both in a deeper knowledge of the early Church than was available to our Reformers, and in the ecumenical encounter of the present day, a call to further reformation, and to a recovery of a fuller

Catholicity, by the exaltation in the Church of the true essence of the forms of continuity Christ has given to it.

At the present juncture in Church history, churches in many parts of the world are hearing a call to find their unity again in a rediscovery of these ancient forms. For all these churches there is something new to discover from one another, as well as something old to share with others. If the episcopal churches have, through the unmerited grace of what must often seem little more than an accident of history, preserved a particular and vital form of link with the historical Jesus, this is not to say that they have nothing to learn, and nothing to gain, from union with churches which have sought to preserve Christ's continuity in other ways, whether presbyteral or congregational. For very often these forms of ministry, though not in the historic sense episcopal, have been enabled to show forth more clearly the essence of the ministry as a form of continuity in Christ, as a means of Christ's pastoral rule over His Body, than has sometimes been the case with an episcopate which had in part forgotten its intimate relationship with the rest of the Body. All have something to receive from such a union as is being contemplated in some areas of the world, especially in India and Ceylon, and such as we must not despair of seeing in Scotland and in England, in spite of the failure of recent attempts. In such unions, various forms of ministry and ministerial continuity are shared, in the hope that whatever each may hold will enrich the united church. Episcopalians believe, however, that though they have much to learn about true episcopacy, they have also something to share and teach, in all humility, about the significance for unity and continuity of the focusing of the ministry in one man in each church, and something to impart, in their particular form of link with the Church of the first centuries, which, if rightly understood and lived, can be a means whereby Christ can more effectively rule over His Church, and make it one throughout the ages. If, as this paper has sought to show, Apostolic Succession has a far wider and deeper meaning than the succession of consecrations, none the less that succession may have its not unimportant part to play in the ordering of the whole Church as Christ's one Body, continuous in Him from generation to generation, until He comes to gather up all succession in the fulness of His Kingdom.

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE WORD OF GOD

by The Rev. WILLIAM G. YOUNG

1. The Authority of the Bible—the Need for a New Approach

One of the greatest needs of our day and generation is for an approach to the question of the inspiration and authority of the Bible which will be sufficiently clear and embracing in its statement of the truth to be a means, both of assurance to all who seek to find God's Word for their daily spiritual food in the Bible, and of reconciliation to those who have approached the problem from varying angles in their search for a satisfying solution, and who, instead of welcoming one another's insights, treat one another with hostility and contempt. Fifty years ago Fundamentalists and Liberals looked at one another across a vast chasm of bitterness and difference: that chasm has persisted to the present day, but in many ways it is not so wide or so deep as it was—and neo-Calvinism has interposed a third approach. Is it too much to hope that the time should now have come when each of these groups will be ready to confess the defectiveness of its own understanding, and the extremes to which it has at times gone in overemphasising one side of the truth; and that each will seek that fuller understanding which an appreciation of the contributions of the others can bring? The barriers between the theologians of these three schools are in some ways more difficult to overcome than those between Christian denominations. In a day like our own, when denominational barriers are being more and more recognised to be sinful, and unions planned and consummated on the assumption, not that one denomination is right and the other wrong, but that the truth is larger than the insights of either, so that each can enrich the other—in such a day, surely it is God's will that barriers between different schools of biblical interpretation should also be broken down, and on a similar basis. The tragedy of the present day is that Fundamentalist and non-Fundamentalist have such a hard line of demarcation drawn between them. To the non-Fundamentalist, the Fundamentalist is generally looked

upon as a rather ridiculous, out-of-date figure; a divisive force in Church life, both at home and on the mission field; a worshipper of the letter rather than the Spirit. There is a tendency to ignore or forget the permanent value, and indeed necessity for the well-being and health of the Church, that lay in the Fundamentalist protest against the extreme Liberalism of half a century ago. On the other side, the Fundamentalist tends to discount and ignore the immense amount of help Liberal scholars have given towards understanding the Bible; while his attitude to the growing recovery of biblical theology, and the growing recognition of biblical authority among non-Fundamentalists, is one of suspicion that the Devil is masquerading as an angel of light, instead of glad recognition that God is leading His Church on to a deeper and fuller understanding of the very truths on behalf of which the Fundamentalist protest was originally made.

Reconciliation and sharing, rather than the 'victory' of one side over the other, is what is needed today, and this is being recognised increasingly by thoughtful Christians. For instance, in a recent article in *Frontier*, Norman Goodall says:

> There are many 'Evangelicals' who are more conscious of their separateness from other Christians than of their identity with all who call upon the name of Jesus Christ as Lord. Must this trend continue? In the coming years, will the many lines that unhappily divide Christians include a sharpening of a differentiation which claims to be based on the Evangel? . . . If the lines are not to be further hardened, with increasingly divisive consequences, something more than criticism, exhortations, or appeals to goodwill must be forthcoming.

He sees the road that must be taken as one of *caring*, and *meeting*

> for the kind of frank, informed discussion, biblical study and earnest prayer out of which there may be given the deeper insight, unity and spiritual renewal which will be for the furtherance of the one and only Evangel.[1]

Gabriel Hebert says:

> Our civilisation has lost its centre, because it has lost the way to God, and put man in the centre instead. And here is I.V.F. . . . and here is S.C.M. . . . S.C.M. and I.V.F. find it difficult to work together; they pursue separate paths, not helping one another. . . . Can they not come together, for the sake of what each has to give the other, to God's glory?[2]

[1] *Frontier*, pp. 249-50, 253.
[2] *Fundamentalism and the Church of God*, p. 27.

The correspondence in *Life and Work* in the spring and summer of 1958 bore witness to the same sense of need. Perhaps I may be permitted to quote from one letter:

> The reconciliation of Liberal with Fundamentalist, and the restoration of mutual respect between them, so that the Liberal is no longer an infidel to the Fundamentalist, and the Fundamentalist is no longer an obscurantist figure of fun to the Liberal, is a crying need of our time. Reconciliation cannot come through compromise. It can only come as a result of a deeper apprehension of God's truth, an apprehension which cannot do without the insights of either of the two viewpoints, but which goes deeper than either.[1]

How difficult the task of reconciliation is can be clearly seen by a brief consideration of three very recent books on the subject of biblical authority: *Fundamentalism and the Church of God*[2] by Gabriel Hebert, '*Fundamentalism*' *and the Word of God*[3] by J. I. Packer, and *The Authority of Scripture*[4] by J. K. S. Reid. They are best considered in that order: Packer's book is a reply mainly to Hebert's, from the Fundamentalist[5] point of view; Reid's book seems to be completely independent of the other two, though he refers to Hebert's earlier books.

The first thing that strikes the reader of Father Hebert's book is its eirenical spirit. There is something very moving in this attempt by an Anglo-Catholic to appreciate the positive contribution that Fundamentalists have made, and to see things from their point of view. Again and again he shows that he has discussed points with Fundamentalist friends, and taken care to be up to date in his statement of what they believe. He does not laugh at Fundamentalism, or pick holes in its extreme forms as though they were representative; he takes it seriously, and obviously tries to be fair. His praise of the positive side of the early Fundamentalist protest against Liberalism is generous, and rings true. His criticism of the extremes of early Liberalism, and his constructive attitude in approaching various problems, such as 'verbal inspiration', the meaning of the Fall, the historicity of the Exodus, the paramount importance of the

[1] *Life and Work*, Aug. 1958, p. 197.
[2] S.C.M. Press, 1957.
[3] I.V.F., 1958.
[4] Methuen, 1957.
[5] At this stage I should explain my use of the term 'Fundamentalist'. Packer dislikes it, and calls it an 'objectionable term' (op. cit., p. 29), and prefers the term 'Evangelical'. The trouble is that many who would rejoice in the term 'Evangelical' are not Fundamentalists. I therefore use the term Fundamentalist to denote a well-known attitude to the Bible, but with no intention to be derogatory or derisive. The term 'Evangelical' is used with a wider connotation.

Resurrection—these show clearly just how far he has travelled from the positions of the critical school of half a century ago. His appreciative, but discriminating and kindly critical attitude to the *New Bible Commentary* would, I believe, commend the agreement of many an Evangelical reader.[1] In spite of all this, however, *Fundamentalism and the Church of God* is not successful in building a real bridge. For one thing, much as he may try to appreciate it, Father Hebert seems unable to 'get inside' the Evangelical point of view. The latter part of his book, with its attempt to show the truth inherent in 'high' sacramental doctrine, using in illustration the story of a Swedish Lutheran, is manifestly limited in its understanding of the Evangelical position. It seems to class Evangelicals as a whole with a type of Lutheran pietist who is deeply introspective and pathologically concerned with personal sanctification. I wonder if Father Hebert would recognise the distinction between John Wesley of the 'Holy Club' (very like the Lutheran pietist) and the same Wesley after his heart was 'strangely warmed', or between what Bishop Newbigin would call the 'Protestant' and the 'Pentecostalist' type of Evangelical.[2] He also fails to 'think through' the question of the authority of Scripture: some aspects are dealt with, it is true, but there is point in Dr Packer's criticism:

> Dr Hebert himself writes a complete book on 'Fundamentalism' without discussing at all the avowed Biblicism of our Lord and His apostles, nor the biblical concepts of Scripture and its authority.[3]

The clearest way, however, to gauge the failure of Father Hebert's attempt to find a meeting-point with the Fundamentalist is to read Dr Packer's book!

'Fundamentalism' and the Word of God is, indeed, written in a very different tone and spirit. Its mood reminds one a bit of Tertullian—attack your opponent wherever possible, and at all costs defend your own position!

> We shall contend that 'Fundamentalism' (in so far as consistent Evangelicalism is meant by this term) is in principle nothing but Christianity itself. . . . We shall show. . . . We shall argue. . . . We shall maintain. . . . Our critics wish that we would align ourselves with them. We look for a day when they will stand with us.[4]

[1] It certainly puts into words what I myself feel about it!

[2] See Newbigin, *The Household of God, passim.* It seems clear that in Newbigin's classification Dr Packer would be labelled 'Protestant', and the pietist Lutheran pastor 'Pentecostalist'. [3] Packer, op. cit., p. 142. [4] ibid., pp. 22-23.

Dr Packer spurns Father Hebert's advances; to him Hebert is a critic and opponent whose arguments have to be demolished. His criticisms of Fundamentalism must be shown to be either untrue, or to apply only to extreme and misguided Fundamentalists. His approach, 'We have something to give you, and you have something to give us', is met with the reply, 'We are right and you are wrong. Superficially, you may agree with us on individual points, and we are glad that you have abandoned some Liberal errors, but fundamentally there is a chasm between us, and until you recognise the existence of the chasm, and come across to our side, there can be no fellowship or co-operation between us.' In Dr Packer's book the reader is, indeed, painfully aware of a spirit of doctrinal self-sufficiency, a legalistic—almost scholastic—orthodoxy. I believe that its position is more extreme than that of many in I.V.F.; nevertheless, it bears the I.V.F. imprimatur, and must be looked upon as in some sense its reply to Father Hebert's book.[1] Superficially Hebert and Packer agree on many things—for practical purposes their approach to the Creation-story and the Fall are very similar—and Dr Packer by no means approves of the excesses of the more extreme literalist Fundamentalists; but if one thing is clear, it is that the gap remains. There is a fundamental disagreement as to the nature of scriptural authority; and as a corollary, as to the rightful place of reason in the approach to Scripture.

Dr Reid's book sets out specifically to tackle this question of the nature of Scripture's authority. The greater part of it is taken up with an examination of various views on the subject—Calvin, Luther, Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Fundamentalist and Liberal views, Barth and Brunner. The final chapter of the book gives Dr Reid's own constructive statement. It is an interesting one, and seems to me to be an attempt to put into words a real experience, using mainly neo-Calvinist terminology. Two quotations give the gist:

[1] Some time ago I was giving a talk on the Islamic view of inspiration to a group of candidates in training for missionary work. I contrasted the Islamic view of revelation of Divine truth through a Book, with the Christian view of revelation through Christ the Word of God, a Person. Afterwards one of the group suggested that there was little to distinguish the Islamic from the I.V.F. view. I felt at the time that there was a vast difference; having read Dr Packer, I am not now so sure of the vastness! I think Dr Brunner was referring to this when he spoke at a meeting in Lahore in 1951 of the danger of becoming 'Muslim Christians'.

The authority of the Bible reposes in the fact that, in statements some right and some wrong, and in practical application some of which is disputable and some even more dubious, a unified witness is borne to Him who is at the centre of the Gospel.[1]

The authority of the Bible . . . consists in the fact that by divine appointment the place where He is witnessed to is the place where His presence is pledged and granted. The Bible has the authority of God who chooses to speak in and through it.[2]

Unlike Father Hebert, Dr Reid makes no attempt to build a bridge, but implicitly or explicitly condemns Fundamentalist views, and the first of the statements we have quoted, with its open reference to error in the written record, is not exactly an olive branch! To my mind a real weakness of the book is its attempt to state authority and express experience in neo-Calvinist terms rather than in biblical ones, and in particular its virtual ignoring of the Holy Spirit. In the early chapters Dr Reid has, indeed, valuable things to say about the Holy Spirit; it is a pity that the constructive statement at the end of the book says so little about His part in giving authority to the Scripture.[3]

A bridge has certainly been attempted; it is not yet built. A further attempt must tackle afresh the question of authority, because this is where the crux of the disagreement lies. Dr Packer puts this bluntly and clearly:

We are in a position to appreciate the fundamental cleavage between so-called 'Fundamentalists' and their critics. The latter are, in fact, subjectivists in the matter of authority.[4]

[Dr Hebert] misses altogether the central evangelical contention about Scripture . . .: namely, that Scripture has complete and final authority over the Church as a self-contained, self-interpreting revelation from God. But this is what Evangelicals are concerned above all to maintain.[5]

Norman Goodall sees this just as clearly. He mentions various issues which separate Fundamentalists from others, and the need to discuss them, and says that the most serious question of all, 'behind theological differences and even differences in ethical judgments', is this: 'what is the nature of the biblical authority on which conviction and conduct may rest?'[6]

[1] Reid, op. cit., p. 267. [2] op. cit., pp. 277-8.
[3] Reid's statement that 'the Bible has the authority of God who chooses to speak in and through it' would have been much clearer and more evidently biblical if the words 'the Holy Spirit' had been added after 'God'.
[4] Packer, op. cit., p. 72. [5] ibid., p. 73. [6] *Frontier*, p. 252.

2. The Spirit and the Word—Inspiration, Communication, Illumination

I. We may call the Bible the Word of God, or we may say, with the Reformers, that it *contains* or *presents* the Word of God. In the words of T. M. Lindsay,

> The Reformers drew a distinction between the word of God and the Scripture which contains or presents that word. This distinction was real, and not merely formal; it was more than the difference between the word of God and the word of God written. . . . The distinction between the two need not prevent us saying that the Scripture *is* the word of God. . . . Only it must be clearly understood that the copula *is* does not express logical identity, but some such relation as can be more accurately rendered by *contains*, *presents*, *conveys*, *records*—all of which phrases are used in the writings of Reformers or in the creeds of the Reformation Churches. The main thing to remember is that the distinction is not to be made use of to deny to the substance of Scripture those attributes of authority and infallibility which belong to the Word of God.[1]

God speaks to us with authority through the words and pages of Scripture. This is a fact of experience to which every Christian can testify, and it surely forms a starting-point on which we can all agree. It is when we go on to speak of the nature and basis of this authority that disagreement arises.

II. The Fundamentalist approach is to emphasise the importance of the written Scriptures as the *objectively* inspired Word of God. Working through the minds and characters of the various writers, the Holy Spirit caused the Book we have today to be written down, and guided the Church to accept what was inspired in this way, and to reject what was merely human in origin, however edifying and helpful it might be. The canon of Scripture as we have it is the sufficient Word of God, containing all things necessary for salvation.

> The teaching of the written Scriptures is the Word which God spoke and speaks to His Church, and is finally authoritative for faith and life. What Scripture says, God says.[2]

> The Word of God consists of *revealed truths*. . . . God reveals Himself to men . . . by teaching truth to them. . . . The Bible confronts us with the

[1] *History of the Reformation*, 2nd edn., I, pp. 461-4. The whole section (pp. 453-67), written in the pre-Barthian period by a conservative, non-Fundamentalist Evangelical, is a particularly valuable and helpful one.

[2] Packer, op. cit., p. 47.

conception that the Word of God which it embodies consists of a system of truths, conveying to men real information from God about Himself.[1]

Its text is word for word God-given; its message is an organic unity, the infallible Word of an infallible God, a web of revealed truths centred upon Christ.[2]

This is the doctrine of *verbal inspiration*.[3]

There is, however, for Fundamentalists, another side to be considered. Careful distinction is made between the *inspiration* through which the Bible came to be written, and the *illumination* of the Holy Spirit required by the reader for its understanding and interpretation.[4] If I understand their views rightly, they recognise in the Holy Spirit a twofold action—a past work of inspiration, and a present work of illumination. The present work is always of a subordinate nature, and is not strictly a speaking through the Scripture to the reader or hearer; but rather a speaking to the mind of the reader or hearer, so that he can understand the truth of the written Word, which in itself is sufficient and perspicuous.[5] Here is what Dr Packer says:

The Spirit must be acknowledged as the infallible Interpreter of God's infallible Word.[6]

The only meaning to which He bears witness is that which each text actually has in the organism of Scripture; such witness as is borne to other meanings is borne by other spirits.[7]

There are no words of God spoken to us at all today except the words of Scripture (direct revelations having now ceased).[8]

If this is a fair statement of the Fundamentalist approach, it lays itself open to the criticism of being too intellectual, and limiting the Holy Spirit:

Neither in Scripture nor anywhere else does the Christian faith possess a *system*, whether of doctrine or conduct, to which it may point and declare: Accept and obey this in order to be saved. The real ground of the sufficiency of the Scriptures is that they testify to Him in whom in order to be saved, men must believe; and the doctrine and the conduct, the faith and the life, have their origins there. . . . Revelation is . . . wrongly conceived when

[1] ibid., pp. 91, 92, 93. [2] ibid., pp. 113-14.
[3] Hebert has no objection to the term 'verbal inspiration': 'If Scripture is inspired at all, it must be the words that are inspired. . . . God's revelation, then, is transmitted to us in the Holy Scriptures by means of language.'
[4] See G. W. Bromiley in *New Bible Commentary*, p. 22, col. 1.
[5] Packer, op. cit., p. 47: 'The Bible is a record and explanation of divine revelation which is both complete (sufficient) and comprehensive (perspicuous).'
[6] ibid., p. 47. [7] ibid., p. 112. [8] ibid., p. 119.

thought of merely in terms of propositions, as though revelation was no more than a series of statements, however true, about God. Revelation is not this, but rather the disclosure of God Himself by Himself. . . . Where unmodified intellectualism operates, the only valid and real reason for distinguishing between revelation and doctrine . . . collapses. . . . There is no longer a distinction to be drawn between the communication by God of Himself and the communication of truths concerning God.[1]

When the Holy Spirit is locked up in Scripture by a kind of inscripturation, what really occurs is the denial that the Holy Spirit has any independent virtue. . . . For the Spirit can be dissociated from the Word either by separation, and in this case men have themselves to bring the spirit of illumination, or by inclusion in the Holy Scripture, in which case the Holy Scripture itself defines and delimits His operations and so usurps them.[2]

It has also to be recognised that the Fundamentalist tries to safeguard his view by insisting that verbal inspiration is compatible only with doctrines of absolute inerrancy, historical and scientific infallibility, and so on. Nevertheless the positive value of the approach must be recognised: it seeks to emphasise the *objective authority* of the Bible, an authority which, rightly understood as interpreted by the Holy Spirit, can be relied on as an infallible guide to faith and life.

III. The Liberal approach is very different. While the authority of the Bible, rightly understood, as a rule for faith and life, has not usually been directly challenged, the emphasis has been mainly laid on the human, historical side of the composition of its literature. Endless trouble has been taken to set the books in their historical background, to trace their authorship and the sources of their compilation, and to examine parallels in secular literature and pagan folklore. When a work has been ascribed to compilation from various sources, attention has been drawn to these sources rather than to the book in the form we have it. Attempts have been made to rearrange books (especially prophets) in chronological order, or to separate out sources by the use of italics, brackets and colours. The Moffatt Old Testament and the Polychrome Edition of Hebrew texts are well-known examples of this method. In the best hands, books of great exegetical and devotional value have been pro-

[1] Reid, op. cit., pp. 139, 182-3, 116. Reid is chiefly criticising Romanist and scholastic views here, but the application to Fundamentalist views is clear.
[2] ibid., p. 102.

duced: one might instance George Adam Smith's volumes in the 'Expositor's Bible', and James Strahan's commentary on Job. Sometimes, however, as in sections of Peake's one-volume Commentary, the message has been lost in a mass of details about sources.

Another aspect of the Liberal approach has been the tendency to pick and choose bits here and there in the Bible as edifying, and to dismiss the rest. To give a modern instance, Dr John Baillie is prepared to agree that *parts* of the Bible, such as 1 Corinthians 13, are verbally inspired, but that quite clearly the Bible as a whole is not.[1] An extreme example of this approach was an edition of the Bible advertised some years ago in *The Muslim World*, in which all those parts which were considered immature and out of date were omitted! Extreme Liberalism of this sort has, however, gone out of fashion nowadays, and there is danger of 'flogging a dead horse' rather than dealing with a living issue, unless we recognise this. At its best the Liberal approach rightly called attention to the progress in the understanding of God's mind and will and love which we find in the Old Testament, and introduced a much needed caveat against an unintelligent and unhistorical literalism; it did much to illuminate the meaning of the biblical text by its painstaking investigation of the historical background; and it did its best to provide an explanation for a universal Christian experience—that God speaks to us in a clearer and deeper way in some parts of the Bible than in others.

> Must we not claim that the same Holy Spirit, who spake by the prophets and inspired the Scriptures, does in another and lesser mode of His operation lead men to a right critical exercise of the natural reason upon the same Scriptures?[2]

The chief danger of the Liberal approach, however, is its *subjectivity*—if the Bible only contains in parts the Word of God, and in others speaks with a fallible, human voice, who is to judge what is the Word of God, and what is not? Such an approach bewilders simple people, and tends to destroy the authority of the Bible in their eyes. If the Bible is not infallible and inspired, except in parts, where is its authority to be found?

[1] See *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought*, ch. VI, esp. pp. 115-20. 'If inspiration is not regarded as plenary, there is no reason why we should not believe in verbal inspiration.'

[2] C. F. Evans, quoted by Hebert, op. cit., p. 76.

Dr Hebert makes a penetrating criticism of a modern variety of Liberal thought which is worth quoting in our assessment of the Liberal viewpoint:

> A theory has been held in recent years that the Revelation consists essentially in the acts of God Himself . . . and that the books of the Bible contain the human record of these things, as described by faithful but fallible men. In this view the Bible, consisting of 'words of men', is no more than a human record of and commentary on God's mighty acts of salvation. . . . But what has happened to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? The implication is that, in the events recorded in the New Testament, God sent His Son and in Him revealed His glory, and then left us to trace out according to our poor notions the works of His mighty wisdom. . . . But this rigid separation between the Word of God and the words of men simply will not do. It is to make a separation between the Son of God and the Spirit.[1]

IV. The neo-Calvinist approaches the problem from a fresh angle. Accept, he says, the contribution the Liberals have made towards our understanding of the human and historical factors behind the compilation of the Bible. Accept the fact that it is in many ways a human book, and in many ways fallible. But recognise, too, that it is a book through which God speaks, a book which may *become* the Word of God to a heart, as soon as God takes it, and makes it the vehicle of His speaking to us.[2] In this it is unique: through no other book will God normally speak in this way. But do not seek to found its authority on some doctrine of objective inspiration in the past; seek it rather in the witness of the Holy Spirit in your heart as He encounters you in the message. It is wrong, however, to distinguish between one part of the Bible and another, as though one part was the Word of God, and another not. Any part of the Bible can *become* the Word of God to you if God chooses to speak to you through it; but some quite different part of the Bible may well become the Word of God to someone else. This view may be illustrated by two short quotations that Dr Reid makes in his book from Barth and Brunner:

> 'God makes the record of past revelation the occasion of present revelation.'[3]

[1] Hebert, op. cit., p. 32. Hebert goes on to show how the Holy Spirit exercised an interpreting function in the cases of the Exodus and the coming of Christ.

[2] See W. C. MacDonald, *Modern Evangelism*. I have not the exact reference. He describes vividly an interview he had with Karl Barth. See also G. W. Bromiley in *New Bible Commentary*, p. 22.

[3] Barth, quoted in Reid, op. cit., p. 200.

'The Bible has its authority . . . in and by the action of God Himself as He uses it to communicate Himself to the believer.'[1]

Dr Reid, whose own position is much influenced by neo-Calvinism, would modify the statement that the Bible *becomes* the Word of God:

It is rightly enough said that the Bible *becomes* the Word of God. Yet this does not happen by haphazard but by God's action. Hence underneath this expression must be understood the truth that the Bible *is* the Word of God. Otherwise it is forgotten that the Bible becomes the Word of God by stated and steady appointment. . . . The Bible itself is vivified by His living presence to convey what He has to say.[2]

The neo-Calvinist approach is valuable in the stress it puts on a side of biblical authority which Fundamentalist and Liberal are both apt to overlook,

authority . . . not as a deposit of faith to be assented to, but as the means through which God makes His Word heard in the present day.[3]

It takes seriously also the fact that God speaks to different people through differing parts of the Bible. Nevertheless, its too exclusive emphasis with the present day is dangerous. It has left the door open for the extremes of Bultmann's 'existential-historical' approach, which minimises the importance of the 'objective-historical' to an extent that leaves Christianity with practically no historical basis, and makes it far too exclusively a matter of personal and individual encounter with God here and now. The danger here is again one of *subjectivism*. For instance, Bultmann believes that the Cross was a mighty act of God, a real historical happening, but that the Incarnation and Resurrection were myths, and not objective-historical acts.[4] On what authority, it may well be asked, does he accept one and reject another, when both are witnessed to in the Bible? It seems clear that the only possible answer must be on subjective lines.

V. I believe that all these three approaches are of value, and that the real insights they contain must form part of any satisfying doctrine of biblical authority. At the same time a good deal of rubbish has to be cleared away: for instance, we must firmly reject the Liberal suggestion that the Bible merely

[1] Brunner, quoted in ibid., p. 233.
[2] ibid., pp. 278-9. [3] ibid., p. 26.
[4] See J. Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, especially VII, secs. 22 and 23.

contains the Word of God in the sense that part of it is, and part of it is not, that inspired Word; at the same time we must reject both the Fundamentalist and the neo-Calvinist positions as one-sided and inadequate, and seek for a recovery and a re-statement of the full biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit's work that will do justice to the truths they stand for.

The Bible speaks of a *threefold action* of God the Holy Spirit, through which He fulfils His ministry of *conveying* or *presenting* the Word of God to men. A few verses from the New Testament make this clear[1]:

> All scripture is inspired by God.—1 Tim. 3.16.

> No prophecy ever came by the impulse of man, but men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God.—2 Pet. 1.21.

> Therefore, as the Holy Spirit says,
> 'Today, when you hear his voice,
> do not harden your hearts . . .'.—Heb. 3.7-8.

> By this [the ritual of the Day of Atonement] the Holy Spirit indicates that the way into the sanctuary is not yet opened as long as the outer tent is still standing (which is symbolic for the present age).—Heb. 9.8-9.

> And the Holy Spirit also bears witness to us; for after saying, 'This is the covenant that I will make with them . . .' then he adds, 'I will remember their sins and their misdeeds no more.'—Heb. 10.15-17.

> We have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who possess the Spirit. The unspiritual man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. . . . But we have the mind of Christ.—1 Cor. 2.12-14, 16.

In these verses we find mention of three distinct actions:

(*a*) a past of action *inspiration*: 'All scripture is inspired by God . . . in words taught by the Spirit . . . men moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God.'

(*b*) a present action of *communication*: 'The Holy Spirit says . . . the Holy Spirit indicates . . . the Holy Spirit also bears witness to us.'

[1] All biblical quotations in this article are from the R.S.V., unless otherwise indicated.

(*c*) a present action of *illumination*: 'They are spiritually discerned. . . . We have received . . . the Spirit . . . that we might understand. . . . We have the mind of Christ.'

The Bible is the Word of God because of this threefold action of God the Holy Spirit—a past action of inspiration, and a double present action of communication and illumination. In this action the Spirit remains sovereign, and the authority is ultimately His authority. Dr Reid is saying something very like this when he states

> that the locus of . . . inspiration is the Holy Spirit, that the Holy Spirit retains this function and does not delegate it to the words of the record.[1]

Let us therefore accept the fact of the verbal inspiration of the Bible, an inspiration that is objective, historical and permanent; at the same time let us guard ourselves from the danger of bibliolatry by recognising that the written record is *the Word of God in its intermediate stage*, and that it becomes the living, inspired Word of God to any human heart only when the Holy Spirit brings His work to completion by speaking through it and illuminating the mind to receive it. To isolate inspiration *or* communication *or* illumination, or to omit any of the three, is to be inadequate and untrue to the biblical record.[2] The purpose of God is to speak to a human heart through a human intermediary:

> And the LORD said to Moses, 'Say to the people of Israel . . .'[3]

God's Word to Israel was spoken first to Moses, but did not bring a response from Israel until spoken by him to the people. So God's Word to us is spoken through the words of the men who wrote the books of the Bible, but the speaking is done today, not by a dead book, but by the Living Spirit through whose inspiration the words were first written down, and whose grace moves our hearts to understand and to respond. In the words of Cowper's hymn:

[1] op. cit., p. 48. Reid is here speaking of Calvin's views.

[2] It might be said that Fundamentalists overstress inspiration, neo-Calvinists communication, and Liberals illumination (which they tend to equate with 'inspired commonsense!').

[3] Lev. 4.1, etc.

The Spirit breathes upon the word,
And brings the truth to sight. . . .
The hand that gave it still supplies
The gracious light and heat.[1]

Charles Wesley's words are more often sung:

Come, Holy Ghost, for moved by Thee
The prophets wrote and spoke;
Unlock the truth, Thyself the key;
Unseal the sacred book. . . .

God through Himself we then shall know,
If Thou within us shine.[2]

It is the late Dr Wheeler Robinson, however, who put the truth most vividly and picturesquely:

The Bible is written in invisible ink, until its hidden characters are brought out by the warmth of personal experience.[3]

VI. This account of the Spirit's work fits in exactly with Evangelical Christian experience. It is all too easy to be orthodox, and to be intellectually persuaded of the truth of Christianity, without having had any personal encounter with the living God in Jesus Christ. Those who have had a definite conversion-experience usually testify that at such a time God spoke to them: often verses of the Bible with which they were perfectly familiar 'spoke to them' in a new way, and with a new authority. Perhaps it was Billy Graham's 'The Bible says . . .' that did it; yet they know that the Word that came was not simply the work of a Book, however inspired, but came from the God who was speaking to them through it, and through Billy Graham's preaching—God the Holy Spirit. Bunyan knew the experience:

I have sometimes seen more in a line of the Bible than I could well tell how to stand under, and yet at another time the whole Bible hath been to me as dry as a stick; or rather, my heart hath been so dead and dry unto it, that I could not conceive the least drachm or refreshment, though I have looked it all over.[4]

Missionary experience gives the same answer—not all who

[1] Hymn 197, *R.C.H.*
[2] Hymn 196, *R.C.H.*
[3] *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, p. 232.
[4] *Grace Abounding*, Conclusion, para. 4.

read the Bible hear or understand the Word of God by any means; yet no other book can replace it in our evangelism, for no other book can claim to be the repository of that Word from which the Holy Spirit is ready to take of the things of Christ and reveal them. Often in missionary circles we hear such words as: 'So-and-so has heard the Gospel again and again. He has read the New Testament. Yet he goes on rejecting Christ.' So often the answer must be: 'How can you be sure that God has ever spoken to him, that the Gospel has come to him "not only in word, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction"?'[1] We too easily identify reading the Bible and hearing the Word of God, as though the Bible were a magic book, and not simply the vehicle which the Holy Spirit is ready to use in His own way and at His own time. The wind bloweth where it listeth.

Finally, in all reverence, can we not say that this was the experience of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word of God? He who was 'anointed with the Holy Spirit',[2] who 'utters the words of God, for it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit',[3] knew communion with God to the full. God spoke *by* His Son, but God also spoke *to* His Son through the words of the Old Testament. The 'It is written'[4] and 'Have you never read?'[5] are not references to an infallible book,[6] but to an infallible message spoken by God to His people through that book, a message which Jesus as man had heard from God the Spirit and understood by God the Spirit, so that it was 'through the Holy Spirit'[7] that He gave commandment to His apostles.

VII. The Spirit's work in presenting the Word of God is *both objective and subjective*, and it is wrong to isolate either aspect, or to treat objectivity and subjectivity as though it were a question of 'either-or'. The Spirit's work of inspiration has produced an objective medium of authority, but the authority itself is never such as to exclude the need for faith. The Church has always been tempted to choose the 'safe' path of legalism,

[1] 1 Thess. 1.5. [2] Acts 10.38. [3] John 3.34.
[4] Matt. 4.4, etc. [5] Mark 2.25, etc.
[6] Packer, op. cit., pp. 54-62 takes the opposite (and I believe mistaken) view, and builds the whole argument of his book on it. The argument is ruthlessly logical—but only if we accept his premiss!
[7] Acts 1.2.

and to set up obedience to an immutable, infallible law as an 'easier substitute' for the daily following of the Spirit of Christ. Similarly, I believe that the dilemma about the right use of reason which divides Hebert from Packer[1] is an unnecessary one: God wants us to use our reason in Bible study, and problems of biblical interpretation, but always in submission to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. We are called upon to accept and use with discrimination the helps which biblical criticism, historical and archaeological research, and so on, have provided, but always under the same Spirit's guidance. The Spirit has spoken again and again in the past, through individuals and through the Church, and we have an immense inheritance of interpretation, exposition, theological and doctrinal and credal statement, and so on; this we have to accept thankfully and discriminatingly, remembering that the Holy Spirit's work of interpretation and illumination goes on in every generation, and that 'God has more light and truth yet to break forth out of His holy Word'.[2] At the same time, interpretation may lead to difference of opinion between sincere and dedicated Christians, often because the truth is bigger than the insights they have been granted, so that both are right, yet neither wholly so.

3. Particular Applications

It is not the purpose of this article to supply ready-made answers to problems of biblical interpretation; we must, however, consider a few problems briefly, in order to indicate the lines along which a right understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit should lead towards a bridging of the gap between Fundamentalist and non-Fundamentalist.

A. 'Original Documents'. NT use of LXX

One of the difficulties which has to be faced by any who seek for a source of authority in the Bible is the fact that the original documents are not available. We have to depend on the acumen of textual critics to come as near as possible to the contents of the original texts. The Roman Catholic approach was to take one translation—the Vulgate—and declare it infallible,

[1] See Packer, op. cit., pp. 137-42 and *passim*.
[2] John Robinson, quoted in Packer, op. cit., p. 89.

all other manuscripts being misleading and erroneous.[1] A rather different approach is to emphasise the fact that modern discoveries, while they have brought to light many necessary corrections in accepted texts, have not materially altered any vital teaching; that therefore the Bible we have is as near in correctness to the original as matters. This view has, of course, received added weight since the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, with their confirmation of the essential soundness of the Massoretic Text.

A right understanding of the Holy Spirit's work affords a more profitable and realistic approach. While we must welcome all that research and scholarship can tell us about the original text, we base our obedience to the Bible's authority not primarily or merely on its objective approximation to correctness, but on the Word which the Living Spirit addresses to us through it. Experience and faith alike forbid us to limit the operation of God's Holy Spirit by the meticulous accuracy or otherwise of the biblical text through which He speaks. He is sovereign under any circumstances. He spoke to the original writers, and inspired them. Are we to deny that He has often guided and inspired translators, too, as they prayed for 'the right word'? Again and again, too, He has spoken to hearts even through wrong, or misunderstood, or erroneous texts and translations, as many who have heard God speak through the A.V. can testify. For instance, how many thousands have been helped by the translation of Job 13.15 as 'Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him'?[2] A friend of mine, about to have his appendix removed, received real comfort from God as he read of 'the operation of his hands'.[3] It is right for us to seek the correctest text available, and welcome up-to-date translations, but even if we cannot obtain full accuracy, we can rest assured that 'the word of God is not bound',[4] for the very reason that the Living Spirit is speaking today.

When we realise this, the problem of the apparent misquotation of the Old Testament by New Testament writers, or

[1] This attitude has recently been modified, but in matters of faith and life is unchanged. One is reminded of the action of the Caliph Uthman, who declared one version of the Quran correct and ordered all the rest to be burnt. The attitude of some extreme American Fundamentalists to the R.S.V. suggests a tendency to regard the A.V. as an infallible translation.

[2] R.S.V. translates: 'Behold, he will slay me; I have no hope.'

[3] Ps. 28.5, A.V.

[4] 2 Tim. 2.9, A.V.

the use of variant LXX translations,[1] assumes its correct pro portions—it may raise questions of exegesis, but it is no longe a problem to faith.

B. Authorship and 'Authenticity'

One difficulty caused by too mechanical a view of inspiration or too rigidly historical an approach, arises over the question of authorship. Fundamentalists who are ready to admit tha certain of the historical books of the Bible (e.g. 1 Chronicles are compilations, are prevented by their view of inspiration from making the same admission about the prophetic books and sometimes go so far as to insist that they were completely dictated or written down by the prophets themselves.[2] At the opposite extreme are those Liberals whose endeavour to approach the problem historically leads them to make a rigid distinction between the prophet's own work and 'later accretions'. The double square brackets in the Moffat Bible are typical of this approach, or a remark like this of Dr George Adam Smith about Jeremiah:

> How pathetic that even after his death he is not spared from spoiling, but that the last clear streams of his prophesying must run out, as we have seen, in the sands of these expanders![3]

It is taken for granted that later additions are the dross which must be separated from the gold. Thus both the Fundamentalist and extreme Liberal approach, though so widely different, have a common presupposition—that what is inspired and important is what can be proved to be by the prophet himself. In order to hear God speaking to you, says the Fundamentalist, it is essential to believe that you have before you the *ipsissima verba* of the prophet, who once declared 'Thus saith the LORD', and so declares today. In order to hear God speaking to you, says the Liberal, you must first of all sift away later accretions, then imagine yourself in the situation of a contemporary of the prophet, make the necessary adjustments, and apply what is

[1] e.g. of Isa. 7.14, where the Greek *παρθένος must* be translated 'virgin', and is so used by Matthew as a prophecy of the Virgin Birth.

[2] I have found this view common among Pakistani Christians who prided themselves on their orthodoxy. O. T. Allis, *The Unity of Isaiah* (a recent I.V.F. publication), has much to say about authorship, but little to say on the unity of the book's message, and is a typical example of emphasis put on the wrong place.

[3] *Jeremiah*, p. 316.

elevant of his message to your own situation and problems. urely we have to say to the Fundamentalist: 'You are limiting he Holy Spirit. Does He who inspires prophets not inspire ditors too?' At the same time we must say to the Liberal: 'You re despising God's providence. Valuable as questions of uthorship and historical reconstruction may be, God has given is the books of the prophets as compilations, and He speaks to is through them in their present form. It is our primary task o recognise and obey His voice, rather than to "improve on" he vehicle of His communication by omissions and rearrangenents.'[1]

Snaith has wise words to say on this subject:

> The literary criticism . . . of the Old Testament has often forgotten that hose who pieced the Old Testament together, pieced it together as we have now. They chose the order we have. The analysis of the sources is but he first step in literary criticism. The editors had the final say, and they sed all the material from its varied sources in order to teach their particular nessage. This message, that of Scripture as a whole, can never be found so ong as we think of the Bible only with respect to its literary sources. . . . We need both elements in Bible study, the message of the men who under God were responsible for the various strata, and the message of those who under God were the final editors. In both the truth of the Bible is to be found. . . . In the New Testament, the fact that there are a number of Lucan sources has never prevented us from speaking of the message of that Gospel as a whole. But in the Old Testament we have been so busy with he trees that we have sometimes neglected the wood.[2]

He applies this to the documentary study of the Pentateuch:

> Even the good order of J, E, D and P may corrupt the scholarly world. We have been so very energetic in isolating each from other, and even within each, in separating stratum from stratum, that we have tended to forget that there might be method even in the madness which so thoroughly dovetailed them together. Perhaps after all that madness was divine.[3]

We have to approach the question of 'authenticity' in the ame way, in particular with reference to such books as 2 Peter nd the Pastoral Epistles.[4] I believe that the first necessity for

[1] I believe that much solid work is called for today along these lines. An ndication of how the method might be used may be found in an article by the resent writer in *The Life of Faith* entitled 'The Shepherd of Bethlehem' (15th Dec. 955) in which it is briefly applied to the study of Micah.

[2] N. Snaith, *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*, p. 89, n. 1.

[3] ibid., p. 13.

[4] See Packer, op. cit., pp. 182-6 for an attempt to explain as reasonable what Dr Hebert feels to be a real inconsistency of the *New Bible Commentary* on this issue.

a coming together of the different schools of thought is to drop this question-begging term 'authenticity'. The action of the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, in accepting these books into the Canon, guarantees their authenticity as part of the Word of God; it does not in itself guarantee the exact authorship of every part of every epistle. It is not as though we have to divide 2 Timothy into parts by Paul and parts by a later editor, and attend to Paul and neglect the editor! Whether by Paul or not, here is the Word through which God wants to speak to us! Surely the time has come for us to recognise that in such cases the question of authorship is definitely secondary, and that those who come to differing conclusions about it are neither to be laughed at as obscurantists, nor treated with suspicion as possible infidels.

C. Historical Criticism

Not much need be said on the subject of historical criticism, which has already been referred to in the preceding section. Surely one of the greatest contributions of the scholarship of the past century has been the tremendous light it has shed on the historical background of the Bible. Dr Packer makes the stock Fundamentalist claim that historical criticism has not increased in any marked way our understanding of the essential message of the Bible:

> Criticism has thrown much light on the human features of Scripture, but it has not greatly furthered our knowledge of the Word of God.[1]

It is true that God's Spirit in the past has not been limited in His power of utterance and illumination by the historical ignorance of His hearers. Nevertheless we have only to examine the *New Bible Commentary* (especially the commentaries on Old Testament books) to see how much its writers owe to historical criticism in their presentation of the meaning of the Biblical message. At the same time, we must in our turn remember that the usefulness of historical criticism is limited: the Holy Spirit remains sovereign. Often the historical background of a verse or passage is clear, and very illuminating. Often, again, it is

The importance which Dr Packer attaches to the question can be seen in his last sentence: 'to deny authenticity is to deny canonicity also'.

[1] op. cit., p. 113. See pp. 112-13 *passim*.

the very reverse, and there is wide disagreement among scholars. If we can 'get inside' a past situation it may help us a lot in our understanding of a message which was originally given in it; often, however, we just do not know, and possibly the obscurity is in itself an indication that a different approach is called for. For instance, the understanding of Isaiah 33 is tremendously helped if it is seen against the background of the details of Sennacherib's invasion[1]; the background of chapters 24-27, on the other hand, is extremely obscure, and they are perhaps better seen in the context of the whole book as summing up in cosmic terms the prophecies of doom applied to individual nations in chapters 13-23. We have to remember, too, that the message of a biblical passage is never limited to its local historical situation: it has to be seen in the context of the whole Bible. New Testament writers often use Old Testament verses in a way that seems to contradict the conclusions of historical criticism, just because they see that their message has a wider and deeper reference.[2]

D. Historical and Scientific Accuracy

The question of whether the Bible is historically and scientifically inerrant is still the main battleground between the average Fundamentalist and the non-Fundamentalist. It is true, as we have seen,[3] that on such subjects as the Fall, Hebert and Packer express very similar conclusions; the modern Fundamentalist is prepared to allow for the existence of poetry and poetic expressions which are not meant to be taken literally. Nevertheless, at the ordinary level, the chasm remains. The Fundamentalist believes that verbal inspiration necessarily implies infallibility of factual statement; the non-Fundamentalist denies any necessary connection. Dr Hebert points out that for the ordinary twentieth-century man, this is a major issue:

> The ordinary modern reader of a biblical narrative wants chiefly to know what exactly it was that happened, or what a trained observer would have seen if he had been there; and he thinks this is the real truth of the matter.[4]

[1] As in G. A. Smith, *The Book of Isaiah*, vol. I, pp. 331-42.
[2] On this see further Reid, op. cit., pp. 251-2.
[3] *supra*, p. 36
[4] Hebert, *The Authority of the Old Testament*, quoted in Reid, op. cit., p. 158.

Dr Reid points out that this is essentially a modern attitude, and that earlier Christian interpreters were much readier to escape from the purely historical by means of allegory and type.

On this subject one or two things must be said briefly:

(i) The primary purpose of the Bible is not to teach science or history. In and through the Bible God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ is central, and everything else is auxiliary.

(ii) A core of hard historical fact is essential to the Christian message. As Dr Hebert well puts it:

> If the Exodus story were not in substance true, the faith of Israel about its own vocation would be grounded on a falsehood; and the same is true of our Lord's resurrection, as St. Paul says in so many words. . . . The truth of the biblical narrative of the working out of God's purpose can be checked at all the main points by internal . . . and . . . external evidence. . . . We may reflect that it would raise difficulties for us if it could be proved that Pontius Pilate never existed.[1]

(iii) I believe that Fundamentalists would be drawn much closer to other Christians if they took their stand firmly on the essential purpose of the Bible as authority 'for faith and life', and recognised that their own belief in historical and scientific inerrancy springs from their faith in that essential authority. The Bible is not the Word of God because it is infallible in matters of science and history; it is open to Christians to believe that it is infallible in matters of science and history because it is the Word of God. Therefore attempts to *prove* its inerrancy in these spheres by reason (some of which may seem to non-Fundamentalists to involve intellectual dishonesty and juggling with the facts) are ruled out as wrong and unnecessary.[2] The foundation is not there, and the foundation is not shaken if such an infallibility is not believed in. On the other hand, if such an infallibility is accepted as a consequence, not a foundation, non-Fundamentalists should stop laughing at the idea, and classing such a faith with that of the man who said he would believe that Jonah swallowed the whale if the Bible said so!

(iv) There are places where the findings of historians or scientists may contradict Bible statements, and show the writers

[1] *Fundamentalism and the Church of God*, p. 43. Hebert's whole discussion is very helpful. It is a pity that Packer (op. cit., p. 65, n. 2) treats it so suspiciously.

[2] Hebert, op. cit., pp. 86-87, etc., makes valid criticisms of the *New Bible Commentary* on this score.

to have been wrong in matters of detail. For the non-Fundamentalist, such contradictions are not a problem to faith, but he may emphasise them in such a way that he poses problems to the faith of others. In some cases a contradiction is due to the limited nature of historical and scientific knowledge, and further discoveries may prove the biblical statement to be right, as they have frequently done in recent years. A statement that such-and-such a biblical detail doesn't square with history or science must, therefore, always be made humbly, and with a mind open to new discovery. At the same time the emphasis should never be there, but always on the positive truth that God has to teach through the passage.

(v) Essentially the same attitude should be taken with regard to 'discrepancies' between one passage and another. The Fundamentalist may say boldly, 'There is no discrepancy', or ingeniously try to prove that there is none; or he may say, 'I can't explain the discrepancy, but because of my faith that there is no ultimate contradiction, I don't allow the matter to worry me.' I believe there is a more positive approach. It is this: 'The Holy Spirit has allowed two accounts, apparently at variance, to be recorded. What does He want to teach me through this?' To take only two examples: Matt. 5.3 has 'Blessed are the poor in spirit', and Luke 6.20 'Blessed are you poor'—which is right? The Liberal will say Luke: Matthew is offended, and spiritualises a plain statement. The Fundamentalist will say both: they are two separate sayings on different occasions. But a more constructive approach is to say that Luke gives Jesus' *saying*, and Matthew gives the Holy Spirit's explanation of Jesus' *meaning*. By *saying* 'poor' Jesus *meant* 'poor in spirit'. Again, the apparent discrepancy between Matt. 19.16-17 and Mark 10.17-18 (softened down in the A.V.) may well have a similar purpose—to get at the deeper spiritual significance of the rich man's question and Jesus' reply.[1]

E. Moral and Spiritual Infallibility

While the battleground is on the question of historical and scientific infallibility, the place of real practical difficulty is that

[1] I have used this approach in discussions with Ahmadiyya Muslims, who make the verses in Mark a basis for attacking the sinlessness of Christ, and found it helpful.

where guidance for faith and life is involved, the realm of moral and spiritual authority. This came out clearly in the recent correspondence in *Life and Work*, when the attitude that a Christian should take to Psalm 137.9—'Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones'[1]—was made an issue between Fundamentalist and non-Fundamentalist. Gone are the days when the problem could be solved by wholesale allegory, as in Origen's masterly, beautiful, but exegetically unsound exposition:

> The infants of Babylon, which means confusion, are the confused thoughts caused by evil which have just been implanted and are growing up in the soul. The man who takes hold of them, so that he breaks their heads by the firmness and solidity of the Word, is dashing the infants of Babylon against the rock; and on this account he becomes blessed.[2]

One Liberal solved the problem by stating baldly that 'God's Word to men is within the Bible, but not within *all* the Bible', obviously not in Psalm 137.9.[3] One Fundamentalist line of approach is to distinguish between *revelation* and *inspiration*—all Scripture is equally inspired, but not all reveals the love of God to the same degree.[4] Revelation is looked on as progressive, e.g. people could not understand God's love aright until His righteousness had been revealed to them. Dr Reid will have none of this:

> It is [the] record of revelation that can alone be rightly said to progress, not the revelation itself.[5]

Again, I believe that a true doctrine of the Holy Spirit's work in presenting God's Word to us gives us real help. We are not left to work things out for ourselves by ourselves. The verse is God's Word to us only when the Holy Spirit has made plain to us in the context of the whole Bible. If I might be allowed to repeat what I have written elsewhere:

> We might think of the Bible as like a portrait of Jesus, whose details are interpreted to us by the Spirit as we read. Such a portrait has its shadows—black patches which by themselves tell us practically nothing, but which are needed to show up the radiance of the face. Other parts of the picture

[1] A.V.
[2] See *Contra Celsum*, VII, 18-26. I quote from Chadwick's translation.
[3] *Life and Work*, June 1958, p. 138.
[4] e.g. the late Dr J. Rendle Short in *The Bible and Modern Research*, last chapter.
[5] Reid, op. cit., p. 184.

seem indistinct or even nondescript, yet they are alike necessary. The face tells us more at a glance than other parts of the picture can after long study, yet if left by itself it would be a mutilated, imperfect likeness.[1]

In our own generation, for Fundamentalist and non-Fundamentalist alike, there is a growing recognition of the unity of the Bible, and the need for seeing it as a whole. We should be deeply grateful for this. At the same time, it is salutary to recall words which Dr James Denney wrote on this subject more than fifty years ago, when Liberalism was at the height of its power:

> Usually those who are perplexed about the inspiration of the Bible discuss their difficulties with no consideration of what the Bible means as a whole; and yet it is only as a whole that we can attach any meaning to its being inspired. There is no sense in saying that every separate sentence is inspired; we know that every separate sentence is not. There are utterances of bad men in the Bible, and suggestions of the Devil. Neither is there any sense in going through the Bible with a blue pencil and striking out what is not inspired that we may stand by the rest . . . it is precarious and presumptuous to the highest degree. . . . It is just as futile to attempt to graduate the inspiration of Scripture, to mark the ebb and flow of the Divine presence in the heart of the writer, or the gradual rise of the tide from the remote beginnings of revelation till it reaches its height in Christ. . . . We shall never know what inspiration is until Scripture has resolved itself for us into a unity . . . its testimony to a love in God which we do not earn, but which in our sins comes to meet us . . . a love which becomes incarnate in the Lamb of God bearing the sin of the world . . . and putting it away by the sacrifice of Himself. . . . Whoever believes in this believes in inspiration in the only sense which can be rationally attached to the word.'[2]

These words, written by one who was decidedly Evangelical in his outlook, and not a Fundamentalist, may fittingly bring to a close this tentative effort at bridge-building. Stressing as they do, in Denney's own direct and pungent way, the central evangelical message of God's love based on objective facts and calling for a subjective response when it 'comes to meet us', it speaks to us of the right attitude in which to approach Bible study, stressing once more the wrongness of regarding the subjective and objective as irreconcilable opposites, instead of as the two complementary sides of the work of God the Holy Spirit, in taking of the things of Christ, and revealing them to us.

[1] *Life and Work*, Aug. 1958, p. 197.
[2] *The Death of Christ* (1902), pp. 315-17.

DEATH AND LIFE IN CHRIST

THE MEANING OF 2 CORINTHIANS 5.1-10

by The Rev. RONALD BERRY

In 1 Cor. 15, his fullest doctrinal statement on the resurrection of the dead, Paul teaches that Christians will receive their spiritual body at the Parousia, those who are dead by resurrection and those who are still alive by transformation. The term applied to the dead, οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ, suggests a provisional and intermediate state from which they will 'awake' at the Lord's coming. Paul does not, however, discuss the nature of this state.

Recently (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 10, pp. 174-94) the Rev. R. F. Hettlinger has argued strongly and fully in favour of the view that in 2 Cor. 5.1-10 we find a striking modification of this earlier teaching, in that the Apostle now declares that he expects to put on the spiritual body at the moment of death. In this paper I shall seek to uphold the view taken by those scholars who fail to see in this passage such a change of mind, but rather believe that Paul is contemplating with apprehension the state of 'nakedness' which death will entail, should it precede the longed-for Parousia; and that he overcomes this apprehension in recalling the certainty of the final resurrection and of the presence of the Lord in the time of waiting.

The question cannot be decided apart from a close examination of the text of 2 Cor. 5.1-10, but it is worth while to note one or two general considerations which arouse scepticism about the alleged development in doctrine.

(*a*) The 'development' amounts to a flat contradiction of teaching which Paul has carefully and clearly stated. 1 Cor. 15 is a much more carefully considered piece of writing than 2 Cor. 5.1-10.

(*b*) The reasons advanced for it seem inadequate in the face of other evidence. It is suggested that the afflictions Paul underwent in Asia forced him to reckon with the likelihood that he would not himself survive to the Parousia and led him to

revise his views on the situation of the dead in Christ. Certainly his sufferings were much in Paul's mind when he wrote 2 Cor., and doubtless the recollection of them occasioned his writing the passage 5.1-10; but the reason for giving expression to a particular teaching is not necessarily the motive for formulating it. Physical death must have been a live question from the very beginning of the Apostle's missionary activities; it was raised in the Thessalonian correspondence (1 Thess. 4.13-18), and 1 Cor. 15 was apparently written in reply to doubts that some had raised concerning the dead (15.12). Paul himself had been in danger of death on at least one occasion before his trials in Asia (1 Cor. 15.31f). It can scarcely be claimed that the problem of death was new to him, either doctrinally or personally. In any case, are we to suppose that he was the sort of man who would hold one view when the death of others was under consideration, only to adopt another, more congenial, view when his own death seemed imminent? Such developments as may be detected in Paul's teaching surely did not arise from self-regarding motives. If, on the other hand, it is suggested that his change of mind was simply the fruit of further reflection, we must ask whether sufficient time elapsed between the two Corinthian epistles to account for such a substantial modification.

(*c*) There is no sign in Paul's earlier writing of any preparation for a new understanding of the fortunes of the dead in Christ. Mr Hettlinger makes a valiant attempt to detect such a preparation in 1 Cor. 15:

> The seed of the conviction, expressed in 2 Cor. 5, that the clothing of the dead in Christ does not wait upon the Parousia may perhaps be reflected in the fact that he asks, not 'what manner of body do they *receive* (at the Parousia)?', but 'with what manner of body do they *come* (with Christ)?' (1 Cor. 15.35). (p. 188)

The attempt is quite unsuccessful; 1 Cor. 15.23 explicitly connects the resurrection of Christians, dead or living, with the Parousia: '. . . then they who belong to Christ, at his Parousia'. Moreover the two questions of 1 Cor. 15.35 are in close parallelism; 'With what manner of body do they come?' simply elucidates the preceding 'How are the dead raised?' so that *come* is synonymous with *are raised*. To read into it the

thought of 'coming with Christ', as distinct from bodily resurrection, is quite unjustified.

(*d*) The supposedly new teaching is introduced by the words οἴδαμεν γάρ (2 Cor. 5.1) as though it were beyond dispute. There is nothing to indicate that Paul is making here a fresh departure in doctrine.

Turning now to the text of 2 Cor. 5.1-10, we find that v. 1 offers no clear guidance for the interpretation of the passage as a whole. There cannot be much doubt that οἰκοδομή refers in some sense to the spiritual body; Dr J. A. T. Robinson's suggestion (*The Body*, p. 76) that it means the Body of Christ, the Church, is unconvincing; the statistical evidence he adduces is insufficient to uphold his contention. Nevertheless, the use of the word οἰκοδομή, which suggests a building still in course of erection, is perhaps significant. Ἔχομεν cannot mean that we now possess this 'building' in the sense of inhabiting it, for the next verse declares a longing to be clothed with it and it is moreover 'in the heavens'. The meaning might be either 'we shall possess at death' or 'we shall possess at the Parousia'. But the choice of the term οἰκοδομή, in conjunction with what Paul has said in the previous verse (4.18), suggests that the verb may have its natural present sense and that the spiritual body

> already exists, in some sense, as a heavenly reality which partakes of the character of eternity. (L. S. Thornton, *The Common Life in the Body of Christ*, p. 285)

This meaning seems to involve no greater difficulty than does Col. 3.3 (which is not dissimilar) or the Johannine Christ's 'I go to prepare a place for you.'

If we ask when this οἰκοδομή becomes οἰκητήριον the answer suggested by Paul's other writings is undoubtedly: at the Parousia. Mr Hettlinger finds this 'an intolerable anticlimax' in our present passage:

> Having dwelt on the problems raised by the fact that he may *not* now survive to the Parousia, the Apostle is supposed to express his assurance of something that will happen if he *does* survive to the Parousia. (p. 184)

In fact this is not so. The Apostle's assurance is of something

which is already a reality 'in the heavens' and will mean the bestowal of the spiritual body at the Parousia whether he survives in the flesh to that Day or not. In 1 Thess. 4.15 Paul had already said that those who are still alive at the Parousia will have no advantage over the dead; here he is repeating that assertion in terms of his own possible death.

It is entirely in accord with this that in vv. 2-4 Paul should turn his attention briefly to the situation between death and the Parousia, should death come first. What he has said might lead to the inference that he regards death as completely irrelevant and is wholly unmoved at the prospect of its approach. These verses acknowledge that it is not so; the prospect of dying involves the Apostle in a tension of groaning and longing, which, however, is not inimical to the confidence he has voiced but is a corollary of it, serving to corroborate it. The γάρ of v. 2 connects it closely with what precedes:

For in this present life, indeed, we groan, longing to be clothed over with our dwelling from heaven.

Our assurance of the heavenly οἰκητήριον is confirmed in experience; since (γάρ) we long to put it on. The influence of threatening death is seen in Paul's use of στενάζειν and ἐπενδύεσθαι. He does not simply long for the spiritual body, he 'groans', longing for it; he does not desire simply to be clothed with it, but 'to be clothed over' with it.[1] If faith imparts the expectation of a spiritual body, the threat of death makes that expectation a strained yearning that the spiritual body might be bestowed while we are still on earth. The explanation of this last fact is given in v. 4, which reiterates the statement of v. 2 with the addition of βαρούμενοι, which either has the same meaning as in 2 Cor. 1.8, 'being burdened with afflictions', or means 'being burdened with anxiety'.

For indeed we who are in the tent (physical frame) groan, being burdened; because we do not want to be unclothed, but to be additionally clothed.

[1] Ἐπενδύεσθαι clearly seems to mean (cf. its cognate noun) 'to put on *over* (something else)', 'to superimpose': the reference is to the assumption of the spiritual body over the subsisting physical frame, i.e. to the Parousia's forestalling death. If the sentence referred to a clothing with the spiritual body *at death*, as Mr Hettlinger believes, the force of the prefix ἐπ- would be lost, for there would be no previous 'clothing' left, over which the spiritual body might be put on. The final clause of v. 4—'that our mortality might be swallowed up in life'—confirms this interpretation (cf. 1 Cor. 15-54).

Death would mean losing the covering of the physical body before the receiving of the spiritual body, thus bringing a period of disembodiment which Paul finds repugnant. That is why his Parousia-longing is strained and tense.[1] It is a weakness of Mr Hettlinger's translation that he is obliged to take ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θέλομεν as 'not because we wish', which is to be accepted as a last resort only if the more natural 'because we do not wish' prove impossible.

The intervening verse (v. 3) presents difficulties on any reading of the passage. As Mr Hettlinger points out (p. 178) such a translation as that of Dr J. A. T. Robinson (op. cit., p. 77)

> If, indeed, it *is* as clothed and not naked that we shall be found (sc. at the Parousia),

is inadmissible. *Ἐνδυσάμενοι* cannot mean 'in a clothed state' which would be *ἐνδεδυμένοι*; nor can a distinction safely be made between *ἐνδύεσθαι* and *ἐπενδύεσθαι* here as though the former meant 'clothed with the physical body' and the latter 'over-clothed with the spiritual body'. *Ἐνδύεσθαι* here is for *ἐπενδύεσθαι* (see Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 115). Further, *εὑρεθησόμεθα* does not necessarily mean 'found at the Parousia', despite Dr Robinson's suggestion that it is a technical term for being 'dis-covered' at the Last Day (op. cit., p. 77); the word more probably has a general reference. These considerations do not, however, bind us to the acceptance of Mr Hettlinger's own translation:

> On the assumption of course that when we have put on this clothing at death we shall not be found naked before God.

The verse may equally well read:

> On the assumption of course[2] that if we put on this clothing before death

[1] If *βαρούμενοι* is 'burdened with affliction', the Apostle acknowledges that his longing is most acute when death seems most imminent, because of his unwillingness to face 'nakedness'; if (as I think more likely) it means 'burdened with anxiety', he acknowledges that his longing is strained and anxious because the prospect of 'nakedness' is unwelcome.

[2] Plummer, in loc., says, 'The force of the *καί* is to strengthen the doubt expressed by *εἴ γε*.' This is very doubtful; *εἴ γε* in the NT does not seem to express doubt, but to imply that the clause it introduces is a virtual certainty, an almost axiomatic premiss (cf. Bonnard on Gal. 3.4: 'Dans le NT *εἴ γε* semble indiquer que le fait envisagé n'est pas hypothétique mais réel').

Thus *εἴ γε καί* here means 'since obviously', 'assuming, as is certainly the case, that'. Perhaps 'on the grounds that' is the best translation in the present context: '. . . on the grounds that if we put it on we shall not be found naked'.

(the Parousia coming first) we shall not be found naked (as would be the case were death to come first).

There is nothing to choose grammatically between these two renderings; the choice must rest on other considerations, including the way in which v. 4 is understood.

V. 5, which is to be taken in close connexion with what precedes, insists that it is none other than God Himself who has brought Paul εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, to the state he has described, of both assurance of and longing for the spiritual body, in that He has bestowed in the Spirit the guarantee of final salvation. Whether a time of 'nakedness' is to be endured or not, the outcome will be resurrection life in its fulness. Vv. 6-8 point out, as a further source of encouragement, that the state of 'nakedness' is not without its advantage. Here the phrases ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος are much more natural as descriptions of present physical 'clothing' and future 'nakedness' in death than they would be as descriptions of present physical 'clothing' and future spiritual 'clothing'. 'Absent from the body' means 'present in the spiritual body', according to Mr Hettlinger. It seems more reasonable to recognise here a statement that death brings, not only nakedness, but release from the relative separation from Christ which is imposed by earthly life, where, though we have faith to guide us, we are denied sight. 'Nakedness' notwithstanding, death has its attractive side for the Christian, and Paul considering this is prepared to leave the security of the physical body for the sake of being 'at home with the Lord'. Mr Hettlinger protests (p. 178) that this interpretation stumbles over the obvious meaning of εὐδοκοῦμεν μᾶλλον in v. 8, which (he says) is 'we would rather', 'we prefer'. Although I do not consider this to be a weighty objection, it may be pointed out that 'we prefer' may not be the sense of εὐδοκοῦμεν μᾶλλον at all; to translate it so implies that μᾶλλον qualifies ευ- only and not the whole verb. If εὐδοκοῦμεν is 'we think it well', εὐδοκοῦμεν μᾶλλον is probably 'the more do we think it well', 'we are the more content'. Indeed it is possible that the adverb qualifies ἐκδημῆσαι, since it usually precedes the verb with which it is associated; the sense would then be 'we are content, rather to depart'. Vv. 9 and 10 sum up the whole discussion in terms of Paul's attitude to his ministry; the possibility of early death

makes no difference to his object of pleasing Christ, for it makes no difference to the fact that whatever happens the last judgment must one day be faced.

If the exegesis we have proposed is substantially sound, Paul here recalls that the outward appearance of life (physical weakness, approaching death) is by no means the whole truth about the Christian. Unseen eternal realities are to be reckoned with, and if death comes to destroy the outward man it cannot alter that invisible reality of life which consists in our attachment to the risen Lord, continues when the flesh is dissolved, and finally will issue in the assumption of the spiritual body. That we long already to put on the spiritual body (while we are still in the flesh, thus avoiding disembodiment) only underlines our assurance of its certain bestowal. That the longing is tense and anxious is due to the fact that we do not want the disembodiment of death but the additional covering brought by the Lord's coming, the transformation of mortality into eternal life.

It should be made clear that Paul's shrinking from 'nakedness' is not merely an instinctive or natural shrinking from death. It is itself informed by his Christian faith, since (*a*) the source of his longing for the Parousia and spiritual body is his belonging to Christ, and (*b*) it is the assurance of the spiritual body which throws into relief the incompleteness of the state of 'nakedness'. The Christian hope makes death seem less natural, not more; it is God, not nature, who has involved Paul in his state of anxious expectation, and that by giving the earnest of final salvation in the Spirit.

That God is behind the tension of earthly Christian experience confirms the Apostle's confidence. And he is the more willing to face death since the limitations of earthly life 'in bondage to corruption' keep us from the Lord. Though death might mean temporary 'nakedness' it would also mean freedom from this earthly frustration. In view of all this, Paul's constant endeavour is to be acceptable to Christ whether he lives on or dies. Neither alternative can alter the most important fact, that all must eventually face judgment.

We are now in a position to discuss the claim (Hettlinger, p. 176) that, by refusing to recognise a modification of doctrine

between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5, we find ourselves attributing to Paul a 'significant change of mind within the compass of ten verses'. Our interpretation implies no such change of mind; what it implies is that Paul was *in two minds* about death—a very different thing. A man may well dislike one aspect of an experience intensely and yet be prepared to undergo that experience—may *prefer* it even, if the translation 'we would prefer' is insisted upon—because of its other aspects. One may shrink from undergoing a surgical operation, for example, while nevertheless wishing to undergo it. It seems that death, to Paul, wears two faces, because he regards life in the flesh in a dual way. The body is on the one hand a means of security by virtue of which we live in the familiar environment and solidarity of human life, and on the other hand that which ties us to sinful and limited 'Adam', denies us sight, and imposes moral frustration (Rom. 7.15-24). To leave the body at death is therefore at one and the same time to be stripped of its security and to be delivered from its encumbrances; at one and the same time desirable and undesirable.

The interpretation which envisages the clothing with the spiritual body at death requires us to regard the Apostle as actively longing for death. This is a very strong objection, for two reasons. (*a*) Such a death-wish is not in harmony with the biblical viewpoint, according to which death is something alien, intimately bound up with sin (cf. 1 Cor. 15.26). (*b*) In 2 Cor. 1.10 Paul not only rejoices in his past deliverance from death but declares himself hopeful of similar deliverance in the future. He can hardly be supposed to express, in the same epistle, both the hope of being spared death and the desire for death. Here, however, Mr Hettlinger would refer us to Phil. 1.23, where Paul does express a certain desire for death:

> having the desire to depart and be with Christ: for it is very far better.

There is no doubt that we do find a change here in the Apostle's attitude: he no longer makes reference to the possibility of 'nakedness'; his reason now for seeing a certain attractiveness in continuing earthly life is the need of his readers. Yet he is still in two minds about death (*συνέχομαι ἐκ τῶν δύο*) and his qualified expression of desire to depart and be with Christ falls far short of a groaning longing for death. The whole tone of

the passage is calmer, less urgent, than that of 2 Cor. 5.1-10; Paul no longer feels that he is in real danger of death, but feels confident he will survive (Phil. 1.25). In this situation his foreboding of death's nakedness has subsided and his desire to be with the Lord correspondingly increased. Between 2 Cor. 5 and Phil. 1, therefore, Paul has admittedly modified his attitude; but the modification is readily understandable as a genuine development of what has gone before, and is in no sense a contradiction.

We may next consider the place of 2 Cor. 5.1-10, as we have interpreted it, in the Pauline doctrine of risen life, and ask what exactly Paul means by the 'nakedness' of death. In our discussion we must include the Pauline uses of the verbs ἐνδύεσθαι and ἐγείρειν, the idea of corporate solidarity as it is associated with the word σῶμα, and the relationship between that corporate solidarity and the individual Christian life in Pauline doctrine.

It is important to recognise that Paul uses ἐνδύεσθαι and ἐγείρειν in two distinct though related senses; I shall briefly examine his use of these two words in turn. The relevant texts in which ἐνδύεσθαι occurs fall into two groups: (*a*) Rom. 13.14, Gal. 3.27, Eph. 4.24, Col. 3.10; (*b*) 1 Cor. 15.53f, 2 Cor. 5.2-4.

The first group is concerned with the present Christian life. In Gal. 3.27: 'As many of you as were baptised into Christ did put on Christ', although Christ is doubtless regarded as an 'inclusive person' there is no direct reference to the corporate solidarity of Christians; that is implied only in so far as baptism 'into Christ' involves incorporation into the Church. Baptism itself is an individual experience, happening at different times to different people, and what is said here to be its significant implication ('putting on Christ') is likewise an individual matter; it is not merely equivalent to 'becoming part of the Body of Christ'. Both the preceding and the succeeding verses confirm this. It is not said that in Christ all form a corporate son of God, but that all through faith are severally sons of God in Christ Jesus (3.26). It is not said that Jew and Greek, bond and free, male and female are for all their differences one Body in Christ, but that there is no such status as Jew or Greek, bond or free, male or female; all are one in Christ Jesus (3.28). *Εἷς*

must be, not 'one corporate unity', but 'one and the same in status and privilege'. The individual reference is supported by Rom. 13.14:

> Put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh to fulfil its lusts;

for as E. Best says (*One Body in Christ*, p. 68), only individuals can respond to an imperative. The verse exhorts Christians to 'put on' the character of Christ in their moral conduct. In Col. 3.10 and Eph. 4.24 Christians are said to put on 'the new man'. In Col. 3.10, as in Gal. 3.27, we have the indicative:

> Ye have put on the new man who is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him who created him.

Although it is tempting to see a corporate reference in the phrase 'the new man', it would probably be wrong to do so. The statement that God has created this new man brings to mind 2 Cor 5.17, and there the 'new creature' is 'any man in Christ' Eph. 4.24, which also speaks of God's having created the new man, is an imperative: 'Put on the new man', and therefore individually intended. We conclude that 'putting on Christ' and 'putting on the new man' describe the status and relationship to the risen Lord of the individual Christian, into which he enters by faith and baptism and which corresponds to his belonging to the corporate Body of Christ. This 'clothing' is already possessed (Gal. 3.27, Col. 3.10) and must be realised in life and conduct (Rom. 13.14, Eph. 4.24)

In the second group of texts, on the other hand, we find that the reference is wholly to the future. *Ἐνδύεσθαι* (*ἐπενδύεσθαι*) has as its object not Christ or the new man but 'incorruption', 'immortality', 'our dwelling from heaven'. 1 Cor. 15.53f explicitly sets *this* 'putting on' at the Parousia, and I have argued that 2 Cor. 5.2-4 does the same. The verses refer to the assumption of the spiritual body by virtue of which Christians will then be incorporate in the resurrection life of the kingdom of God (cf. 1 Cor. 15.50); this cannot be said to have already begun.

The texts in which *ἐγείρειν* occurs correspondingly fall into two groups: (*a*) Eph. 2.6, Col. 2.12, 3.1; (*b*) 1 Cor. 15.15-52, 2 Cor. 4.14.

Again the first group has to do with the present Christian life; and Paul uses here the compound verb *συνεγείρειν*. In

Christ Jesus God has raised us up with him (Eph. 2.6); in baptism we were also raised with him through faith in the working of God (Col. 2.12). In Col. 3.1 this 'being raised with Christ' is made the basis of an imperative:

> If ye then were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is.

There is nothing in these verses and their contexts to suggest that anything else than the individual Christian life is in mind. It is perhaps significant that this terminology never appears in those epistles in which Paul uses the language of justification, and that conversely the language of justification is absent from Colossians and Ephesians. This suggests, not that 'to be risen with Christ' means exactly the same as 'to be justified', but that it replaces the latter as a description of the Christian's present situation. Common to both is the close association with 'faith' (cf. Eph. 2.5, 8, Col. 2.12), and both are individually applied. Most important, 'being risen with Christ' does not refer to the resurrection *of the body*.

In the second group of texts we are concerned with the future, the final consummation. They deal quite explicitly with the bodily resurrection at the Last Day, and there is not the slightest suggestion that this bodily resurrection has already begun in the present life.

We move on to Paul's use of the word 'body' (σῶμα), and here we are at once confronted with the idea of 'corporate solidarity'. Dr J. A. T. Robinson (op. cit., pp. 26-33) has shown that man, as σῶμα, is man in his external appearance and relationships, man in the world and bound to the rest of creation, and yet man himself as person:

> σῶμα stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God. (p. 31)

But it must be remembered that σῶμα means all this in still meaning 'the human body'. Whatever is implied of man by Paul's using the word σῶμα is implied, that is, of man *in his present bodily state*. The statement (Robinson, op. cit., p. 28) that:

> σῶμα . . . does not mean something external to a man himself, something he *has*. It is something he *is*. Indeed, σῶμα is the nearest equivalent to our word 'personality',

needs some qualification. *Σῶμα* is something man is *in his present bodily life*, personality *in embodied form*. There is no suggestion that man is so completely identified with *σῶμα* that he cannot exist at all apart from the body. It is possible for Paul to be 'absent in body but present in spirit' (1 Cor. 5.3), and that a religious experience might be enjoyed 'out of the body' as well as 'in the body' (i.e., without depending upon being mediated through the bodily character of life at all—2 Cor. 12.2). It is even possible for there to be life in a state 'absent from the body' (2 Cor. 5.8). That man on earth is 'body' does not mean that he is utterly incapable of life elsewhere in some other, non-bodily state. So it is in this present earthly life that man lives in corporate solidarity with his fellows; it is as *σῶμα* that he is inescapably bound up with 'Adam' and therefore subject to death.

This brings us to another important fact about the body: it is mortal in its present form. The word 'body' does not *in itself* imply mortality, but to be *σῶμα* means *on earth* to be *σάρξ* also, to be involved in the solidarity of weakness, sin and death which is the common lot of all mankind. The only body possible to men on earth is the 'mortal body' (Rom. 6.12, 8.11, 2 Cor. 4.10, 11; cf. Rom. 7.24). In Rom. 8.10, 11 Paul says of Christians:

> And if Christ is in you, the body is dead (*νεκρόν*) because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken your mortal (*θνητά*) bodies also through the Spirit who dwells in you.

Here *νεκρός* must be equivalent to *θνητός*: 'subject to death'. The Christian as *σῶμα* must die because of his corporate involvement in sinful humanity; but as spirit he is destined for life; moreover the indwelling Holy Spirit will also quicken his mortal body. We notice (*a*) the body is mortal; (*b*) a distinction is made between 'body' and 'spirit'—life consists in the latter, not the former, by virtue of the indwelling Spirit; (*c*) the body can be quickened—there is the possibility of a body which is not mortal. This verse summarises what we have said about 'the body'; the body is mortal and can become immortal only by one of two means: either by first dying and then being

subsequently raised at the Parousia, or by 'putting on' immortality at the Parousia, should that event precede death. As it is, a 'natural' body, it is subject to death; only as it will be, a 'spiritual' body, can it be immortal. That is to say, the only corporate solidarity of man in this life is a solidarity which is subject to dissolution.

But what of the phrase, 'the Body of Christ'? In the Pauline writings σῶμα has also reference to a corporate unity of a different kind from that above. The body is a corporate unity *within itself*:

> . . . the body is one, and has many members, and all the members of the body, though they are many, are a single body. (1 Cor. 12.13)

This is not man in the solidarity of creation, bound to others; it is man in the unity of his own being, one man composed of many constituent parts. 'So also is Christ': when Paul speaks of the Body of Christ it is this corporate unity *within* the Body of which he speaks, the fact that individual Christians together form a single unified organism. His use of the term is directed particularly, therefore, towards the mutual relations and unity of Christians within the Church:

> Thus in calling them members of the Body Paul seeks to teach their relationship and duties, not to the world, but to one another. (E. Best, op. cit., p. 113)

This corporate solidarity of the Body of Christ is created and built up by the Spirit; but the principle of this corporateness is the same σῶμα which is the principle of solidarity 'in Adam'. It is in the solidarity of their being as σῶμα that Christians, by the action of the Holy Spirit, are together the Body of Christ; their body is therefore a temple of the Holy Spirit which is in them (1 Cor. 6.19). The indwelling of the Spirit does not, however, depend on their being σῶμα; it is not the body but the spirit which is the point of contact between man and the Spirit (Rom. 1.9, 8.4, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, Eph. 3.16, 4.23; cf. Rom. 12.2). That is to say, while the unity of Christians with one another is a corporate unity, *the unity of the Christian with his Lord is not a bodily unity at all.* Christians are said to be 'one body in Christ' (1 Cor. 10.17); they cannot be said to form 'one body *with* Christ'. 1 Cor. 6.15: 'your bodies are members of Christ',

seems at first sight to suggest that Christians do have a somatic union with Christ; but the verbal expression is dictated by the requirements of the passage, with its contrast between 'members of Christ' and 'members of a harlot'. In this very passage it is in fact made plain that while union with a harlot involves a bodily oneness: 'he that is joined to a harlot is one body (with her)'; union with the Lord is of a non-bodily kind: 'he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit' (6.16, 17). Paul could not have said 'one body' in the latter statement, although it would otherwise have been extremely appropriate.[1]

It follows that we must guard against too readily equating the phrase 'in the Body of Christ' with the phrase 'in Christ'. 'The Body of Christ' is that corporate solidarity in which they who are 'in Christ' live on earth.[2] During the present life the two go inseparably together, so that to be in Christ involves at the same time being in the Body. It is the Holy Spirit who sets a man both in Christ and in the Body of Christ; but whereas it is by virtue of his being *πνεῦμα* that he is 'in Christ', it is by virtue of his being *σῶμα* that he is simultaneously 'in the Body'.

It also follows that the Church, as a corporate organism of mortal bodies, is itself mortal, attaining immortality only at the Last Day. Thus death takes a man both from the corporate solidarity of 'Adam' and from the corporate solidarity of the Body of Christ. But not from life in Christ: that on earth he is necessarily a member of the Body does not mean that the Christian may not elsewhere exist in Christ apart from the Body. Dead Christians are most certainly 'in Christ'—they are *οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ* and *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (1 Cor. 15.18, 23)—but they are nowhere said to belong to the Body of Christ. As E. Best states (op. cit., p. 113f):

> ... there is no indication, implicit or explicit, in the passages we have discussed (i.e. *σῶμα*-passages in the earlier Pauline epistles) that either the saints at rest or the angels are members of the Body.[3]

[1] It seems to me quite unwarranted to argue (Robinson, op. cit., p. 52) that the use of the word *κολλᾶσθαι* in 1 Cor. 6.17 implies that the union of the Christian with his Lord is a 'physical' one, simply because the same word is used of sexual union. What of Rom. 12.9? The verb is chosen because it is appropriate to both sexual and spiritual union.

[2] That is, we must distinguish between 'inclusive personality' (which the phrase 'in Christ' ascribes by inference to the Lord) and 'corporate solidarity'. The two are by no means identical.

[3] Surprisingly, Best nevertheless assumes, without any real evidence, that the dead are members of the Body (op. cit., p. 114).

The same is true of the later epistles also.

We should now be able to see the way in which 'putting on Christ', 'putting on the new man', and 'being risen with Christ' are related to 'putting on the dwelling from heaven' and 'being raised a spiritual body'. During this present life, the Christian is both πνεῦμα (in a direct relationship with God in Christ) and σῶμα (in a corporate relationship with all other Christians). Initiation into the Christian life is correspondingly by faith and by baptism, and the Christian life itself is at once life 'in Christ' and life 'in the Body of Christ'. We may express this diagrammatically as follows:

The Christian life / man as πνεῦμα —by faith —in Christ
The Christian life \ man as σῶμα —by baptism—in the Body of Christ;

remembering that as man is both spirit and body at the same time, so his life is both in Christ and in the Body at the same time, and his entry into that life is by faith-and-baptism considered as one whole.[1] Now Gal. 3.27 says that at baptism Christians put on Christ, which means they are all sons of God in Christ, through faith; Rom. 13.14, in a passage of moral exhortation, bids them put on Christ, i.e. live as befits sons of God. Col. 3.10 says that since Christians have put on the new man they are to live in righteousness; Eph. 4.24 bids them put on the new man, i.e. live the new quality of life. Col. 2.12 says that in baptism, where they were buried with Christ, Christians were also raised with him through faith; Col. 3.1 says that if this is so, they must set their mind on the things that are above, where Christ is. Since, as we have seen, all these verses refer to the individual Christian, it is clear that 'putting on' Christ or the new man, and 'being risen with Christ' describe the individual state which corresponds to membership of the corporate Body of Christ, considered either as status or as moral character, and refer to the fact that the Christian participates by the action of the Spirit, through faith, in the 'inclusive person' of Christ. On the other hand, to put on the heavenly dwelling, to be raised a spiritual body, refer to the Christian's incorporation into the *perfected* corporate solidarity of the kingdom of God.

[1] Faith and baptism may not always coincide chronologically, of course; but they belong together as dual aspects of a single whole.

To summarise: our present clothing with Christ and our being risen with Him is that individual life in Christ which is the significant reality subsisting in and with our membership in the mortal Body of Christ; our future clothing with the heavenly dwelling and our bodily resurrection is our entry into the perfect corporate life which is the fulfilment of our individual participation in Christ. The former continues after death has dissolved the imperfect and *σάρξ*-hindered corporate solidarity with which it was associated, and issues in the latter.

It is because the Parousia must be thought of as 'the perfection of the person in its corporateness' (Hettlinger, p. 192) that there is no room in this for a clothing with the spiritual body at death, and that a period of 'nakedness' must intervene between death and the Parousia, between the natural body and the spiritual body, between the earthly Body of Christ and the perfected Body of Christ. For it is the body that is the principle of corporateness, and when the Apostle contemplates disembodiment or 'nakedness' it is not primarily of a loss of corporeality that he thinks, but of a deprivation of corporateness. The individual's communion with Christ is in no way impaired by this 'nakedness'; on the contrary, it is enhanced inasmuch as it is no longer subject to the limitations of *σῶμα*. It is the direct horizontal communion with other Christians which is interrupted, and it is this loneliness of separation from those he serves and whose fellowship is precious that Paul terms 'nakedness' and from which he draws back. To be 'at home with the Lord' will more than compensate for this, but it is the Last Day, with its 'perfection of corporateness' bestowed in the bestowal of the spiritual body, for which Paul most earnestly longs. There is obvious significance here for our understanding of the Communion of Saints; our oneness with the dead in Christ resides in the fact that both they and we are joined to the same Lord, and not in their still belonging with us in the corporate solidarity of the Church. No direct dealings with them are possible; we can reach them only through our Lord, so that the proper expression of our concern for them is prayer on their behalf. The practice of the invocation of the saints, which reverses this by seeking to reach Christ through the dead, is therefore vain and unscriptural. Likewise, while the dead in Christ can serve the living through their intercession with the

Lord with whom they are at home, they cannot approach us directly in such ways as are alleged by spiritualism.

The 'logical necessity for the postponement of the hope of a heavenly clothing until the Parousia' (cf. Hettlinger, p. 187) has not and has never had anything to do with a 'doctrine of the identity of material elements'; Paul could not abandon such a doctrine, since he was never so naïve as to hold it. The logical necessity is found in the fact that perfect fulness of life is essentially corporate and is consequently possible only within the context of a perfected new creation. A 'spiritual body' has neither a function to perform nor the possibility of performing it in isolation from a transformed creation of which it is a part. However inadequately they conceived of it, patristic and medieval theologians were not utterly wrong in trying to give expression to the hope of individual blessedness at death and at the same time regarding the soul as disembodied until the Parousia. For the full Christian hope is of something beyond individual blessedness, and includes the expectation that

> the creation itself will be set free from the bondage to corruption and obtain the liberty of the glory of the children of God. (Rom. 8.21)

They without us cannot be made perfect.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Freedom of the Will. By Austin Farrer. A. & C. Black, London, 1958, Pp. xi + 315. 28s.

Dr Farrer is never easy to read, and anyone who takes up his Gifford Lectures in the hope of finding there a clear, easily-grasped defence of libertarianism will be disappointed. This, however, is as it should be and is no criticism of the book. The debate between the advocate of freedom of the will and the determinist is too serious to be a parrot-like echoing of slogans. It is nevertheless just to say that the difficulty of the book is partly due to our being carried along to the hinterland of the mind-body problem before getting to the real problem. The first five chapters form this prologue, discussing the mind-body problem, and when in Chapter VI we come to the problem of freedom itself we wonder why he needed to go north as it were in order to go south. Of course, it is true that the problem of freedom touches on all the most vital problems of philosophy, so that the analogy of the map and the journey is not quite good enough. But at least we can say that the argument of the prologue does not seem indispensable to the argument of the book as a whole. In the case of a book so elegantly conceived and gracefully written this is a criticism. Also, the device of the running debate between the protagonists is theoretically an excellent technique for expounding a philosophical problem, but in fact it can—and does—lead to obscurity. We are then the more grateful that our author is able to express his points pithily and lucidly in the conclusions of the various chapters.

Though 'free' is a value-word, Dr Farrer rightly insists that the problem of free will is a formal problem. Freedom in general can only be defined negatively as the absence of constraint or interference. The determinist, says Dr Farrer, is in a predicament similar 'to Descartes' when he sought to exercise universal doubt. Descartes saw that nothing but an exercise of will could carry out the experiment of not believing; equally nothing but an arbitrary choice could keep up the experiment of not choosing. The determinist may still insist that explanation has the last word. But, rejoins the libertarian, even if causal explanation may overtake everything in the end, the last word lies with personal action since explanation is a personal action. The libertarian refutes the determinist's suggestion that there is no great difference between causal explanation and personal understanding. Now the determinist counters by saying that to be interpretative at all this talk of free

decision must be such as to support prediction, and if so it is inconsistent with the ground of the libertarian position. But a prediction from present or past facts will not call free will in question if it is based on previous and standing choice. Trying another line of attack, the determinist says that a moment's reflection suffices to persuade us that no one acts without motive, but the sense in which this supports his case is an open paradox. However, the most straightforward argument for determinism rests on the claim that all our voluntary behaviour is to be—as so much in fact has been—explained by special sciences in terms of uniformity; but the belief in the deterministic implications of psychology is based on a confusion of the deterministic methodology of psycho-analysis with the claim of social psychology to embrace the whole of conduct. What of responsibility then? Though legal metaphor is the form and substance of moral conscience, in its most developed, most sensitive activity, conscience leaves law clean behind. So if we set out to talk of responsibility we end by talking of valuation. The conclusion to which Dr Farrer leads us is that reasonable conduct is as such free. Finally, he brings out the relation between theism and morals by showing the contrasting shapes of its rivals—atheistic existentialism, philosophical humanism and antique naturalism. Will, the creative moment in man, raises all the questions of theistic philosophy. The relation of the creaturely to the creative will is a mystery.

Now that I have given as full an exposition of the argument as possible, (which, however unusual, seems to me the first duty of the reviewer), I shall venture some points of criticism. It seems to me particularly unfortunate that Dr Farrer's final chapter is so obscure and his treatment of the paradox of the creaturely and the creative wills so cursory. For one of the most puzzling aspects of what we call Christian morality is this: in the sense in which it is true to say that such behaviour is due to the grace that is given me it is not autonomous. Whilst we can agree with Dr Farrer that it is making things too simple if we say that the dependence of physical nature on divine activity is less mysterious than is the dependence of human life on divine activity, yet to say that our personal insight into this latter dependence is brightness compared with the fog we are in over the dependence on God of any physical substance is to ignore the problem we have mentioned. Another crucial point in his argument is that the term moral responsibility is more or less vacuous of meaning. Much of what he says here is illuminating and indisputable; but he seems to me to press his legal metaphor or parallel too far. He begins by treating conscience as an interiorisation of the law and ends by showing that moral responsibility de-legalises itself. It may be questioned, however, whether there is any

ain in speaking of conscience as the *interiorisation* of the law. True, ve do speak of it as the internal authority, but this a vastly different natter; and this very difference suggests that the legal parallel does ot really fit the case. For it fails to reveal the difference between he challengeable external authority and the unchallengeable in- ernal authority. Moreover, Dr Farrer would not deny that onscience is essentially more than prohibition. But if that is so, onscience is essentially unlike law. This book is a delight to read ecause it is a clever performance by a philosophical virtuoso, but t will probably disappoint those who expect a Gifford Lecturer to nake a greater penetration of the theological field than is achieved n Dr Farrer's final chapter.

I found the following misprints: pp. 124/3, 'of' for 'if'; 151/3, examplify' for 'exemplify'; 299/2, 'Satre's' for 'Sartre's'; 315/1, being' for 'begin'. J. Heywood Thomas

Order, Goodness, Glory. By W. A. Whitehouse. Oxford University Press, London, 1960. Pp. 83. 9s. 6d.

Dr Whitehouse's Riddell Lectures in the University of Durham carry forward the theme of his book *Christian Faith and the Scientific Attitude* (1952). He has set himself three questions about the natural world: How is it arranged? For what purposes is it reliable? Will it bring credit to anything or anybody?, and he says: ' "Order; goodness; glory": these are traditionally the aspects which men have hoped to discern in their view of nature and to discern in such fashion that the view of nature would be a religious one.' He has learnt from a critic of his earlier book that hitherto, while he has kept both eyes open, he has not brought together the two fields of vision, and he addresses himself in this book to the problem of unified binocular vision.

This book is the expression of a deep concern, is the product of considerable learning and acute insight, and is not less trustworthy because its author is severely critical of any positive results. 'All we can do', he says, 'is to try to frame questions which, however muddled, are not empty of meaning.' But the negative character of the outcome would seem to call in question the adequacy of Dr Whitehouse's own understanding of what he is attempting. He has turned away from 'the conventional effort to construct a coherent world view where scientific knowledge and religious affirmation can both be related to a natural knowledge of God'. But the bogey of 'a natural knowledge of God' has hidden from him the possibility that natural science and Christian faith may need to be related on some neutral territory, and that the prior question is: what sort of language will it be which can express the result of binocular vision?

If both the scientist and the Christian theologian would ask how their specialisms affect life in community, the way might be open for a new consideration of order in nature. It is greatly to be hoped that the author will carry forward to full fruit this important study.

H. CUNLIFFE-JONES

The Imitation of God in Christ. By E. J. TINSLEY. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 190. 21s.

No Christian would want to deny that the imitation of God in Christ formed part of the total meaning of Christian faith and life. The most valuable part of Mr Tinsley's study on this theme is the second part of his book which deals with the imitation of God in the New Testament. Here he is completely at home, and traces his theme competently and well in the Synoptics, St. John, St. Paul, 1 Peter and Hebrews, doing full justice to the variety of treatment in the material studied. Mr Tinsley is careful to insist that the imitation of which he speaks 'is possible only because of a prior act of redemption' (p. 127) and says that the imitation of Christ in St. Paul 'is not some kind of human endeavour, a striving to emulate the life of Christ. It is a part of the mysterious hidden work of the risen Christ through the Holy Spirit. It is a life lived in and through the Christian, moulding him to the shape of the Image of God which his Lord is' (p. 162).

Mr Tinsley is not so much at home in the Old Testament, and while he has interesting things to say, this part of his book seems to be more a thesis which the Old Testament must exemplify than the inevitable outcome of a full knowledge of the Old Testament.

The weakness of the book is philosophical. Mr Tinsley is given to unguarded statements and he does not hesitate to say roundly in his preface that 'it is the imitation of Christ which has always been the distinguishing characteristic of Christian Ethics, Spirituality and Worship'. The book opens with the sentence, 'Christian Spirituality has been, for some time now, a subject largely neglected by the professional theologian outside the Roman and Orthodox traditions.' There come to the mind without any searching, of books published in this country in recent years, Kenneth Kirk's *The Vision of God* (Anglican), H. H. Farmer's *The World and God* (Presbyterian), Raymond George's *Communion with God in the New Testament* (Methodist). All of these studies have a different conception of the basic element in Christian spirituality from Mr Tinsley's. It is to be hoped that, if Mr Tinsley carries out his intention to write a further book on the theme dealing with its interpretation in different periods of Church History, he will be more modest about his theme and relate it carefully to other conceptions of Christian

spirituality. But Mr Tinsley's study of his theme in the New Testament is valuable and should not be missed.

H. CUNLIFFE-JONES

Jesus Lord and Christ. By JOHN KNOX. Harper Brothers, New York, 1958. Pp. 276. $4.00.

RECENTLY with little revision Knox has brought together in this volume three earlier books: *The Man Christ Jesus* (1941), *Christ the Lord* (1945), and *On the Meaning of Christ* (1947). The appearance of these books in one volume offers opportunity for an appraisal of Knox's critical position. *The Man Christ Jesus* is an effort to show that the impression of Jesus' moral personality is the basis for the confession of Him as the Christ. This confession developed in the Church in response to its faith in Jesus and does not represent Jesus' actual conception of Himself. The 'gap' between the personality and character of Jesus Himself and the actual faith of the early Church is overcome through the way in which Jesus came to be interpreted in the life of the early community whose faith transfigured His earthly life (p. 56). *Christ the Lord* carries further Knox's analysis of the meaning of Jesus in the early Church. In the community Jesus was remembered, known still, and interpreted. Knox argues that the contribution of early Christian experience and faith is very great in the transformation of remembered facts in Jesus' career.' The essential and permanent significance of Jesus lies in the fact that He was the centre of meaning in the life of the community. The intimate relation between revelation and the community of faith is explicated in *On the Meaning of Christ.* Examining the reality with which the New Testament witness is concerned, Knox argues that it appears under three aspects: (1) as the event through which God discloses Himself; (2) as the person who was the centre of the event; (3) as the community which came into existence as part of the event which provided the locus for its culmination.

In our appraisal of Knox we shall be concerned with some of the central themes and issues which emerged out of these three volumes when taken together as a whole. Knox has already indicated that they belong together in an essential harmony. We may at the outset characterise Knox's general position as a historical and communal interpretation of Jesus Christ: the knowledge of Christ is mediated to the believer by the community of faith which is grounded in a memory historically determined.

Knox argues that a given external occasion only belongs to history if it is united with a human response; (p. 64) the event of which Jesus Christ is the centre happens to persons and among them. We

find Jesus in the Gospels as He was remembered and known by those who believed in Him. The real historical Jesus is the Jesus known in the company of those who confessed His saving significance. Knox makes much of the impression of the moral personality of Jesus. He uses the word 'impression' to remind us that Jesus comes to us through the life of the community and speaks to us only through that medium. Knox believes that glimpses of the inner life of Jesus are constantly breaking through Gospel accounts (p. 26, p. 29). This way of viewing the matter stands remarkably close to that of Ritschl and his school. Indeed, there is more than a little of Ritschlianism in Knox. Ritschl argues that the historical activity in which Jesus becomes known discloses the personality of Jesus in His identification with God's purposive, loving will and the consequent manifestation of that purpose in Jesus' own life. Knox, like Ritschl, speaks of Jesus' conception of His 'vocation' and this category is primarily moral in its connotation. Jesus devoted Himself to the exercise of His calling through His loving on men's behalf and thus disclosed the reality of the Kingdom of God. Too frequently Ritschl has been identified with the *Leben-Jesu-Bewegung*. Actually Ritschl himself insisted it is Jesus as interpreted and evaluated in the community who is normative for faith. Ritschl declares that it is vain to establish the importance of Christ by biographical expedient, for we can discover the full compass of Christ's historical actuality solely from the faith of the community (cf. especially, *Justification and Reconciliation*, volume III, E.T. 1902, pp. 1-3). Knox likewise regards as integral to the full import of Jesus the reflection of His meaning in the consciousness of those who believe in Him.

Knox believes that it is the primitive Church which identified Jesus as the Son of Man and Messiah (p. 99). The primary reason advanced by Knox against Jesus' own identification with these titles is that one cannot imagine a sane human being entertaining thoughts about Himself which the Gospels attribute to Him. (For a further development of this approach in Knox see his later book, *The Death of Christ*. Abingdon Press, 1958, pp. 71ff). One may refer to Schweitzer's *The Psychiatric Study of Jesus* for a criticism of the effort to construct a liberalised and modernised Jesus designed to harmonise with our ideals of life and conduct. As Schweitzer points out, the efforts to employ psychological criteria as a basis for interpreting Gospel history inevitably does violence to the texts and leads to the projection back into history of what belongs to our time.

Knox is willing to grant that his conclusions about the term 'Son of Man' are only probable results of historical criticism (p. 97), but he believes that the impression of Jesus' personality is really inde-

pendent of the shifting results and probabilities of historical investigation. We may compare Knox's view here with that of Wilhelm Herrmann, who in *The Communion of the Christian with God* argues that the impression of Jesus' moral personality has the power to manifest itself to the believer's conscience as an undeniable inward event which surmounts the situation of critical historiography. We find in Knox language almost identical with that of Herrmann who speaks of the fidelity of Jesus' personality which shows 'a firmness of religious conviction, and clearness of moral judgment, and a purity and strength of will'. (Cf. *The Communion of the Christian with God*, 2nd English ed. 1906, p. 85; and Knox, p. 26, p. 34.)

We must ask whether the New Testament has any independent interest in the moral personality of Jesus as such. The manner in which Jesus' obedience is portrayed in the Gospels has to do with the unique and active operation of God in and through Jesus' human will. Jesus' baptism, His temptations, His prediction of His passion, His agony in Gethsemane all show us the reality of His Person in a Messianic and eschatological setting; Jesus is the Beloved Son in and through whom God's Word is manifest and God's will is done. It is the *work* of Christ which is eschatological in character. By the application of criteria derived from human psychology Knox does violence to the structure of the Gospel history with its steady movement towards the crucifixion and resurrection as the climax of Christ's ministry.

Knox's whole effort raises anew the question concerning the justifiable criterion of historicity by means of which a judgment about the trustworthiness of the synoptic account of the life of Jesus may be established. The question is whether the eschatological and Messianic framework within which the ministry of Jesus is set according to the evangelists provides a basis for the understanding of an inner coherence in the various words, deeds, and events centring in Jesus, a coherence which we uncover in the texts themselves, or whether we can do little justice to the traditional context of the synoptic history and must judge between genuine and the non-genuine portions of this history on the basis of psychological criteria such as Knox proposes.

Knox's interpretation can hardly do justice to the place which the stories of the baptism and temptation of Jesus have in the Gospel history. The evangelists unfold the life-story of Jesus in order to show how it moved towards the passion and resurrection of Christ. The baptism and temptation belong together; Christ is baptised of John and at the Jordan He enters in humiliation into relationship with those acknowledged to be sinners repenting. The story of His temptation is the story of His refusal to abandon the course on which

He entered at the Jordan. Jesus lives by the will of God and it is this will which determines His action. The predictions of the passion in the latter part of the Gospel history are not accidentally or arbitrarily inserted. They are not simply a literary device of evangelists, as Knox seems to suppose. (He makes clear his agreement with Bultmann on this point in *The Death of Christ*, p. 101f.) The unfolding of the destiny of Jesus was a difficult thing for the disciples to accept and understand (cf. Mark 9.9f, 9.31f; Luke 19.34f). The anticipatory manifestations of Jesus' Messiahship encounter misunderstanding and doubt. This is the case of Peter's own confession at Caesarea Philippi. The Self-disclosure of Jesus is wrought out not in a single explanation but in the carrying out of His work to its fulfilment. The movement from concealment to the manifestation of Jesus' Messiahship means that the sequence of Jesus' words and deeds have an anticipatory and proleptic character prior to His passion and resurrection. Jesus' work may be seen as a struggle against false Messianic expectations, and this struggle becomes an essential part of the Messianic ministry and its fulfilment through obedience and suffering. Knox is in danger of supposing that the Old Testament and later Jewish traditions contained a definite Messianic concept and that the primitive community simply took over this concept from Judaism and applied it to Jesus. What the Messianic titles really imply in their application to Jesus cannot be appreciated from the titles themselves but only from their relation to Christ's own work.

Knox not only declares that Jesus did not conceive of Himself as Messiah, he believes that Jesus' significance does not at all depend upon the way Jesus thought of Himself (p. 103). His significance is focused primarily in the community's interpretation of the remembered figures: '. . . Men did more than love Jesus; they were ready to make a Christ of him' (p. 32). The words of Christ which emerged out of the spiritual experience of the community are as authentic as the words of Jesus Himself. 'Christ' tends in Knox's thought to become the title for the reception and creative interpretation of Jesus in the community. The problem which Knox's thesis really presents is that of defining the sense in which Jesus is the revelation of God. If the primitive community is the first to apprehend Jesus as the Messianic fulfilment and if this conception is projected back into the mind of Jesus by this community, then we must say that revelation is something that happens in the primitive community but not in Christ's own Person. This is the conclusion to which Knox comes; it is through the experience of Jesus as known in the Church 'that the fresh activity of God among men, which we call revelation in Christ *first occurred*' (p. 131; italics mine). This

may be seen more clearly as we turn to Knox's interpretation of the resurrection.

The New Testament itself shows that the reflection on Jesus' death depends on the acknowledgment of His resurrection (p. 119). We may say that if Jesus of Nazareth had not been known and remembered in the company of His disciples there could have been no knowledge of the resurrection, but it is also true that without the affirmation of the resurrection the disciples would not have continued to remember Jesus. The disciples were always interested in the resurrection of one particular man, Jesus of Nazareth. They did not illumine the Cross simply by the application of a general conception of the resurrection. Knox at times speaks of the resurrection as a genuine occurrence having its objective occasion (p. 242). '. . . The knowledge of the living Christ is altogether continuous, of a piece, with the memory of the human Jesus' (p. 119). Clearly Knox's point is an important one. The risen Christ is disclosed in His identity with the One whom the disciples had previously known and who had died on the Cross. Knox is helpful in showing that the community's faith in Christ's present lordship derives its content from the community's understanding of His historical activity. However, Knox tends to suggest that the post-Easter history of Jesus is really the community's history of faith rather than a history with its primary locus in the man Jesus of Nazareth who in His own initiative presents Himself to the disciples anew.

Knox argues that the category of 'event' should have primacy over the category of 'person' in Christology. The Church is not only the continuation of the event but its culmination (p. 264). '. . . It was only in the community that the meaning of the event was realised and thus it was only there that the event in the full sense occurred . . .' (p. 211). Knox says that the resurrection and the coming of the Spirit and the creation of the community may be conceived as a single element (p. 218). This leads Knox to subordinate the significance of the accounts dealing with the appearances of the risen Christ.

Schleiermacher is of primary importance for understanding this point of view. Schleiermacher declares that the picture (*Urbild*) of Jesus as the Christ originated in the community and is perpetuated in it. The community extends and prolongs the spiritual movement which had its beginning in Jesus (cf. especially Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, E.T., pp. 437, 568). It is the Spirit which illumines in the conscience of the believer the picture which brings Christ into memory. This concept of the *Urbild* plays a decisive role in Schleiermacher's Christology because by means of it he views the community as the continuation and explanation of the

spiritual impulse which flows from Jesus. It is not the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth which has risen but rather the picture of the Christ that lives on in the Church. Knox himself indicates that the resurrection is the illumination and transformation of the memory of Jesus in the community. The memory and image of Jesus as the centre of the life and meaning of the community provides the focus for the continuity of the historical-communal experience of the people of the Spirit. The resurrection becomes a name for the total effective influence of Christ through the Spirit. If Bultmann embodies one line of the theological tradition which stems from Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Herrmann, so far as the significance of the faith of the individual is concerned, Knox perpetuates this tradition where it lays emphasis on the nature of the community as the locus for revelation.

Knox's use of the category of 'event' finally leaves inadequate a certain crucial differentiation which must be made in properly distinguishing yet relating Christ and the Church. It is the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as the conclusion of His ministry and passion which signifies that the Person of Christ is determinative for the ground of the Church's existence. Knox, like Schleiermacher, has abandoned the doctrine of hypostatic union and the Christology of *assumptio carnis*; thus he has failed to distinguish between the grace of hypostatic union and the action of the Holy Spirit in incorporating us into Jesus Christ. It is the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth in His humanity which is the completion of the revelation of the mystery of Christ's Person and the guarantee of the permanence of the union between God and man. In this way the relation between Christ and the Church is *irreversible*. The giving of the Spirit is made possible by the One who has already risen. Hence the time of the Church is to be distinguished from the time of the disclosure of Christ in the resurrection, for there is no presence of the Spirit which circumvents the concrete witness to Jesus as alive after His passion. In other words, Easter is the concluding part of Christ's own history in word and deed, and this history in its wholeness, including, the ministry, death, *and* resurrection, precedes the history of the community in its dependence on this first history. Furthermore, the resurrection of Christ Himself is seen as the presupposition of the Church's mode of union with Him (Acts 4.10; Rom. 6.5, 7.4; 1 Cor. 15.23; 2 Cor. 5.15; Phil. 3.21). It is Christ's resurrection which alone makes intelligible the *eschatological* character of the Church's life in the Spirit. Christ as the first-born of Brethren, the Head of the new Israel, is the One into whom the members of the Church are incorporated. But this incorporation awaits fulfilment in the *parousia*, so that the community remains the partial and provisional representation

of the new humanity, an earnest of the inheritance to be fully possessed.

DANIEL DEEGAN

The Holy Spirit and Christian Thought. By LINDSAY DEWAR. A. R. Mowbray & Co., London, 1959. Pp. 214. 25s.

THE appearance of a new book on the Holy Spirit, long a notorious weak spot in Western theology, is always a matter of great interest, which is fully justified in this case. The author is a prominent High Church Anglican and close follower of the late Dom Gregory Dix, and he does not conceal his dislike for all Protestant theology, which he criticises along the traditional lines. Occasionally he is betrayed into making rash statements, e.g. (p. 145) that Calvin, for all his use of the term 'Mother', really regards the Church as our foster-mother 'into whose bosom God is pleased to collect His children'. *Inst.* 4.1.4 would have shown that this is not so. There were times when the reviewer pointedly felt that Canon Dewar wrote the book with one eye on opposing Karl Barth in every possible way; may not his greater asperity, compared with, say, Dix, be an unconscious tribute to the recent progress of Neo-Reformed theology in the English-speaking world? Nevertheless, the reviewer, whose theological principles are Reformed, found this a most rewarding book in many ways.

In its basic structure, the book is almost, but not quite, unexceptionable. After a thorough survey of the scriptural teaching, the writer traces the doctrine through the Patristic period up to Augustine, finding a severe declension followed by a partial recovery culminating in the last mentioned Father; then follows a severely critical account of Reformation theology, and, finally, a study of the Holy Spirit in relation to modern psychology, in which the author has long been interested. His conclusions are summarised under nine heads, but it is fair to say that he is chiefly interested in four. These are as follows.

(1) The Holy Spirit, as Third Person in the Trinity, is fully personal in the widest sense. This is a major issue in Trinitarian theology, but as Canon Dewar does not follow it up in its complexity, we must also abstain.

(2) The specifically Christian work of the Spirit is primarily in Creating the Church, and, contrary to a common view, the Spirit is essentially the Guarantor of the supremacy of the Church over the individual member. It follows that many Christian activities, such as prayer, and love in its Christian sense, which are traditionally associated with the individual, are really essentially corporate activities, and even when the individual prays and loves it should be as a member of the Body of Christ, according to the model of the

corporate prayer of the Church, and of the sacrament in which Christ's sacrificial love is dispensed to us. This is one thing that modern Protestantism has to take much more seriously, although we should wish that the author's treatment of these issues in detail were different.

(3) The giving of the Spirit is in Confirmation rather than Baptism, with the implication, explicitly drawn by Dix if not by the present author, that Churches without Episcopal confirmation do not fully possess the Holy Spirit. It is noteworthy that, while Mr Dewar criticises the Fathers before Augustine on all other points, he finds general agreement on this issue. Here he is on much more uncertain ground, and it is doubtful whether either his Scriptural or his Patristic exegesis has overthrown the position of G. W. H. Lampe, that the gift of the Spirit is associated with Baptism.

(4) The Holy Spirit has a natural operation comparable with the distinctively Christian work; *inter alia*, the operation of the Spirit in those baptised and not confirmed is of this character. This is primarily based on a questionable exegesis of the Synoptic passages on blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. This side assumes great importance in the last chapter, in which a fairly simple analogy is drawn between certain psychological phenomena and the work of the Spirit. If anyone is in doubt about what Barth condemns as *analogia entis*, this is a good example.

What are the strong points and weaknesses of this book? The strong point is that Canon Dewar has something to say, and says it well and lucidly. A merely routine book on the Spirit would have been disastrous. Even more important, he shows that the Holy Spirit is a field of positive theology, and that this positive theology is related to the whole of the rest of theology. The only doubt which the reviewer feels is whether Mr Dewar, by concentrating so pointedly on the old issues between Protestant and Anglo-Catholic theology, has actually darkened counsel. It is to be hoped that this will not nullify the book's many good points.

The weaknesses of the book are indicated by the remarkable fact that the author jumps straight from Augustine to the Reformation without the slightest reference to the intervening period, a fault traditionally characteristic of the theology he opposes. There is no worse place in theology to make this error than in the Doctrine of the Spirit. The result of this is that two most important issues are almost entirely omitted, the *Filioque*, and the whole eschatological and pneumatic enthusiast tradition whose most original representative was Joachim of Flora. It is true that the Quaker George Fox is mentioned, and castigated, but he represents this tradition in an advanced state of softening. Even though British theo-

scottish-journal-of-

logy is in general not as aware as it should be of the ramifications of enthusiasm, the omission of all reference to one of the direct ancestors of Nazism and Communism is a serious omission topically, let alone in other ways. As regards the former omission, this is not the first time that an Anglican has written about the Holy Spirit, or the Eastern Orthodox Church, without mentioning the *Filioque*; this attitude is not shared either by the Orthodox or Roman Catholic Church, both of whom regard the *Filioque* as a supremely important issue. This is a serious omission theologically, ecumenically and, once again, topically, when we remember the part played by Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia.

A re-examination of the scriptural section of the book in the light of this reveals two corresponding deficiencies. The first is in the relation of the Spirit to the Person and work of the Incarnate Christ. There is no mention of the Conception by the Holy Spirit. Even more serious, there is almost nothing about the Spirit's testimony to us of the reality of Christ's forgiveness, which He won for us at so great a price. *Nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum.* A true sense of the gravity, pervasiveness, and, above all, the mendacity of sin would kill all our appetite for natural theology or *analogia entis*. The whole of the tradition to which Canon Dewar belongs is seriously deficient in this regard, and it is a wonder that he was not alerted to this by the psychologists he so liberally quotes in the last chapter. Forgiveness is the indispensable foundation for everything else. The other thing is the work of the Spirit in the continuity and eschatological direction of the Church's work and witness, for which the decisive Scripture passage is Acts 1, as distinct from Acts 2. Incidentally, Protestant theology has an even more urgent need to study this question. Here, of course, we impinge closely on the great issues dividing Anglo-Catholic from Protestant. Of course, it must be admitted that Mr Dewar shares these deficiencies with most other present-day theology, but it would not be a great exaggeration to say that they are the most important parts of any theology of the Spirit. It is possible, and, in the opinion of the reviewer, correct, to interpret the whole of Church history since A.D. 1000 in terms of the *Filioque*, as the Greeks do. Certainly, our theology of the Spirit, and therefore our theology as a whole, will not cease to be lop-sided until we have squarely faced these issues.

J. A. B. Holland

Die politischen Voraussagen der Propheten. By E. Jenni. Zwingli Verlag, Zürich, 1956. Pp. 118.

This short study should prove to have a lasting importance and value. Its subject is the predictive element in Old Testament

prophecy. Exaggerated as it was to consider the prophets primarily as predictors of remote events, it was equally one-sided to regard their predictive function as unimportant and think of them as ethical pathfinders. Dr Jenni, however, takes as his subject not the whole subject of prediction but those examples of it which seem to lie on the plane of future historical or political events, or events in the life of a particular person. It thus does not include predictions which are 'eschatological' as he defines that word, that is, prophecies of the coming end of the present order in a general sense; nor does he include prophecies on a historical plane but of a very general kind, such as threats of 'the sword' or of 'ruin' or the like. The field of study thus comprises those predictions of future events of a historical-political kind, or those predictions which might at first sight be taken as such. It does not include the pseudo-prophecies or *vaticinia ex eventu*. The number of passages thus finally accepted for discussion is twenty-six, and the number of events to which they relate is sixteen in all. With this type of prediction it is of course possible to discover in many cases whether the events came to pass as predicted, and in what degree of agreement with the prediction; and it is one of the interests of Jenni's book that he has gathered all such information together.

In fact this material does not follow a single pattern closely, as Dr Jenni soon shows. Quite apart from the real *vaticinium ex eventu*, we have passages where a rather more general original prophecy is later particularised more closely to make it fit detailed events. In other cases what appears at first to be a detailed historical prediction will resolve itself into a use of traditional patterns of the divine intervention into history. Some predictions find their fulfilment only in part, or only in one sense but not in another. In one most instructive case (Ezek. 26.7-14, 29.17-20) the prophet adds another prediction when the first one is only partially fulfilled. In one case (Jer. 44.29) the detailed prophecy is made in order that the fulfilment of its prediction may be seen as a sign of Yahweh's power in a more general eschatological intervention.

Naturally the conclusions Dr Jenni reaches at each passage depend on the convergence of a great deal of data from literary criticism, form-criticism, oriental historical sources, and so on. There is not space to discuss all this here; suffice it to say that the material is handled very capably, especially in the short space given, and that Dr Jenni well realises that others might want to modify his conclusions, to define the terms differently, or to delimit the subject in another way. Perhaps the most important point which can be suitably taken up in this review is the observation that historical prediction belongs to the periphery of prophetic thinking, and that

many of the more exactly predictive passages come not from the prophets themselves but from the 'secondary' circles of their disciples and glossators (see p. 104f).

What Dr Jenni here says seems to me to be true, and yet I wonder if it does justice to the secondary prophetic tradition. Is this tradition, with its natural tendency to 'historicise' the rather general predictions and find a 'fulfilment' for them, not perhaps a genuine expression of what the Israelite consciousness expected from the prophets, and to some extent therefore surely of what the prophets themselves thought they were doing? The ability to see what is invisible to others, either because it is spatially remote or because it is temporally future, seems to be present in certain early pictures of prophecy. Later the law of the prophet in Deut. 18.22 assumes the fulfilment of prediction to be a recognisable mark of the true prophet, however naïvely; and this seems to be also a part in Jeremiah's attitude, for example, to the false prophets of his time. It is perhaps wrong to overemphasise, as we often do, that the words of the false prophets derive from false religious conceptions; they also are predictions which will not come true. That the later or secondary tradition made the references of the predictions more precise than the original word is true, but may have been taken for granted, even by the prophet in the making of his prediction. Thus though the historical predictions in the canonical prophets may appear to be marginal or peripheral, they may really be cases where an underlying understanding of what a prophet is is expressed, and cases therefore which help us to understand what the prophet is doing in his more 'central' task of eschatological communication.

It should at any rate be clear that the question of prediction, which has been so mistakenly used and also mistakenly evaded, is likely to reappear to engage our minds in this generation. Professor Albright has recently declared in his sweeping way that there are no *vaticinia ex eventu* in the Old Testament. If this is even approximately true, much rethinking has to be done. It can be affirmed with certainty that Dr Jenni's little book will be one of the main instruments for all who wish to participate in this rethinking.

JAMES BARR

Nèphèsh, Histoire de l'Âme dans la Révélation d'Israël, au sein des Religions Proche-Orientales. By DANIEL LYS. Presses Universitaires de France, 1959.

THIS work, published under the auspices of the Faculty of Protestant Theology of the University of Strasbourg, is a model study of its kind. Its aim is to evaluate the use of the term 'soul' throughout the Old

Testament. There, Lys shows, *nephesh* is a word used of persons, members of the People of Israel, a people living within history, moreover, a history which was evolving in the presence of God. A semantic study demands that every occurrence of the word *nephesh* be examined *in situ*. We must discover what the original author meant by his use of the word at any one point in history. Though each moment in Old Testament history represents a 'coming' of God towards the fulfilment of history in Jesus Christ, yet each of those moments is 'total' for each *nephesh* who participates in it. What then is the content of the *nephesh* to whom God reveals himself in the 'I-thou' relationship we speak of today? Is an explanation of it not bound up with the very concept of revelation itself so that the *nephesh* becomes no less than a datum of the Word uttered?

Lys at this point offers an interesting discussion both of the philosophical and of the Old Testament notion of the soul. But he is then naturally led to declare that it is not possible to separate the thought of Israel in this matter from that of Israel's neighbours, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Canaanites, the Greek world, and even that of Iran. Lys well sums up a fifty-page discussion of the influence of those nations on Israel in three succinct and useful pages.

The second part of the book offers an analysis of the use of the word *nephesh* in the Old Testament from the earliest layers of tradition until post-exilic times. One's first impression is that the detailed columns of figures are just a little bit pedantic, and that he author has learned little from J. Pedersen, A. R. Johnson, G. Pidoux, and others. But no. His careful statistics serve the very valuable end of revealing an important development of the term *nephesh* at the period of the Exile, just when it would after all be most likely for Israel to be affected by the thought of her neighbours. Passing from the primitive notion of *nephesh* as mere potentiality *of* being, that is to say, from the conception that the being exits only so long as there is a potentiality *in* him, the exilic writers now go on to utilise the word *nephesh* to designate this potentiality as a potentiality, not *of*, but *in* man, of the numinous, of the holy in him, as against what *in* him is profane. Thus the word *basar*, 'flesh', no longer means merely living substance, but that *in* which *nephesh* resides. The identification of the *nephesh* with the blood, a material element in itself, however, precludes Hebrew thought from following the lines of a manichean dualism—yet, as Lys admits, the door is now left open for speculation. How is it then that the Old Testament finally rejects any doctrine of a natural survival of the soul, and of a conception of matter as being evil in itself?

Nephesh, that is, this potentiality *in* man, declares Lys, is that by means of which man *participates* in the holy. It is no longer merely man as a total living creature before his Creator that does so; rather it is that element in man which, under certain conditions, is worthy of meeting with God. Therefore that which God now meets in the cult is no longer man, but the numinous in man, and this numinous quality surpasses mere human existence until it now serves to designate the dead just as much as it does the living. This numinous element is indeed impersonal in spite of its individuation, but the conception here set forth, especially from the book of Ezekiel, is the union of the two following ideas: (*a*) the soul is that which is the numinous or even the divine in me; and (*b*) the soul is that which makes me myself and no other.

We are almost at the point therefore of receiving the ferments of the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul, yet Hebrew thought in practice never admits them. This is because the Hebrew must insist that man exists by the grace of God alone. It seemed to him at first as if death were a rupture which marks the brutal and irremediable end of human existence, yet death is now no longer in opposition with what we know as life. There must indeed be an automatic survival, yet not in terms of Platonic thought. Before the Exile, that element in man which contributed to individuation of being was the flesh. The *nephesh* merely expressed the animation thereof; but now the criterion of individuation might be considered to be the 'soul', of which the 'flesh' may possibly be but the envelope and the prison. Would Israel ever go as far as that however?

The answer comes in the succeeding study, that of the post-exilic material. Here we find, says Lys, that the human body itself attains a dignity it was on the point of losing during the Exile. The several words used by the priestly writers for 'corpse' emphasise that it is not the 'body' at all which is laid in the grave, but the mere 'corpse'. The latter is not the 'body', since the body has no reality in its own right, since it exists only in the shape of animation. In this case the animation occurs in the form of 'flesh', and it is the latter which is the equivalent of *nephesh* if we understand *nephesh* as 'living being'. The terms *nebhelah* (withered thing) and *mappeleth* (what has fallen) could both be translated to mean 'corpse', but it so happens that they are never used to mean such in any phrase parallel to the interesting phrase which we meet in post-exilic literature, viz. a 'dead *nephesh*'. This is because these two terms express merely the negativity of the idea in the word 'corpse', and make no reference to its potentiality, despite the fact that a corpse is now considered in the priestly literature to be taboo. It was taboo simply because it still represented the *nephesh* of one who was a 'being-before-God'.

Nephesh at this period thus regains the meaning of *individual*, but now not from the angle of the vitality of the individual's potentiality, but from that of the purity (or its reverse) of his potentiality. Thus *nephesh* virtually comes to signify not so much a living individual, not even one who is living before the living God, but actually the holy or sanctified individual before the holy God.

A reviewer cannot do justice to the close-knit and well-documented argument of this book in a few sentences. Lys has given us a foundation study for all who are seeking for a true biblical doctrine of man. And such is, of course, an essential discipline for the Christian Church today, since we are now being challenged to present to the world the biblical answer to the perverted view of man that stems from the writing of Karl Marx.

GEORGE A. F. KNIGHT

The Gospel according to Saint Mark, by C. E. B. CRANFIELD. The Cambridge Greek Testament Commentary. Cambridge University Press, 1959. Pp. 480. 40s. net.

IT is now more than eighty years since there appeared the first commentary under the title *The Cambridge Bible for Schools*, to be followed shortly afterwards by *The Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges*. Both series attained a high standard of scholarship, and across the years they have stood as examples of sound exegesis and exposition. But in the meantime new problems have emerged, and particularly in the realm of biblical theology new and exciting horizons have been opening up. It has therefore been considered expedient to replace some of the earlier volumes by providing a completely fresh treatment of the material; a new and more attractive format has also been designed. The present series—now called simply *The Cambridge Greek Testament Commentary*—was launched under the direction of Professor A. M. Ramsey, who, however, had to resign this duty at the time of his appointment to the See of Durham. His place as General Editor was taken by Professor C. F. D. Moule of Cambridge, who has himself contributed the first volume of the series, on Colossians and Philemon. Readers of the *Scottish Journal of Theology* will give a specially cordial welcome to the second volume which has recently appeared, that on Saint Mark, for it comes from the pen of one to whom the Journal is already much indebted, the Rev. C. E. B. Cranfield, of the University of Durham.

Let it be said at once that here is a book which will certainly take its place alongside such standard commentaries on the earliest Gospel as those by Swete and Rawlinson and Taylor. I should in fact be inclined to classify it with what are perhaps the two out-

standing works on this Gospel in modern times, E. Lohmeyer's *Evangelium des Markus* and W. Lowrie's *Jesus according to St. Mark* (which has never been so widely known as it deserves to be). The Introduction is commendably brief, for the author has adopted the wise principle of reserving theological exposition for the appropriate points in the body of the Commentary itself. Incidentally, it is a pleasure to read a Commentary which has the courage to abjure small print and to reduce footnotes to a minimum.

Any writer on Mark today must face and come to terms with certain redoubtable problems. These concern the evangelist's treatment of his sources, the nature of these sources themselves, the chronological framework of the narrative, and the demythologising process. Cranfield argues that Mark has used and reproduced his sources with a respect and frankness and self-restraint which justify confidence in the Gospel's reliability. While recognising that the tradition at some points has been modified in the course of transmission, he repudiates the scepticism which sees the sources as legendary constructions, reflecting the apostolic Christology rather than true traditions of Jesus' words and works. On the question of the Markan framework, he shows that in the case of isolated tradition-units the evangelist may have supplied historical contexts where these were lacking, and may also have been responsible for topical groupings of certain elements in the material; but there is nothing here of the defeatist exegesis which disparages Gospel chronology as thoroughly muddled and artificial and haphazard. The pendulum has swung a long way since K. L. Schmidt's *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu*. We are surely entitled to believe that the distinct progression which can be traced through the narratives represents not any editorial manipulation but the actual course of events of Jesus' ministry. Mark has been accused of imposing an arbitrary sequence upon the incidents he narrates; but Cranfield sees clearly that the sequence belongs to and arises out of and is rooted in the events themselves. On demythologising he has this to say: 'It has of course long been recognised that the New Testament sometimes makes use of picture-language and that this picture-language should not be taken literally' (compare Calvin's comment on the description of the Son sitting at the right hand of the Father). But the Incarnation, the Cross and the Resurrection cannot be subjected to the reinterpreting process without changing Christianity into something other than itself. 'The demythologised gospel', writes Cranfield, 'is in our view, whether it proves attractive to modern man or not, an example of *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο*.'

A few of the many virtues of this Commentary may be enumer-

ated. Variant readings, grammatical points, lexicographical material are clearly and adequately set forth, without being laboured to the point of tediousness. 'A notable gift for the clamorous presentation of the obvious' was Denney's comment on a certain loquacious exegete: any reader of this book can be assured from the outset that in Cranfield's hands he is entirely safe from that kind of boredom. The style is incisive and succinct; and the exegesis, while taking account of predecessors in the field, is refreshingly independent. Many of the more extended discussions within the body of the Commentary are models of lucidity. There is no repetitiveness, steps in an argument are clearly indicated and numbered, alternative hypotheses are furnished fairly, and the whole work moves forward with a momentum and in a unity which are very impressive. Above all, this is a truly theological Commentary in the best sense of the word. Take the healing and other miracles, for example: conspicuously absent are the desupernaturalising interpretations, the laboriously ingenious but essentially dull and gratuitous 'explanations' of the element of the supernatural, which much contemporary exegesis seems compelled to employ. 'Mark's account' [of the Resurrection] 'warns against all attempts to domesticate or reduce to the measures of our mental capacity or emotional convenience the decisive intervention of God.'

This is New Testament teaching at its best. What Cranfield has done is not simply to add one more to an already somewhat daunting and ever lengthening list of Markan Commentaries, not even to take us back into the living tradition of the early Church. He has helped us to understand more deeply the meaning of the Incarnation for our existence in the modern world, and to realise more vividly the majesty and mercy of that mysterious but all-sufficient ἐξουσία which is the same yesterday, today and for ever.

JAMES S. STEWART

The Gospel of Truth. By KENDRICK GROBEL A. & C. Black, London, 1960. Pp. 206. 16s.

PROFESSOR GROBEL has rendered signal service in the writing of this book, a translation with commentary of the Gnostic Gospel of Truth discovered in Egypt in 1945-46. The Dead Sea Scrolls came into the public eye through the announcement of certain sensational 'discoveries' regarding their relation to Christian origins; the Gospel of Thomas likewise achieved notoriety because of the quite unfounded suggestion that it was 'a fifth Gospel', and possibly even the source of some of the canonical material—a claim, incidentally, made by none of its editors, and one which some of them have expressly denied; the Gospel of Truth however, although published in 1956,

has not as yet received much attention. Whatever the reason, it is not that this document is not significant. If van Unnik is right in holding that it is an early work of Valentinus, written before the elaboration of the specifically Gnostic teachings, this 'Gospel' is important as revealing a formative stage in the development of the Gnostic heresy, a period of transition from a more or less 'orthodox' Christianity into Gnosticism proper. If the first editors are correct in their more conservative opinion that it is Valentinian, without closer specification, it is important as an addition to our available resources for the study of this school of thought. And even if those scholars are right who have denied the Valentinian origin of the document, it remains important in view of the paucity of our evidence for the early centuries of Christian history, in particular for the early development of the Gnostic movement.

Unfortunately, the price of the original edition must have put it beyond the means of many, although in fact it soon sold out. More unfortunately still, the English translation there provided was the least satisfactory part of the book. Dr Grobel, however, is perhaps a little unfair in dubbing it 'a translation of a translation—the French—with little or no reference to the Coptic, made by a translator whose mother tongue obviously was not English'. This is certainly the impression often conveyed, but there are sections which seem to reflect an effort at independent rendering of the original Coptic text. However, a revised edition is in preparation, and it is to be hoped that the version there provided will prove more adequate.

Dr Grobel supplies a complete translation, including the four pages missing from the original edition but subsequently discovered with the rest of the Nag Hammadi collection in Cairo. The text is broken into short sections, and the commentary is placed on the opposite page, each note being numbered so that it is possible to read the translation with due warning of the points discussed. This is prefaced by an introduction of some twenty pages, and the book is completed by a four-page bibliography. The translation on the whole is a great improvement on that previously published, but with a text of this kind it can scarcely be called definitive. There are, for example, several passages in which a rendering must be determined by the translator's conception of the meaning of the context, and at some crucial points the key word is one which does not yet appear in Crum's Dictionary. When it is added that Coptic has no neuter, so that a pronoun may mean either 'it' or 'him', and that there are places where the antecedent is by no means clear, the difficulties of the translator may be imagined. As Grobel says, 'there are ambiguities in the Coptic . . . to which no single trans-

lation can do justice'. Once or twice the effort to match the version line by line with the original text has led to distortion of the English, but generally preference has rightly been given to considerations of English style. The notes are useful and illuminating, and the commentary burks no issues. Where he is at a loss, Dr Grobel is not afraid to say so, although he always makes a real effort to provide a solution. In general, this is a model of scholarly treatment, and although there may be differences of opinion on points of detail one could hope this example might be widely followed.

The notes which follow are written less in criticism than to supplement an already useful volume. In the introduction Grobel accepts van Unnik's identification of the author as Valentinus, but would date the document some ten years later. He does not note the objections to this identification raised for example by Haenchen (*ZKG*, 67 (1955/6), 154f) and Schenke (*Die Herkunft des so-genannten Evangelium Veritatis*, Berlin, 1958). Reference is made to Schenke's translation of the four missing pages (*TLZ*, 1958), but not to Till's transcription and translation in *Orientalia*, 28 (1959), 170ff, nor to his critique of the original edition (ibid., 27 (1958), 269ff) or his translation of the whole in *ZNW*, 50 (1959), 165ff. German translations of the documents published in Labib's photographic edition (the Gospel of Thomas, that of Philip, and the Hypostasis of the Archons) have appeared in *TLZ*, and are now collected in Leipoldt-Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften aus den Papyrus-Codices von Nag-Hamadi*, Berlin, 1960. The 'official' edition of the Gospel of Thomas, of course, was published in November 1959 (Collins, London; cf. also Grant-Freedman, *The Secret Sayings of Jesus*, London, 1960). One version of the Apocryphon of John is closely parallel to that in the Berlin Codex, published by Till in 1955 (*TU*, 60). Reference may also be made to Puech's inventory and discussion of the contents of the Nag Hammadi library in *Coptic Studies in Honor of W. E. Crum* (Boston, 1950), and to his article on Gnostic Gospels in Hennecke-Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* (1959). Van Unnik has argued (*Vig. Chr.*, x (1956), 149ff) that the Apocryphon of James is not Gnostic; he has also withdrawn his argument, based on the system of finger reckoning pre-supposed on p. 32 of the MS., for a Western origin for the Gospel of Truth (cf. Marrou in *Vig. Chr.*, xii (1958), 98ff), but Grobel still says this system 'is known only from Latin lands'. Finally, Doresse's *Les livres secrets des gnostiques d'Égypte* has recently been published in English (Hollis and Carter, London, 1960). Some of these publications must of course have appeared too late to be utilised, but others might have been noticed.

In the Bibliography, patristic authors are listed as in Migne,

although four of the Greek writers are more commonly quoted in the Berlin edition (*GCS*). A few misprints have been noted, and on p. 151, line 16 belongs to note 427, not to note 428. When all is said, however, this is a notable contribution, and it is to be hoped that it will fulfil its author's purpose.

R. McL. Wilson

Consummatum Est: Eschatology and Church in the Gospel of St. John. By Alf Corell. S.P.C.K., London. Pp. 240. 25s.

Mr Corell's book appeared originally in Swedish in 1950. He sums up his thesis as follows: '*Τετέλεσται*[1] is the key word of the Fourth Gospel, the key to the solution of its theological problem' (p. 106). I would hesitate to endorse his claim to have reached 'a new and truer understanding of the whole book' (p. 204), since the Fourth Gospel has so many aspects that no one approach can be considered normative. Nevertheless, Mr Corell has established four important points which scholars may have tended to ignore.

1. While John does not use the word *ἐκκλησία*, his theology is beyond question ecclesiological. Jesus is the King of God's ransomed people, the Messianic Shepherd of God's flock, the true Vine of Israel. He came to found a divine society whose members would be united to Him and to each other by the *ἀγάπη* through which He is united to the Father.

2. The act by which Christ created the new community was His death, as is shown by the crucial saying in 12.32, 'I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me.' The word 'all' is significant. The section 12.20-32 shows that before the mission to the Gentiles can begin the Messiah must die, for 'except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit' (v. 24).

3. It is, therefore, in accordance with John's outlook to call the Cross and Resurrection 'eschatological' events, and the Church an 'eschatological' community. On the evening of Easter Day Jesus bestows the Holy Spirit and institutes the apostolate (20.22-23); He admits believers to the eternal life of the world to come. But the Church receives only an anticipation, a prolepsis, of this life. The End is not yet. Mr Corell rightly refuses to accept Bultmann's arbitrary excision of those texts that refer to a future Parousia and a future judgment.

4. John intends to place the eschatological life of the Church in a liturgical setting. Mr Corell quotes seven passages (not quoted by Cullmann) which, he believes, reflect stereotyped 'confessions' of

[1] 'It is finished'—the cry of Jesus from the Cross (John 19.30), rendered in the Latin (Vulgate) version ('Consummatum Est').

faith. He also sees several references to Baptism and the Eucharist. On the ministry in the Fourth Gospel he justly remarks that its essence is participation in the life, death and resurrection of Christ who is the first and chief *ἀπόστολος* and *διάκονος* of God.

Of these four points, it seems to me, 1 and 2 stand firm, and Mr Corell deserves credit for having made them with force and clarity. On the third, I would only raise the question whether John's radical contrast between the Church and the world does not need to be supplemented by Paul's realisation that Christians, while they are no longer 'of' the world, are still 'in' it. The real difficulty occurs at this point, and in particular over Mr Corell's attempts to discover allusions to the sacraments. We cannot fail to see an allusion to the Eucharist in chapter 6, and we may well be inclined to see an allusion to both Eucharist and Baptism in the 'blood and water' of 19.34. But can we follow Mr Corell in his sacramentalist interpretation of such incidents as the miracle at Cana and the conversation between Jesus and the woman of Samaria? Whether we follow him or not (and there is no sure canon of exegesis here), one thing is clear. The sacramentalism of the Fourth Gospel does not depend on a speculative handling of individual texts; it depends on the fact that constitutes the Gospel's leading theme—the Incarnation. Why does John omit the institution of the Eucharist? Mr Corell asserts that he omits it because 'sacraments belong to the New Age ushered in by the death and resurrection of Jesus' (p. 77). This assertion, while true, is not the whole truth. John's omission, surely, implies that the Eucharist derives its validity, not from the words that were spoken, but from the sacramental life of the Incarnate Word who spoke them; for *this* is the life that was sacrificed on the Cross and is communicated to believers through the Paraclete. The One who said *τετέλεσται* and so released the life of the Age to Come, was the One of whom John wrote in his prologue *καὶ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο.*

H. P. Owen

The New Testament Text of St. Ambrose (Texts and Studies: Second Series, No. IV). Edited by R. W. Muncey. Cambridge, 1959. 32s. 6d.

Anyone who has done the kind of work involved in the preparation of a book such as this will have sympathy with Mr Muncey in the difficult task which he set himself in dealing with the NT text used in the writings of St. Ambrose. Even after allowing for the difficulties, some doubt must be raised as to whether Mr Muncey has presented his results successfully.

Other reviews will probably indicate that this book evidently

comes short in dealing with the actual quotation material contained in Ambrose's works. The correlation of that material to the evidence of the Greek manuscripts and other sources seems also to be somewhat inadequate.

Rather surprisingly Alford's 1894-5 edition is used for the evidence of Greek NT manuscript authorities. As a result no mention is made of the very relevant evidence of the papyri. Θ and W are casually mentioned on p. xlvi, but neither they nor Θ's relatives 565 and 700 are regularly quoted, though they also support numerous readings.

A spelling 'Cleromontanus' for the usual 'Claromontanus' is adopted without explanation for the name D of the Pauline Epistles. The established practice of using 'd' to represent the Latin of Codex Bezae is departed from without explanation in favour of various circumlocutions, but the symbol 'd' is in fact used on p. xlii alongside 'D' where both must apparently mean Codex Bezae Latin.

'Minuscule' and 'Cursive' are not treated as synonyms so that e.g. on p. xli, 1 and 1582, which are both members of fam. 1, are treated as if they were quite separate from each other. At p. lvii a MS. is described as 'Harl. 5678 (xv cent.)' but turns up again the next paragraph as '2016'.

Numerous manuscripts appear in the discussion without reference to them in the lists of material, e.g. Codex Lichfeldensis and Codex Forojuliensis. A further confusing feature of the sigla used by Mr Muncey is that roman capitals appear to do duty for various things at the same time. 'L' stands, fairly enough, for the Greek Codices 'Regius' of the Gospels and 'Angelicus' of Acts etc. (019 and 020) but it is also found standing for the Vulgate MSS., Codex Lichfeldensis and Codex Langobardus, and, in addition, for the Bodleian MS. of Ambrose's 'Expositio Euangelii Secundum Lucam' (Laudiensis 259). 'A' and 'D' are worked even harder.

No very clear picture is given of the nature of Ambrose's text. At p. lxviii nine instances are quoted for the use of 'intrare' but it is then indicated that in a third of these Ambrose does not use the word—rather a large exception! I have observed no attempt to confirm or refute the statement of Souter (*Text and Canon*, 1913 edn., p. 88; 1954 edn., p. 81)—'Ambrose . . . based his work largely on Greek sources, and perhaps partly on this account is a very unsatisfactory quoter of the Latin Bible.' It seems clear that this work will have to be used with considerable caution.

Inaccuracies, including contradictions, mis-spellings, mis-statements and duplications, appear all too frequently, both in the Introduction and in the Apparatus.

Ian A. Moir

Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron. By BONIFATIUS FISCHER, Verlag Herder, Freiburg. Vol. II *Genesis*, parts 2-4, 1952-4; Vol. XXVI *Epistulae Catholicae*, *Apocalypsis*, part 1, Jac., 1956, part 2, 1 Petr., 1958.

Die Alkuin-Bibel. By BONIFATIUS FISCHER. 1957; *Wortschatzuntersuchungen zu den lateinischen Texten der Johannesbriefe.* By WALTER THIELE. 1958. Aus der Geschichte der Lateinischen Bibel. Verlag Herder, Freiburg.

REFERRING to my review of the first two parts of this monumental edition, June 1954, I am happy to record that vol. II, Genesis, has been completed in three further instalments and that two instalments of the last NT volume have been published. The former followed one another according to plan, one each year. For the NT, however, more preliminary work was required than foreseen, and each part took two years; but there is some hope that the worst difficulties have been overcome by now. A mere glance at the published parts gives an idea about the enormous amount of conscientious and intelligent work behind this edition. However, that is not all there is to it. Pp. 527-71 contain *Nachträge und Berichtigungen* in which the present reviewer finds his observations utilised, followed by five pages of a register of sources, both MSS. and patristic authors.

Those interested in the progress of the work, the conclusion of which none of us will live to see, and in its special problems and difficulties, are referred to the Foundation's annual *Jahresbericht.* The last indicates the difficulties, not of the literal quotations, but of the brief and free allusions whose evaluation requires great experience and more than one attempt. Specialists' work like that of finding out the way in which later expositors use Tyconius' commentary on the Apocalypse is mentioned as an example. From this report we learn that the next volume to be published will be XI, Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus. It gives great pleasure to announce that here for once the Göttingen Septuagint, the Beuron Old Latin and the Rome Vulgate volumes are being prepared simultaneously and under close co-operation. It may not be widely known that the Benedictine nuns of the Abbey of Mariendonk near Kempen are preparing Latin-Greek and Greek-Latin Concordances of the *Vetus Latina.* Their work on Genesis will be completed in a year's time. The quotation slips amount now to more than half a million, additions being made to such an extent that work-students are employed to insert them. More helpers are added for the preparatory work which includes Eastern translations to be evaluated afresh.

In order to avoid delay of the instalments and too comprehensive introductions, there is a series of monographs. In the first B. Fischer reduces the almost legendary fame of Alkuin's Bible to its true size. As a technical book production, it was modest when compared with the artistic masterworks of the later school of Tours. Charlemagne's intention with it was not textual criticism, but the less ambitious one of setting right the abundance of spelling mistakes. This certainly is not the only point. It is not forgotten that the canonisation of Jerome's Gallican Psalter is due to the Alkuin Bible. There is very much paleographical information, splendidly supported by a generous selection of coloured reproductions. This monograph sets a model by its masterful combination of openness to the manifold aspects in question with a reverential sobriety.

Dr Thiele's painstaking work is of the kind well known from Dr Sanday's studies by which this branch of research was nobly initiated. We are given first the full material, and on its basis the vocabulary is analysed. It is a far cry from the eighteen-eighties, as far as 'African' and 'European' Latin is concerned. The 'Europisation' begins already in Cyprian's own writings. Change of words to avoid repetition is duly considered, and, finally, the different types of text are characterised with due restraint. Part of the monograph is an elaboration of Dr Thiele's Doctoral Thesis submitted to the Protestant Theological Faculty of Tübingen University. This contact with current university research is one of the most encouraging aspects of the work of Benedictine Beuron.

PETER KATZ

The Circle and the Ellipse. By HENRY CHADWICK. Oxford University Press (Clarendon), London, 1959. Pp. 17. 2s. 6d.

INAUGURAL lectures are not expected to be loaded with heavy metal. Their habit is to indicate the possession of learning, not to make a display of it. This Dr Chadwick does, in gratifying fashion. The original centre of the circle was Jerusalem, which even after the destruction wrought by Titus and by Hadrian did not lose its sentimental and mythical primacy. The other centre, the second focus of what becomes an ellipse, is Rome, whose rise to pre-eminence is here summarily sketched, with the paradoxical conclusion that 'if there is one man who more than any other one man may be regarded by the historian as founder of the papacy, that man is surely St. Paul'. A very pleasant lecture, which confirms one Oxonian's suspicion that Cambridge has sent us a good thing.

E. EVANS

The Blind Seer: George Matheson. By JOHN CREW TYLER. Philosophical Library, New York, 1959. Pp. xii + 175. $4.75.

GEORGE MATHESON is not an easy subject for a biography. He was a Scottish preacher of the High Romantic school; his life contained much tragedy and much personal heroism; he is known to most people for one highly emotive hymn around which a legend (largely spurious, as this author agrees) has gathered itself. The dangers of romanticism in the biography of such a man, of factual record and objective analysis slipping over into almost superstitious incense-burning, are very nearly impossible to evade.

The author of this modest but careful treatise has done well with this hazardous undertaking. His reader will not, we think, be too grievously exhausted by the continuous eulogy of the text. But the reader must be warned that, although we have reason to know that Dr Tyler (who is indefensibly called 'Rev. Tyler' on the jacket) has consulted all the available sources and has approached his work in a scholarly way, documentary references are very scarce in the book, and he is required to take his author's word for facts and even for quotations. This modern tendency to omit both references and (as here) indexes of all kinds is by no means to be unreservedly commended. Anybody who wants to go further into some point that has impressed him as interesting will have to go over the ground again or write to the author. The book is interesting enough to provoke a not inconsiderable correspondence.

When the subject is a preacher, and not only a preacher but a poet, it is more difficult to extract for certain a 'theological system' from his work than, we suspect, this author admits in his fourth chapter. The theology there described is neither conclusive enough to provide much illumination nor so expressed as to make due allowance for the large amount of selection and interpretation which the author necessarily brought to it.

But there is much else of interest. In a final section on 'O Love that wilt not let me go', the author takes pains with the unstable historical evidence, dismisses most of the romance, and—for this we must especially thank him—reprints the fifth verse of the hymn (p. 167) that Matheson wrote much later than the other four. Unaccountably the author disparages it. To this reviewer's mind it raises the whole composition from dubiousness to greatness.

Scots readers should not be unduly put off by the statement on p. 1 that Lochalsh is in 'Wester Rose'. Persevering beyond that, they especially will find much here to give substance to their memories of a saint of their ministry.

ERIK ROUTLEY

La Christologie de Saint Jean Damascène. By KEETJE ROZEMOND. Buch-Kunstverlag Ettal, 1959. Pp. 117. DM. 17.

MADAME ROZEMOND would probably admit that her work, like that of John of Damascus, contains nothing that is particularly new, but is an excellent statement, in systematic form, of facts and doctrines already known and acknowledged to be true. She has produced a valuable work, which may perhaps direct some reader or other to the writings of the Damascene himself, with their precise theological thought and expression, and their living piety and devotion to our Lord and Saviour. The first of four chapters treats in general terms of the doctrine of salvation by Christ, the second of John's elucidation of the doctrines concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation involved in the Chalcedonian definition of the faith. In the third chapter the learned authoress looks backward to the sources of this doctrine and of the forms of its expression. Chapter four, by no means the least interesting part of the book, consists largely of quotations from John's sermons and liturgical compositions, and illustrates the bearing of Chalcedonian theology on Christian devotion. Altogether a delightful piece of work. E. EVANS

The South African Liturgy. By PETER HINCHLIFF. Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 123. 21s.

THE Liturgy of the Church of the Province of South Africa is of notable interest within the liturgies of the Anglican family, and it is fortunate that the telling of its story has fallen into such competent hands as those of Professor Peter Hinchliff of Rhodes University. Much of the evidence belonging to the compilation of the Liturgy, agreed to in its final form by Synod in 1924 and again approved and fixed in 1929, has already been lost. But much of great interest and relevance has been preserved; and this by diligent and painstaking research has now been rescued and presented by Professor Hinchliff.

Systematic revision began in 1911, the year in which Dr W. H. Frere (later, Bishop of Truro) published his *Some Principles of Liturgical Reform*, and his influence at this point upon the South African bishops seems clear. Evidence of consultation at this time has not been found, but his influence upon the alternation eucharistic rite of 1919 (the first recorded instance of his advice being sought by the bishops) was 'so overwhelming as to be inexplicable unless one may assume some such prior contact'. Meanwhile, two young liturgically-minded priests, named Bazeley and Gould, living then in Grahamstown, began in 1913 to urge upon the Church a radical revision of the eucharistic rite. They were much influenced by W. C. Bishop's articles in the *Church Quarterly Review*, but they differed from his conclusions on several points. Dr Hinchliff traces

in detail these various threads of influence, and others, in the shaping of the rite; and it is fascinating to see their interaction and fusion. Then follows a careful and intricate account of the controversy upon the epiclesis, a controversy somewhat out-of-date now, but raging in the 1920's. As it has been said, 'we know now, in a way that was not realised in 1928, that the Eucharist has developed directly out of Jewish forms of thanksgiving, that the first Christians thought of consecration as effected by thanksgiving, and that the controversies between eastern and western views of consecration belong to a later, not to an earlier period' (quoted on p. 115). Thus, before their time, so to speak, the South African bishops held a theology of consecration to the effect that the whole of the eucharistic prayer was the consecratory form, and deliberately moulded their rite round this theology. Not less important was their new approach to the corporate nature of the eucharist and to the meaning of eucharistic sacrifice. Discussion of these points, and remarkable agreement upon them, are now a commonplace of ecumenical debate; it was not so thirty years ago.

This book is a valuable contribution to liturgical understanding, and it will command the attention of all interested in liturgical revision, not only among Anglicans but also among a much wider group. Dr Hinchliff is to be congratulated upon a lucid exposition of the material for his account, and upon his diligence in collecting it before it had been allowed to vanish into oblivion.

W. D. Maxwell

Anglican Liturgies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By W. Jardine Grisbrooke. Alcuin Club Collections, No. XL. S.P.C.K., London, 1958. Pp. 390. 42s.

This is a very important and most welcome contribution to liturgical study. For one thing it deals with a period, 1637 to 1764, which has recently rather lacked detailed study, and for another it gathers together twelve texts of Anglican Offices from that period, prints them and comments upon them from historical, liturgical and theological angles. The texts are those of the Scottish Liturgy of 1637, the liturgies of Jeremy Taylor, Edward Stephens, William Whiston and John Henley, the Nonjurors' liturgies of 1718 and 1734, that of Thomas Rattray, and the Scottish Liturgy of 1764. It is a very great convenience to have these texts in one cover, because, though the first and the last are readily available, most of the others are rather difficult to get. The only earlier attempt to gather them was that of Peter Hall in his *Fragmenta Liturgica* last century, but his texts were printed in separate volumes and were not very reliable. From this point of view therefore this book is very welcome.

The plan of the book is that first there is commentary on the liturgies selected for examination, this taking up nearly half the space. Then the texts themselves are given, followed by some useful bibliographical notes and finally a good index. Some may feel that a more convenient arrangement would have been to give each text by itself followed by the commentary upon it. But many more readers would have found the running headlines much more helpful if on the recto sides of the leaves the title of the text being commented on or printed had been indicated, instead of only 'commentary' or 'text' throughout on both recto and verso. This is the only criticism on the make-up of a book which is excellently produced and remarkably accurately printed.

The importance of this work lies in its study of the development of a 'distinctively Anglican liturgical type', and along with that an examination of the development of a specifically Anglican Eucharistic doctrine. And this, in view of the widespread feeling that the Communion Service of the Book of Common Prayer needs revision. There are no doubt many reasons on different sides for this feeling. Our present author takes the view that while the Book of Common Prayer service bears the impress of Cranmer and expresses his views on the Sacrament, the Church of England has long rejected his notions. It is therefore essential that there should be a form of service which will be more in accord with Anglican doctrine. Cranmer is here regarded as no more than Zwinglian in his doctrine of the Eucharist, and indeed he seems to be rather severely dealt with.

But the main purpose of the book is to examine the liturgies of the period indicated and to see how the doctrine expressed in them developed. This is done with care and skill. There is close examination not only of the liturgies themselves, but of the various writers of the times, and a valuable feature is the large amount of quotation from these writers. To take but one example, there is a detailed examination of the doctrine of John Johnson, in whom the author finds 'the eucharistic doctrines of mature High Anglicanism'. Johnson's works are extensive and difficult to read, but this study gives an excellent statement of his ideas. The Nonjurors are also closely examined, and it is interesting to note that the present author is preparing a work on the doctrines and worship of the Nonjurors. Their liturgy of 1718 'has a claim to be regarded as a primary source of all the Anglican rites descended from the Scottish Liturgy of 1764'. And of course the influence of the 1764 Rite on the American Prayer Book and other modern Anglican forms has been very considerable. And that influence will still be at work in future revisions. Hence the great importance of the liturgies of this period.

It will be seen that a tremendous amount of work has gone to the production of this volume, and it is certain to be widely read and studied by all who are concerned with the Eucharistic worship of the Church.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Christian Calendar. By NOËLE M. DENIS-BOULET. Pp. 125; *The Eastern Liturgies*. By IRÉNÉE-HENRI DALMAIS, O.P. Pp. 143. Burns and Oates, London, 1960. 8s. 6d. net each.

THESE two volumes appear in the series 'Faith and Fact Books', most of which, including the present two, are translated from the French. That on the Christian Calendar gives an excellent summary of the development, from the early importance of the lunar and solar cycles down to the present day, with its new problems. Future reforms of the Calendar are discussed, including the possibility of fixed Easter and the proposals of the World Calendar Association. There was room for a handy up-to-date study of the Calendar, and this should to a large extent supply the need.

The book on the Eastern Liturgies is also welcome and useful. After introductory chapters on the Eastern Churches and the liturgical families, the various rites—Baptism and Confirmation, the Eucharist, Confession and Absolution, Anointing of the sick, Funerals, Ordination, Marriage and the Divine Office—are described briefly and clearly. Both volumes have short bibliographies, and though Roman Catholic, both are valuable introductions and can be recommended to all who are interested in the subjects.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions, by A. C. BOUQUET. Library of Constructive Theology; Nisbet, London, 1958. Pp. x+430. 25s.

DR A. C. Bouquet's two Pelican publications, *Comparative Religion* and *The Sacred Books of the World*, introduced him beyond the restricted circle of missionaries and students of religion to the general public as a learned and lucid expositor of non-Christian religions. This book in the Library of Constructive Theology represents his attempt to relate this knowledge to the Christian Faith. In fact he tells us far more about the non-Christian systems than he does about either the Christian Faith or the relation between the two. Near the beginning he mentions that Dr Kraemer's second large study, *Religion and the Christian Faith*, appeared after he had planned and largely written this book. It is possible that a delay in his work enabling him to digest some more of the great Dutchman's reflections might have made this a more worthy contribution on this momentous subject—but it is improbable. It is improbable because

Dr Bouquet's Christian theology belongs to the obsolescent liberal type with its static and intellectualistic view of revelation. It is improbable because in spite of the writer's pastoral experience in the Anglican Church he gives little space to the consideration of the doctrine of the Church which has a massive relevance to his theme. (This again is theologically inevitable within the presuppositions just referred to.) It is symptomatic that his kindly tolerant approach seems to stop short at 'Continental scholarship', as he calls it. Thus we find him opposing Kraemer, Kittel *and* Bultmann on the problem of the Logos in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel!

The opening sentence of Chapter I is indicative of the approach. 'Let us begin by trying to look at ourselves objectively.' After this subjective and anthropocentric signpost you might expect a review of post-Cartesian philosophy but fortunately this is not attempted though I have no doubt that the author would have done it with great skill. What you do find for the next rather tedious thirty pages is a disconnected sequence of factual notes and comments on cosmology and logical analysis. He tells us that his front gate in Cambridge looks out on the University Observatory and the Solar Physics Research Station which are linked with the great name of Eddington who not so long ago tried his hand at natural theology. Certainly Dr Bouquet feels very much at home in the heritage of Cambridge philosophical theology from the Platonists to Dr F. R. Tennant. To a past generation much of this would have had some apologetic significance.

In the next great section on 'A Brief Historical Survey of Religion up to the Emergence of the Christian Movement' we see Dr Bouquet at his best and the book would be worth buying for these fifty pages alone. He takes the idea of an 'axial age' in religion from Karl Jaspers but extends the period indicated by the latter to something like 800 B.C. to A.D. 300 His work on the animism, polytheistic pluralism and magic of the pre-axial period, and especially his notes on Sir James Frazer, are most valuable. With regard to the axial age itself he gives us excellent critical summaries of the origins of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Jainism and developments and declines in Egypt, Babylonia and India. For the post-axial era he takes us to India, China and Israel. In this section he makes three interesting claims:

> 'It is only Christianity which throughout its whole course has proclaimed a sufficiently lofty ideal of spiritual perfection to lead to the correlative doctrine of the inadequacy of man to reach it unaided.'
>
> 'The contribution of the great Hebrew prophets to the thought

of the axial age is different from that of most of the others in its attitude towards the course of events.'

'. . . we notice that the development of the Christian movement out of the Hebrew Church is something which has no real parallel elsewhere.'

After a note on the diffusion of religion he outlines the rise and expansion of Christianity and tackles the problem of the Logos. He is of the view, against Bultmann, that there are strong links between the Logos of the Fourth Gospel and the second century apologists. '. . . a direct appropriation by him [the Evangelist], coming very possibly through Philo, of the current Hellinistic usage, to denote the identity of Christ with the now personalised cosmic Logos' is how he sums it up. He is rather shocked by Bultmann's idea that any philosophical thought of the Logos as controlling the rational orderliness of the cosmos is quite foreign to the Johannine literature, but his case is not convincing.

He then returns to a long consideration of Islam, Resemblances and Fundamental Differences and Indigenisation. This is his own subject once again and he moves in it with confidence and cogency.

We then get two chapters on Marxism. One keeps on saying to oneself 'Why do I have to read all this over again?' There is nothing here that we have not heard twenty times over—and with a keener analysis—from MacMurray, Berdyaev, Tillich, Niebuhr and many others. After Charles West's *Communism and the Theologians* much of these chapters seems strangely beside the point.

He then gives us a stimulating view of the modern missionary landscape—Afro-Asian emancipation, resurgent Buddhism and Hinduism, the new China and Japan, the Jews, expanding Islam and the dominance of America. Some of the descriptive material here is out of date already but I feel that many of his value-judgments will stand up well to the next decade. E.g. '. . . a great deal (only too much) of Christianity, and especially American Christianity is as unfitted to guide the future of religion in the world as the marxists of Russia and their friends are to dispose of it.'

But it is the next hundred pages which interested me most of all. In them the following scholars parade to have their papers marked so to speak in the subject of what Dr Bouquet terms 'external theological revaluation' and which he likens to the French 'théorie générale' i.e. a re-casting of the Christian attitude in the light of new knowledge about religion in general—if there be such a thing—and/or other religions:

F. D. Maurice; the authors of *Essays and Reviews* and *Lux Mundi*; Westcott; Troeltsch; Rudolf Otto; J. M. Wilson; F. R. Tennant;

W. E. Hocking; T. R. Glover; Nicol MacNicol; Przywara; Söderblom; William Temple; Althaus; Frick; Witte; Mensching; Bavinck; Heiler; van Baaren; van der Leeuw; Harold Smith; Brunner; Dewick; Kraemer; Bultmann; Tillich; Jaspers; Toynbee; Slater; Farmer and the authors of *Essays Catholic and Missionary*.

This is a magnificent *tour de force* and if it doesn't come off, who can blame him? It breaks down in three ways: (i) Lack of space. He has to select and condense ruthlessly and thus cannot always avoid distortion. (ii) As sometimes happens in H. R. Mackintosh's *Types of Modern Theology* it is not always easy to distinguish between his representation of the views of some thinkers and his comments on them. (iii) This is the most serious and fundamental—the lack of an adequate theological standpoint. I mentioned at the beginning of this review what his standpoint seems to be. In the end he fails to place 'religion' clearly in relation to Jesus Christ as Kraemer and other biblical realists seek to do. He does not distinguish between 'Christianity', 'Christendom', the 'Church' and 'Christ'. He does not seem to find any halting-place between verbal inspiration and a merging of the Bible in world literature, if I have read his strictures on Kraemer aright. He fails to tackle the problem of Revelation. His book has sent me back again to the famous chapters in Barth's *Dogmatics* I/2 on 'The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion; The Problem of Religion in Theology; Religion as Unbelief; True Religion'. Not that Barth has trite answers to Bouquet's questions but rather that Barth is aware of dimensions and questions which Bouquet does not raise but which have to be faced by a Church with the Bible on a missionary frontier.

We salute our greatest British teacher in Comparative Religion but hope that he will increasingly avail himself of the resources of modern dogmatics.

KENNETH MACKENZIE

BOOKS RECEIVED

Karl Barth: Anselm: *Fides Quaerens Intellectum.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 171. 25s.
Elsie Broadie: *The Remaking of the Nation—the Chosen Nation,* Book 4. The Religious Education Press, Wallington. Pp. 126. 6s. 6d. and 5s. 6d.
Hermann Doerries: *Constantine and Religious Liberty.* Yale University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. 134 + index. 32s..
Jacques Ellul: *The Theological Foundation of Law.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 140. 18s.
Douglas J. Elwood: *The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards.* Columbia University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. 162 + notes and indexes. 30s.
C. G. Finney: *Lectures on Revivals of Religion* (ed. W. G. McLoughlin). Harvard University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. 470. 48s.
R. M. Frye: *God, Man and Satan.* Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press. Pp. 184. 30s.
A. T. Hanson: *The Pioneer Ministry.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 171 + indexes. 21s.
G. S. Hendry: *The Westminster Confession for Today.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 253. 21s.
Hommage à Wilhelm Vischer. Causse Graille Castelnau, Montpelier. Pp. 227. NF16.50.
Joachim Jeremias: *Infant Baptism in the first four centuries.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 98. 12s. 6d.
Curt Kuhl: *The Old Testament, its origins and composition.* Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 300 + indexes. 25s.
Walther Luthi: *The Letter to the Romans, an exposition.* Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 221. 21s.
J. H. Scheepers: *Die Gees van God en die Gees van die Mens in die Ou Testament.* (Uitgeversmij J. H. Kok). N. V. Kampen. Pp. 326. f9.50.
Max Scheler: *On the Eternal in Man.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 478. 63s.
Ninian Smart: *A Dialogue of Religions.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 130. 18s.
Roy A. Stewart: *Rabbinic Theology.* Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 177 + indexes. 21s.
The New English Bible: New Testament—Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press. Library Edition 21s., Popular Edition 8s. 6d.
R. S. Wallace: *The Gospel Miracles.* Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 161. 15s.
W. C. C. Commission on Faith and Order: *One Lord, One Baptism.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 71 + appendices. 6s.

Titles of other books received are held over till June issue

Printed in Great Britain by ROBERT CUNNINGHAM AND SONS LTD., ALVA